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ABSTRACT 
 
Komponen utama dalam reformasi  ekonomi termasuk kerajaan menarik diri daripada 
sektor perusahaan dan perkhidmatan melalui penswastaan sektor-sektor tersebut. Cabaran utama 
yang dihadapi oleh kerajaan Yemen, selepas tamatnya konflik yang berakhir dengan penyatuan 
Yemen Utara dan Yemen Selatan, adalah untuk meningkatkan kembali pertumbuhan ekonomi. 
Oleh sebab kerajaan Yemen masih baru, ia masih lagi mempunyai saki-baki sistem kerajaan 
lama yang mana sektor awamnya sangat terpusat. Peraturan dan monopoli yang tidak cekap 
dalam syarikat awam menghadkan banyak aktiviti sektor swasta.                                               
   Sebagai salah satu usaha untuk memperbaiki ekonomi secara menyeluruh, kerajaan 
Yemen telah melaksanakan program penswastaan sejak awal tahun 1995 untuk menyusun 
semula sektor perusahaan agar menjadi lebih cekap, menguntungkan, dan berdaya saing. 
Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk mengenal pasti kaedah penswastaan yang sesuai, masalah dan 
halangan yang dihadapi oleh Yemen; menentukan motif dan matlamat penswastaan di Yemen; 
menilai kesan penswastaan terhadap firma-firma di Yemen dari segi keberuntungan, kecekapan 
operasi, perbelanjaan modal, output dan pekerjaan; mengenalpasti halangan utama yang 
dihadapi ketika tempoh peralihan penswastaan; dan mengenalpasti langkah-langkah 
penstrukturan utama selepas penswastaan. Walaupun terdapat peningkatan dalam beberapa 
pembolehubah ekonomi yang diguna pakai, prestasi sektor perusahaan selepas penswastaan 
masih lagi tidak banyak berubah dalam tiga syarikat yang dikaji. Tiga penunjuk pembolehubah 
keberuntungan iaitu pulangan atas jualan, pulangan atas aset, dan pulangan atas ekuiti didapati 
tidak signifikan. Penunjuk kecekapan pendapatan bersih (kecekapan operasi) juga tidak 
signifikan. Purata perbezaan antara tahun asas dan tahun ketiga selepas penswastaan bagi nisbah 
perbelanjaan modal terhadap jualan dan nisbah perbelanjaan modal terhadap aset juga 
menunjukkan tiada peningkatan yang signifikan.  Walau bagaimanapun, dari segi kecekapan 
operasi untuk jualan, jualan output dan jumlah pekerjaan menunjukkan peningkatan yang 
signifikan. Kesimpulannya, hasil dapatan kajian ini menunjukkan penswastaan di kalangan 
syarikat terpilih yang dikaji secara khususnya dan secara umumnya di Yemen tidak 
mendatangkan kejayaan. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A major component of economic reform includes the government's 
withdrawal from the production and service sectors of the economy, including 
privatization of most public sector enterprises. The main challenge that the 
government of Yemen faced after a conflict and unification period was to increase 
the economic growth at the time that government of Yemen inherited the over-
centralized public sector. Therefore, an inefficient monopoly and over regulation 
appeared in public enterprises and restricted many private sector activities. 
 
As part of comprehensive economic reforms, the Government of Yemen initiated a 
privatization program in early 1995 to restructure enterprises towards more 
efficiency, profitability, and competency. The objectives are to identify privatization 
methods, problems and obstacles that Yemen faced; to determine the motives and 
goals of privatization in Yemen; to assess how privatization affects firms‟ 
profitability, operation efficiency, capital expenditure, output, and employment; and 
to assess the major problems and constraints the target enterprises encountered at the 
time-of-handover and explore the major post-privatization restructuring measures 
adopted. In spite of the presence of some increase in the measured variables, the 
performance of these enterprises after the privatization process was not better than 
before the privatization process in the three enterprises examined. The tests of the 
three profitability variables (return on sale, return on assets, and return on equity) 
were found to be not significant. The net income efficiency (operating efficiency) 
indicator was also not significant. The mean difference between the baseline and 
three years after the follow up privatization for both the capital expenditure to sale, 
and capital expenditure to assets recorded no significant increase respectively. 
However, in terms of operating efficiency for sale, the output sale and employment 
indicators each recorded a significant increase respectively. In conclusion, the 
findings of this study demonstrate the privatization of these selected enterprises 
specifically and generally in Yemen was not successful.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction to Privatization  
 
During the 1970s, a specific transformation was observed in the economic problems. 
The focus was more on the direction of open-mindedness and the contribution of the 
private sector as a means of economic restructuring. The United Kingdom and the US 
were the trendsetters in this regard, and, subsequently, the majority of the countries 
around the world followed the road of privatization to resolve the economic issues. 
Such issues entailed properly stated documents showing bad performance and the 
inability of the public sector organizations, along with the benefits obtained from an 
accepted privatization policy as a means of making it better (Megginson, 2005). 
Currently, following the failure of the state-owned organizations in past decades the 
privatization regime can be found throughout the world (Bienen and Waterbury, 1989). 
 
The problem of privatization is among the most significant international problems. 
This problem has both economic and managerial dimensions in the current scenario in 
which all countries are experiencing an economic meltdown. This is seen in the 
condition of developing countries in the form of stagflation, and is exacerbated by the 
tendency of the first world countries to collaborate with each other together with the 
reinforcement of the economic well-being of the global agreements like the Basel 
Convention on Banking Supervision and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Both of which create international markets for trading goods from the 
developed countries and the condition of the ISO standards for developing countries to 
trade the factory-made items out of their countries to America and the European 
countries (Dayoub, 2006). 
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Keeping in mind the part played by the above-mentioned agreements in the 
progress of the global economy, it is often observed that the developing nations only 
have the role of supplying the raw materials and buying the finished goods coming in 
from the developed countries. Such a condition imposes a burden on the developing 
nations in terms of a shortfall in the budget, the accrual of external loans, slow progress 
in the imports and exports and increasing unemployment, making the conditions perfect 
for privatization to take place. In addition, some standards have been set by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund as a means to streamline the process of loan 
consistent with the principles set by the London Club and Paris Club (Dayoub, 2006). 
This also pertains to the international solutions provided to create a balance in the 
financial structures and to increase the degree of performance and effectiveness, as 
implemented in many countries, irrespective of the degree of economic progress and the 
different systems being used. Irrespective of the real progress in terms of social and 
economic aspects or the transformation of the managerial progress, the procedure of 
privatization still remains a difficult task that cannot be carried out speedily (Dayoub, 
2006). 
 
The procedure is complicated and has some economic, legal, social and political 
aspects attached to it. Moreover, the national conditions and ecological variables should 
be taken into account while chalking out a strategy for privatization and advancing 
privatization policymaking. However, it is an established fact that the international 
instances of privatization cannot be replicated in other countries so it is advisable to 
keep such instances as examples, learn from the mistakes and use them as a guideline 
for regulating and leading the privatization ventures in the years to come. 
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The following section of the research will elaborate on the definition of 
privatization, and reasons for its adoption by developing countries as part of their 
development strategies.  
 
1.2. Definition of privatization 
 
As it is in the case with many political concepts, the concept of privatization came in 
multiple meanings. Concept of privatization in general sense is refers to the increasing 
role of the private sector in economic activities represented by contributing in the 
production and investment of resources as well as reduce and minimize the role played 
by governments and public authorities played in economics.  
 
A general often indicates term for privatization is to transfer total or partial of the 
ownership from the public sector to the private sector (Beishem, 2012).  
 Also, privatization concepts comes in other meaning as “But it can also be done by 
arranging for governments to purchase goods and services from private suppliers or by 
turning over the use or financing of assets or delivery of services to private actors 
through licences, permits, franchises, leases or concession contracts, even when 
ownership remains legally in public hands There are even cases such as „build-operate-
transfer‟ contracts, where the private sector creates an asset, operates it for a certain 
length of time, and then transfers it into public ownership.” (Beishem, 2012).  
 
 Since many different authors give the definition of privatization as we can see in table 
1.1 from different perspectives, there is no clear definition or consensus on one 
definition. Therefore, different commonly accepted and used definitions of privatization 
are given in the following paragraphs.  
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Table 1.1 Definitions of Privatization  
No Author  Definition 
1 Cowan, 
1990:6;Suleiman 
and Waterbury, 
1990:4  
Transfer (sale) of public assets, including enterprise, to 
the private sector. It may be a complete or partial 
divestiture.  
2  
same 
Transition to private law legal form, as when formal 
separation from the public administration is 
accomplished.  
3  Hanke, 1978: ix)  Transfer of public production tasks to private firms ( i.g: 
contracting out) 
4  
same 
Transition of state corporations to private business 
management, in the sense of profit – oriented 
management  
5 same 
 
Extension of the margin of autonomy for the 
management of public enterprises  
6 same Debureaucratizaion in the sense of freeing formal 
provisions and administrative instructions.  
7  
same 
Decentralization ( less in the geographical sense, more in 
the general sense of delegation of authority to decide, 
plan, and act)  
8 Ramanadhan, 1991: 
232-3 
Marketization or submission of public enterprises to the 
same conditions under which private firms operate or 
marketization.  
9 Key and Silberston, 
1984:8-16) 
Promotion of competition by market process with goods 
supplied by public enterprises. 
10 Heald and Steel, 
1986: 282 
Dismantling “ natural” state monopolies by allowing 
more than one enterprises in the industry 
11 same Adaption of wages and working and employment 
conditions to those of the private sector 
12 Starr,1989 Unilateral reduction of the nature and scope of public 
services  
13  
same 
Privatization of public resources, meaning the use 
without payment of without covering costs of the 
productive forces of the SOE (e.g. free supply of know-
how created by the SOE to profit-oriented producers in 
the private sector). 
14 same Privatization of public revenue (e.g. providing incentives 
of any king to business activities)  
15  
same 
Denationalization, meaning (a) to submit domestic state 
firms to the participation of domestic public firms in the 
foreign market or (b) to permit the take-over of state 
firms by foreign capital. 
Djamhari (1997) 
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The privatization concept was illustrated by Adam Smith while discussing  
famous companies of that time, such as the Dutch East Indies Company and the British 
South Africa Company. As a new concept, privatization was defined by Adam Smith as 
an activity, function or organization transfer to the private sector from the public sector 
(Cowan, 1990).  
 
According to Starr (1988), the term privatization did not gain wide circulation in 
politics until the late 1970s and early 1980s. With the rise of conservative governments 
in Great Britain, the United States, and France, privatization has come primarily to 
mean two things: (I) any shift of activities or functions from the state to the private 
sector; and, more specifically, (2) any shift of the production of goods and services from 
public to private. The first, broader definition of privatization includes all reductions in 
the regulatory and spending activity of the state. The second, more specific definition of 
privatization excludes deregulation and spending cuts except when they result in a shift 
from public to private in the production of goods and services. 
 
Starr (1988) argued that four types of government policies can bring about such 
a shift. First, the cessation of public programs and disengagement of government from 
specific kinds of responsibilities represent an implicit form of privatization. At a less 
drastic level, the restriction of publicly produced services in volume, availability, or 
quality may lead to a shift by consumers toward privately produced and purchased 
substitutes (called "privatization by attrition" when a government lets public services 
run down). Second, privatization may take the explicit form of transfers of public assets 
to private ownership, through sale or lease of public land, infrastructure, and enterprises. 
Third, instead of directly producing some service, the government may finance private 
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services, for example, through contracting out or vouchers. Finally, privatization may 
result from the deregulation of entry into activities previously treated as public 
monopolies.These forms of privatization vary in the extent to which they move 
ownership, finance, and accountability out of the public sector. The spectrum of 
alternatives runs from total privatization (as in government disengagement from some 
policy domain) to partial privatization (as in contracting-out or vouchers) Starr (1988).  
 
 
In cases of partial privatization, the government may continue to finance but not 
to operate services, or it may continue to own but not to manage assets. Privatization 
may dilute government control and accountability without eliminating them. Where 
governments pay for privately produced services, they must continue to collect taxes. 
Privatization in this sense diminishes the operational but not the fiscal or functional 
sphere of government action. By putting the delivery of services into the hands of a 
third party, governments may divert claims and complaints to private organizations, but 
they also risk seeing those third parties become powerful claimants themselves. 
Whether this sort of partial privatization achieves any reduction in government spending 
or deficits must necessarily be a practical, empirical question Starr (1988). 
 
Savas (1987) provided another definition of privatization as any change that 
takes place over the ownership or activity of the assets that decreases the role of 
government in it and increases the role of private owners. This definition was seconded 
by Steve H. Hanks (1987) and Van de Walle (1989) who considered privatization as a 
service, control or ownership change from the public sector to the private. There are 
many other definitions of privatization based on the same concept.  
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The concept of privatization spread rapidly globally and was adopted by many 
countries. However, the reason behind this widespread adoption is still unanswered. In 
order to determine the answer, the advantages of privatization need to be evaluated. In 
addition, the companies involved with privatization need to understand its objectives 
and the motives behind its adoption.  
 
Djamhari (1997) stated that privatization needs to be established on reasonable 
motives and objectives that all the concerned parties clearly understand, instead of 
treating it as a dogma, which is not always the motive. This statement presents the need 
to explore the reasons behind the privatization decisions, as Djamhari (1997) proposed 
that understanding the motives behind privatization can add valuable insight for the 
privatization of SOEs, the objectives to be followed, the adoption of methods and the 
expectation of the results.  
 
There are many reasons for opting for the policy of privatization, such as the 
potential benefits that may come as part of the policy as well as the macroeconomic 
reform package that it offers along with other stimulating components for a country‟s 
economy in the form of improved products and services, investment, increase in capital 
or access to foreign markets. According to Kikeri et al. (1992), privatization is 
considered as a strong policy that can bring more improvements compared to the SOEs, 
such as removing excess labor and thus increasing economic competition. The authors 
also cite that the reason governments pursue privatization is because of international 
lending and/or international agency persuasion or pressure, which, if the governments 
follow, may allow them to increase the international funding or get new loans (Leeds, 
1991).  
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In addition, Poole (1988) provides another reason for opting for privatization in 
that the governments become too big to handle the activities, which leads to 
bureaucracy and lowers the efficiency. In evidence, Poole provided the example of 
England and the USA in which because of the tax revolt in various USA States, the 
need for privatization occurred to deliver the needs of people at less cost. The reason 
given for privatization in England was the increasing costs of the Government, which 
after the adoption of the privatization concept were seen to decrease. Thus, Poole 
viewed privatization as a means of lowering the costs as well as increasing economic 
efficiency, which is the main difference between public sector motivation and private 
sector motivation not just in theory but also in practice, as evident from different 
countries including the USA, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Canada, England, Malaysia, 
France and so on (Poole, 1988).  
 
Kikeri and Shirley  come to result that the ownership of an enterprise is a vital 
component in the activity of the enterprise in the developed and developing countries. 
The SOE‟s experience of the profitable activities is difficult to achieve because of the 
political interference, financial crisis and SOE‟s high budget, which caused these 
countries to adopt privatization as part of their solution (Kikeri et al., July 1992).  
 
According to the study of the Development Research and Policy Analysis Division 
(2001), there are many reasons that encouraged governments but restricted SOEs to 
choose privatization. First, the enterprises operating under the privatization flag will 
ultimately cause an increase in the social welfare status of the country. Second, the 
SOEs financial problem can be resolved. Third, the crisis of the 1980s was a major 
concern globally, which led to the opting for privatization. In addition, another reason 
for the adoption of privatization is given as the pressure by the World Bank and IMF on 
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the developing countries to improve their political and technological situation, 
especially in the socialist communities. Lastly, the ideological perspective of 
privatization on which it operates is assumed to enhance the efficiency compared to 
SOEs. In a study conducted by Arin and Ulubasoglu (2005), they stated, with evidence 
from Turkey, that the concurrence of the evolution of privatization and its growth 
provide major reasons behind the adoption of privatization, such as growth in jobs, 
economic efficiency and so on. Even though many reasons are given for the adoption of 
privatization in various countries, there is a consensus among all of them regarding the 
efficiency of privatization to resolve the economic problems faced by them.  
 
1.3. Privatization in developing countries 
 
Privatization has proved to be an important component of the state policies in the 
developing nations since the 1980s. By means of these privatization schemes, the state 
intends to increase the performance of the SOE sector, reduce the financial load on the 
SOEs and to make the capital markets dynamic. Depending on the particular targets set 
by the state, the privatization procedure has adopted various forms, differing from one 
country to the other. Although the case of every country is different, some of the 
common features that are present in all privatization schemes include ways of 
privatization and the prevalence of incomplete divestiture and slow or declining sales. 
Various other characteristics of the privatization schemes in third world countries 
include the restrictions with regard to the ethnic balance and the state of the capital 
markets. Each of these factors alters the process of privatization in a specific manner.  
The perceived sequence in the privatization schemes of the third world countries will be 
discussed next. 
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1.3.1. Preparation of privatization 
 
Initially, there appears to be a prevalence of incomplete privatization. Undeniably, some 
countries (like Mexico and Chile) carried out a complete privatization scheme on a 
wider scale. The other prominent features of privatization, either complete or 
incomplete, is that it took place in most of the countries having slow or declining sales 
in the cases where consecutive stakes of the state ownership are put on sale. Two 
propositions were developed by Perotti and Guney (1993) to describe these slow sales: 
(1) A restricted capability of the capital market 
(2) A tactic for maintaining the reputation of the government, which is selling an 
enterprise wherein there is a readiness to preserve a marginal stake and to tolerate the 
remaining risk.  
 
They regard that their casual assessment of the evidence seems better than the next 
explanation. Perotti (1995) built a model according to which privatization sales must be 
slow (while acquiring quick control transfer) in order to take full advantage of the 
shareholders‟ trust on the state policy risk. It is claimed by Jones, Megginson et al. 
(1999), that privatization will be carried out in phases if the first obvious worth of SOE, 
depending on its previous performance, is less as compared to its intrinsic worth. 
 
1.3.2. What method should be adopted 
 
When talking about the ways to carry out privatization, they are generally decided by 
the goals of the state and the specific requirement of the country. 
Privatization has been carried out in various methods by different countries. For 
example, Chile, South Korea and Singapore achieved it through making dealings and 
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sales of their shares to the public so that they acquire a wider range of their ownership. 
However, in the case of countries like Malaysia, the privatization of investors is gained 
through the properties and shares of SOEs being sold to them. This results in the 
production of various forms of ownership structure. 
 
Sader (1993) highlighted the great increment in the value of direct sales by 58% 
and 80% in terms of the transactions made. This result was observed between 1988 and 
1993 due to the high rate of privatization going on at that time. As an example, this 
direct sales‟ trend is highly observed in sub-Saharan Africa, which is their major means 
of privatization. This trend in this area showed the following outcomes: 
 Less worth of assets and properties 
 Local capital market remained underdeveloped 
 Downsizing and closing of organization and sold assets resulting in a 
high rate of privatization. 
 
However, in some circumstances the joint venture of private sales and public offerings 
are observed. For example, Latin America and Turkey offer their shares, to be sold, to 
both main investors and public. Similarly, Bumiputras in Malaysia perform these sales 
to public along with social groups. Another trend is seen among African governments 
who enhance the performance of their SOEs through privatizing their management 
rather than spreading their ownership. Several African government do so by privatizing 
contracts, leases and concessions of their organization. This contracts‟ privatization is 
mostly popular in Africa and the hotel industry, as depicted by the World Bank (1995). 
Concisely, it is observed that different and a wide-range of types of privatization are 
adopted by various governments. 
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1.3.3. What should be privatized? 
 
Galal et al. (1994) argue on the sales of assets or market shares and rather imposed on 
the sales of competitive enterprises. According to them, competitive enterprises are of 
less importance and small compared to domestic sales or imports. By doing so, the 
following two factors can be avoided: 
1. Sales of those enterprises cannot exploit the market power. 
2. There will be no difficulties regarding post divestiture regulation. 
 
Competitive bidding is viable because, as compared to the factor market, they 
are small. In addition, the problems of setting the prices and dialogues can be 
circumvented. Frequent alterations in performance are also likely because of their 
absolute small size.  
 
Most of the developing countries, except Chile and South-East Asian counties executed 
these policies at the start of their privatization process. Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore 
considered ports, utilities, airlines, etc., to be privatized at first. Public utilities and other 
public services, in many other countries, have been categorized in the strategic category. 
As a result, their strategic enterprises have either been not included in the privatization 
programs (as in Tunisia) or private investors are given permission to own shares in 
these firms while the state keeps the voting control to itself (as in Brazil). It has also 
been observed that in some countries (like in Turkey), minority shareholdings are being 
sold. These are the firms in which the government does not hold most of the shares. 
This is one method of generating more revenue while at the same time reducing the 
stake in the company.      
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Most of  governments in Africa benefit from privatization by shutting down 
enterprises that are making losses and by generating profits in the short-term. This is 
why only those enterprises and sectors that are not earning a good profit that would 
require huge downsizing are considered for privatization in Africa and why the majority 
of the countries have only privatized minimal or SOEs that are not politically 
noteworthy. SOEs that are small and medium sized in manufacturing and services are 
most likely for privatization (Tanyi, 1997).    
 
1.3.4. Capital markets development 
 
It can also be judged by the development of the capital markets in a country which 
privatization methods can be implemented, for example, in thin stock markets the 
customary public offering of shares is not practicable. Private sales of SOEs to local and 
foreign investors, in such a case, become the main method of divestiture (Berg and 
Shirley, 1987). Privatization assists in the development of capital markets, which has 
actually been seen in countries like Chile, Jamaica and South Korea. These countries, 
because of privatization, increased their number of shareholders and total market 
capitalization. For countries whose capacity to absorb is frail compared to the size of the 
privatization sales, it has also resulted in delays and new private share issues starting to 
crowd out.  In the case of developing countries that have weak capital markets and the 
application of regulations is poor, the privatization history shows that in such a case the 
sales of stock market are not a good option (Kikeri et al., July 1992).  
 
In sub-Saharan African countries, the issue of limited and nonexistent capital 
markets is big. Some of the countries have been developing their capital markets, which 
obstructs voluntary private market financing and private sector development. Factors, 
 14 
 
such as unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, the poor supervisory environment and 
the unwarranted government intrusion in the private sector activity, increases decision-
making incompetence. This is why Africa‟s private sector is so volatile, and why 
investors have less wealth, which makes them more prone to risk and so they hold 
short-term deposits instead of investing in corporate securities. They become less prone 
to risk when per capita income and investor‟s wealth increase, and then they want to 
branch out their assets (Tanyi, 1997). 
 
1.3.5. Ownership structures 
 
Privatization decisions heavily rely on ownership structures in the case of several 
developing countries. The government‟s objective for controlling groups with a strong 
economy might not be linked with the actual concentration of entrepreneurial expertise 
and domestic private capital. These economically strong groups comprise the urban elite 
class, political groups, economic dynasties and some ethnic groups consisting of Indian 
Africans and Chinese Malays.  Ethnic groups are sometimes excluded, or, at the time, 
favored for taking part in privatization by several governments. Some countries, like the 
Philippines and Mexico refrain from engaging foreign investors due to certain social 
and political reasons. This, however, deprives the countries from gaining immense 
technology, market, and new capital from foreign ownership. Therefore, in countries 
like Mexico and India, such restrictions on foreign investment have been lifted in many 
cases and only made applicable in certain firms, as in Nigeria and Jamaica. The SOEs 
that are relatively large in size and possess a large domestic capital market were 
generally allowed for foreign participation in privatization (Galal et al., 1994).  
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Recolonization has made the participation of foreign investors in Africa to be a 
crucial and sensitive issue. The governments are reluctant to deploy privatization 
policies due to the reason that privatization has already altered the dynamics of wealth. 
Privatization can worsen patronage on the basis of ethnicity, which will further lead to 
socioeconomic inequalities across the population (Dinavo, 1995). The ruling elite or 
ethnic groups who tend to be the potential buyer in newly privatized firms are the core 
factor slackening the use of privatization. For example, the economically strong yet 
politically disadvantaged religious or ethnic groups comprising of Senegalese, Indians 
and Lebanese rule the western part of Africa while Indians in East Africa form a 
disproportionate group of potential buyers (Dinavo, 1995).   
 
The workers who have gained benefit from the employee stock ownership scheme 
in Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, Portugal, Mexico, Chile, etc. form another recurrent 
participative group in the ownership structure of the majority of privatized firms. The 
research study by Galal, et al. (1994) shows that considering forced retirements and 
layoffs in divested firms, their workers are not that much worse off. In order to ensure 
support for privatization policy, foster its productivity and cater for the less favored 
with wealth and incentives, most of the governments allocate shares ranging from 5 to 
20 percent on easy credit terms and reduced prices for the employees.  
 
1.4. Privatization in MENA countries 
 
In order to improve the pace of investment within the private sector, MENA countries 
(Middle Eastern and North Africa countries) relied upon deploying privatization 
programs. However, compared to East Asia and Latin America, privatization of SOEs in 
MENA has taken place at a slow pace although the region‟s major economies were 
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provided with privatization programs since the early 1990s. This can be attributed to the 
fear of job losses and low interest involved. Moreover, the issue tends to be due to the 
inconsistent and slow implementation of reforms. MENA possessed less than a 3% 
share in the privatization transactions of developing countries during the period of 1990 
to 1998. Not only this, the region has also been left behind in catering for new projects 
relating to the private provision of infrastructure (PPI) and MENA, which only had 4% 
of all the PPI projects spread around the world by the end of 1998.  
 
Morocco, Kuwait and Egypt took drastic initiatives for deploying privatization 
in the 1990s. Their footsteps were also followed by MENA countries; however, they 
were unable to accomplish privatizations comparable to the level defined by their 
potential capabilities. The governments‟ intentions pertaining to privatization methods, 
sale conditions and types of enterprise for sale were considerably affected by the failure 
and success of these initiatives in specific countries and is becoming a burning issue for 
them (Page 2003).  
 
The majority of the Arab nationals possess valuable assets and are interested in 
investing them in Arab states as they are closer to their homes. This is a major driving 
force in making privatization programs successful in MENA States compared to other 
developing regions of the world. The assets possessed by the Arab national tend to be 
more valuable to the people outside the region. Not only this, in some countries, the 
savings of the nationals exceed their GDP as well.  The recent spike in prices of oil 
manifests private investment to be more resourceful as MENA States are engaging in 
private capital from GCC nationals.  The FDI and non-Arab investment also helps (Page 
2003). Reforms need to be much more focused and consistent and must be introduced at 
an accelerated pace for making MENA States compatible in the global economy (Mitha, 
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2007). The reduction of political and institutional barriers and deregulation can be 
instrumental in attracting private investment in MENA States and making MENA States 
more focused towards privatization (Sala and Artadi, 2003). 
 
Although current privatization initiatives are aimed at integrating private firms 
and industries in the whole economic rehabilitation process, private firms have a great 
potential for taking the progress to the next level by refining the effectiveness of the 
region and providing an ample amount of jobs in the future to ensure an augmented 
work strength. This is actually something that government agencies like MENA can 
never do.  
 
The Gulf States are largely dependent upon their oil exports; however, they have 
some of the most competitive private sectors in the world that can be quite helpful for 
other Arab countries to follow. For example, the United Arab Emirates embraced 
significant development through non-oil trade that accounted for 70 percent of GDP in 
2000 and preserves the lowest redundancy ratio in the whole region, which is about 2.3 
percent (Yousef, 2004). The primary reasons why these simulations from the Gulf 
States are not easily replicated in the other parts of the Middle East are the slow speed 
of policy designing, discouraging atmosphere for the business that undermines the 
enterprise system, governmental restrictions on investment, the complications in the 
process of conforming to guidelines, fragile execution of property rights and 
mistreatment (Yousef, 2004). Furthermore, government banks rule the financial reforms 
agenda, which, in general, supports nationalized enterprises, superior industrialized 
organizations and offshore enterprises; which, resultantly, makes it problematic for 
entrepreneurs to invest easily and secure their start-up capital (Yousef, 2004). 
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The member States of MENA are working closely towards modifying the rules 
of engagement to create an investment friendly environment to motivate more FDI 
entries. Some of the latest reforms include new or restructured investment legislation, 
incentives, such as tax and custom obligation disruptions, comfortable limitations on 
foreign possession restrictions, denationalization and capital market restructuring 
(Cornelius and Warner, 2003). Nearly every Arab State approved and designed some 
sort of reformed shape of corporate and investment law to encourage foreign investment 
in the country in 1990s.  
 
 Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait went for a change in legislation process by 
uplifting the ban and restrictions on overseas possessions (Cornelius and Warner, 2003).  
Table 1.2 IPO transactions and values in the Middle East and North Africa, 2000-2007 
(US$Million) 
Number of countries with privatization 12 
Total number of transactions 107 
Total amount (US$) 28,262 
Total 
Economy (US$ 
millions) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000 -
2007 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
3,243 666 339 2,08
4 
3,33
8 
4,15
5 
11,0
47 
3,39
0 
28,262 
Algeria 7 369 360 421 223  161 1,541 
Egypt 308 207  52 2,17
1 
7,58
2 
310 10,630 
Iran     350   350 
Iraq       1,25
0 
1,250 
Jordan 568 20 112 173 2 55 319 556 1,805 
Lebanon     236   236 
Libya       205 205 
Morocco 2,110  1,55
1 
2,61
6 
147 650 847 7,921 
Oman     852   852 
Syria  70      70 
Tunisia 230 227  247 121 2,28
2 
61 3,168 
Yemen 20     214  234 
Source: Steytler 2009        
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Qatar approved a new law in 2000 agreeing 100 percent foreign share 
proprietorship in nominated sections, such as agriculture, industry, health, education 
and tourism, which has increased from the preceding cap of 49 percent (Cornelius and 
Warner, 2003). This allowed the foreigners to own the bulk of stock in the more 
profitable sectors of the economy that will also appeal to investment that was quite 
absent in the MENA States, courtesy of these legal limitations. Other nations, like 
Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates offered quite 
handsome inducements for foreign investors, which included free-trade regions along 
with the introduction of special privileges for the overseas investors (Cornelius and 
Warner, 2003). 
 
 
 Most of these States also introduced a new version of the law that uplifted any 
previous ban on any firm from operating in there. Out of those countries, Morocco and 
Lebanon were the forerunning States with almost zero restriction on external investment 
in the country, native content, local jobs and capital deportation (Cornelius and Warner, 
2003). GCC States have some national labor requirements and land possession 
limitations to GCC residents only, but there is no local version of the law that imposes 
any restriction on capital deportation for outsiders (Cornelius and Warner 2003). Other 
than that, Tunisia and Egypt have some native legal framework necessities to given 
sectors and there are also capital return limitations; however, there is no difficulty in 
managing it. This is totally the opposite to the case of Syria as there are extremely 
compelling deportation limitations while local content and labor laws are almost absent. 
(Cornelius and Warner, 2003). 
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 In recent years, there have been extensive reforms in the stock markets in 
Morocco and by transferring its stock market; it has regained its status of being the most 
dynamic country in the Arab nation (Cornelius and Warner, 2003). Other less active 
capital and stock markets can be found in Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and GCC 
States while Syria is scheduling to have its stock market operative in 2007 (Cornelius 
and Warner, 2003). North Africa is moving ahead of the rest of the Arab States by 
executing the legal provisions concerning the creation of new financial tools, such as 
undertaking capital and private equity reserves (Cornelius and Warner, 2003).  
 
These reforms and the changed set of rules can play a vital role in not only 
developing local capital markets but will also provide an essential legal framework in 
the establishment of competitive institutions that are the need of the hour for MENA 
States. They need to strengthen such institutes to accelerate economic activity, create 
new jobs and regularize the local capital and financial market while encouraging global 
community to invest in the system, (Cornelius and Warner, 2003). 
 
The other side of the story is that from 2000-2007, the Middle Eastern and North 
African countries generated over $28.3 billion privatization capital in 12 countries 
involving 107 deals. In the regional privatization capital, Libya and Egypt grabbed 28 
and 38 percent, respectively, while Algeria and Tunisia generated, 5 and 11, percent 
correspondingly. According to table 1.2, the overall value of the region depreciated by 
70% and came down to $3.4 billion. Additionally, the transactions came down to 33 in 
2006 and 20 in 2007. The year 2007 was quite interesting as two new countries were 
inducted into the privatization; Iraq came with $1.25 billion through selling a 15-year 
telecom license and Libya with the sale of the Sahara Bank worth $205 million.   
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In the privatization game, Egypt was the forerunner in the number game by making 
48 deals. On the other hand, Tunisia and Jordan made 14 deals each in the same period 
that came under consideration. At the start of 2000-2002, the privatization activities 
went down; however, in 2006, the campaign again was kicked off to reach the level of 
$11 billion. The major contributor in whole privatization process, the Arab Republic of 
Egypt faced a serious financial setback owing to its internal problems as its value 
shrank from United States dollar $7.6 billion to just US $310 million by 2007. It was 
primarily owing to the public resistance to the program that the government had to stop 
it (Steytler, 2009). 
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CHAPTER TWO: PRIVATIZATION IN YEMEN 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mohd. Nur (2003) stated that over the last four decades, the developing countries have 
faced many economic problems due to the policy of privatization, which has been 
widely adopted by the said countries to solve the economic issues. Privatization has 
been given high importance because it is assumed that the policies of privatization cause 
improvement in the performance of the organizations.  
The topic of privatization is discussed for the improvement of the public sector and 
reforming perspective in developing countries, and, especially, in the Republic of 
Yemen, specifically, in the role of establishment and corrective action to the state.  
The structures of this chapter are; Yemeni studies of privatization, background of 
Yemen which will discuss the macroeconomic, policy of Yemen with specific to policy 
of privatization, reasons behind privatization in Yemen, privatization process, status of 
privatization process, problem statement, objective of study, scope of study, and 
limitation of study.   
 
2.2.  Yemeni studies of privatization  
 
Some studies discussed the privatization in Yemen highlighted the experience of 
developing countries compared to the experience of Yemen in the area of privatization. 
Many recent studies (al-Sayani, 1996; Ismail, 1998; Al-Saidi, 2002; Habtoor, 1997; and 
Al-Rubaie, 2001) choose and follow secondary sources in data collection and primary 
data also used.  This section will give a brief discussion of these studies.  
Dr. Mohammad Abdullah Al-Sayani from Yemen carried out a research by the 
name of "Privatization as a policy to curtail the role of the state and the transition 
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towards a market economy" in which he dealt with the problem of economic systems 
and privatization for a market economy from an economic point of view.  A separate 
section was devoted to the progress in the economy of Yemen; demonstration and 
investigation and the assessment of the state-owned organizations and the issues they 
are encountering. He came to the conclusion that there is a need to follow the process of 
privatization by means of careful and slow steps and then carry on with the evaluation 
of the conditions of the organizations that have been privatized and look for the 
dedication of the new heads of those organizations in performing the duties that have 
been decided upon (al-Sayani, 1996). 
 
  Mohamed Ahmed Sayani‟s research by the name of "Accounting evaluation of 
enterprises to be transferred to the private sector", lays emphasis on the privatization 
from the viewpoint of accounting by selecting the best manner to evaluate the assets of 
the organization, which were to undergo privatization. The research emphasized 
numerous valuable findings that are helpful in assessing the worth of the organization 
(Alsayani, 1996).  
 
 The research by Ahmed Osman Ismail by the name of "The economic impact of 
the experience of specialization in Yemen", focused on two field studies – the clean-up 
project of Al-Thawra General Hospital and the clean-up project of Sana'a. The research 
indicated the pros and cons faced after the privatization of these projects. The results 
show that progress is seen in the working of these projects followed by the privatization 
process and the unfavorable factors arising from the dismissal and demobilization of the 
work (Ismail, 1998). 
The research by Mohammed Yahya al-Saidi having the title "Administrative 
perspective of privatization and the extent of his success in the Republic of Yemen", 
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lays emphasis on the cases identified in relation to the privatization of several state-
owned tourism companies, which were privatized in Yemen. It centered on the 
supposition that effectiveness of administration and its influence on the wide-ranging 
achievement of the privatization program is closely linked. Moreover, he debated the 
part played by the Legislators in offering effective solutions for the majority of the 
issues. He came to the conclusion that the state-owned companies suffer from low 
productivity and capacity in administration along with the failure of the administration 
to accomplish the goals set for the project.  Nonetheless, according to Al-Saidi, this 
exhibits a certain visible advancement in the administration, working and service (Al-
Saidi, 2002).  
The study conducted by Dr. Saleh Bin Habtoor entitled "Managing the 
privatization process and its impact on the economies of the Arab World" emphasized 
the methods of handling privatization and the methods for applying it. He considered it 
mandatory to work hard in order to reinforce the ability of States to effectively handle 
the procedure of privatization. For this reason, an appropriate organization should be 
selected, which requires restructuring, handling of complicated business dealings, 
appropriate choice of techniques for execution, recognize partners for the private 
industries and an assessment following the process of privatization. The researcher later 
studied the instances of various Arab countries in the context of privatization and the 
impact of executing such policies. The research identified that the effect of privatization 
was quite visible on the Arab economies but differed between countries. The research 
concluded that not all the influences of privatization on Arab economies could be 
recorded as the research did not deal with all the aspects (Habtoor, 1997). 
 
A research conducted by Abdo Mohamed al-Rubaie, having the title "Privatization 
and its impact on development in developing countries (concerning reference to the 
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experience of Yemen)", debated the instances of privatization in several developing 
nations and highlighted their favorable and unfavorable instances. He came to the 
conclusion that as a result of privatization, the debt of certain developing countries (like 
Yemen and Egypt) has diminished but the debt of several developing nations is still on 
the rise. The research identified that privatization presents one of the most significant 
aspects of globalization in which multinational companies regarded privatization as a 
tool to penetrate the markets in the developing nations opening a gateway for investing 
their finances in the privatization. The research also came to the conclusion that the 
privatization rule has resulted in greater joblessness and an ever-increasing progression 
of poverty in developing countries (Al-Rubaie, 2001). 
 
The principles of capitalism socialize the open economy, which was introduced 
by privatization policies. The collapse of other economic systems and the backbone of 
this system allow completion of provision positively, which is essential in setting 
capitalism to rule the world and international financial institutions to execute as a 
system to develop and carry out the rules and tactics for capitalist countries. 
 
This study favors a broad structure to enlarge the control of multinational 
companies that becomes weak in  the features of rising countries and societies, 
traditions, customs and beliefs to succeed on a comprehensive world power and slowly 
show the way to be missing from the institutions and international organizations 
decentralized to single national authorities and local government, which is legally 
needed to choose an appropriate direction for the completion of plans in the investment 
and then manage economies of developing countries through globalization by the help 
of capitalist ideological globalization.  
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2.3. Background of Yemen 
2.3.1. Macroeconomic Review 
 
Yemen‟s successful development took place due to the unification of the country in 
1990. North Yemen or the Yemen Arab Republic operating under capitalism became a 
lower middle-income country by 1990. The Yemen Arab Republic derived a gross 
domestic product (GDP) of seven times larger, with a population almost four times the 
size and almost 50% greater GDP per capita than the People‟s Domestic Republic of 
Yemen (South Yemen). Before the unification of Yemen in 1990, the smaller and 
inferior South Yemen had its power in better health, education and gender outcomes 
due to the 23 years of socialism. The weak foundation of south Yemen before its 
unification is the main reason for some of the key problems. Legacies of the socialist 
period of South Yemen caused major issues in the claiming of lands. Comparatively, the 
northern part of Yemen suffers more from the issues in improving health and gender 
outcomes. Yemen effectively suppressed a civil war after unification in 1994, which 
was managed with the return of 800,000 Yemenis working in other countries. They also 
battled different economic upsets, such as interrupted flows of payments, unstable oil 
prices and deferral of foreign aid. Internal security problems are always a risk for 
Yemen (Al-Asaly, 2001). 
 
The high risk of internal disagreement and weak institutions caused major 
damage to Yemen, and constituted the main issues stopping Yemenis from developing 
their country. The United Kingdom Department for International Development, which 
is a vital mutual donor for Yemen, has marked Yemen as a weak State since January 
2005, even though Yemen hardly ranked above the group of low-income countries by 
the World Bank. In a list of failed States compiled by a Foreign Policy magazine, 
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Yemen ranked eighth in the overall list of 60 countries, which is identified as a weak 
State, emphasizes its issues in commencing and maintaining sound economic and social 
policies. A more selective and reforming approach has been suggested to Yemen‟s 
development partners because of this difficult working environment (Freeman, Hurlbut 
& Pereira, 2004). 
 
With major economic growth staggering and democratic institutes slowly 
finding their footing, it is clear that Yemen‟s prospects are still questionable. There is a 
promising new democratic tradition starting in the country, which involves multiple 
parties. This tradition was helped by the energetic but tightly reigned press (Yemen‟s 
press has been rated as the third worst press within the Middle East and North Africa 
region). Yemen has taken small but steady steps towards democracy by holding three 
multiparty parliamentary elements (1993, 1997 and 2003) and the first ever direct 
presidential elections in 1999. Another strong instrument for the decentralization of 
elected councils at the district and governorate level was passed as local authority law in 
2000. 
 
Up to 1984, Yemen‟s main sources of foreign exchange were worker 
remittances and foreign aid. It was after discovering oil in 1984 that Yemen‟s main 
source of foreign exchange shifted to oil and holds 90 percent of total merchandise 
exports. However, the fact of the matter is that, given Yemen‟s current rate of 
production, their oil sources will be consumed completely within eight years. In the 
same way, scarce water sources are being grossly overexploited. Yemen‟s 
demographics only serve to make the country‟s natural resources situation more dire. 
When you combine population increase (3 percent yearly) with high birth rates (six 
children per woman) and an increasing labor force contribution (particularly rural 
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women) the Yemen workforce is increasing at the annual rate of 3.8 percent. The harsh 
reality of the situation is simple; with the impending water crisis on the horizon and 
when their oil supplies finish, Yemen will not be able to support their present growth 
rate in the agriculture sector. Unless the non-oil related sectors are encouraged to grow, 
a brain drain is imminent.  
 
2.3.2.  Policy of Privatization in Yemen 
 
It was clear from the beginning, that there was an attempt to establish more liberal 
political and economic systems. The new constitution, which was rectified in 1992, 
gave way liberalizing Yemen economic and political systems. In particular, it allowed 
for establishing political parties labor unions and private enterprises. 
Article no. (5) Of the Constitution stated that as follows: 
“The political system of the Republic of Yemen is based on political and 
partisan pluralism in order to achieve a peaceful transformation of power. 
The law stipulates rules and procedures required for the formation of political 
organizations and parties, and the exercise of political activity. 
Misuse of governmental posts and public funds for special interest of a specific 
party or organization is not permitted”. 
 
As result of that, the number of political parties increases dramatically to reach 
over 40 parties. Two parliament elections were hold in 1993 and in 1997. In additional 
to that a contested presidential election and local election were preformed in 1999 and 
2000 respectively. 
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The Constitution also primates establishing social organizations and 
associations. Article (57) states that "In as much as it is not contrary to the Constitution, 
the citizens may organize themselves along political, professional and union lines. They 
have the right to form associations in scientific, cultural, social and national 
organization in a way that serves the goals of the Constitution. The state shall guarantee 
these rights, and shall take the necessary measures to enable citizens to exercise them. 
The state shall guarantee freedom for the political, trade, cultural and social 
organizations". 
 
After unification, the economy became more open. It is stated in the Permanent 
Constitution "the national economy is based on freedom of economic activity which 
benefits both the individual and society and which enhances national independence. The 
national economy should be founded on the following principles: 
a. Islamic social justice in economic relations with aims at developing and 
promoting production, achieving social integration and equilibrium, providing 
equal opportunities and promoting higher living standers in society. 
b. Lawful competition between the public, private, cooperative and mixed 
economic sectors, and realization of equal and just treatment in all sectors. 
 
c.  Protection and respect for private ownership, which cannot be confiscated 
unless necessary in the public interest, in lieu of fair consideration and in 
accordance with law." (article, 7) 
 
 
In addition, Article (10) says, "the state shall sponsor foreign trade and promote 
internal trade and investment in a way that serves the national economy. The state shall 
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issue legislation that guarantees protection for producers and consumers, availability of 
basic commodities, restriction of monopoly and shall promote, according to the law, 
private capital investment in all socio-economic development fields and in accordance 
with law".  These changes in the Constitution opened the door for privatization 
especially in the south where most of public enterprises are located. In this environment, 
the privatization process was born in Yemen. Despite of the adoption of these 
principles, the economy of the new state inherited almost all economic problems of two 
formal states as well as new economic problems of new state, which put some 
constrains on the privatization process. It has moved slowly due to several factors (Al- 
Asaly, 2001). 
 
The first factor was the high cost of unification, which caused public 
expenditure to skyrocket tremendously during the period of 1991- 1994. It reached 
amount of Y119.88 -13824 in 1995 compared to Y44.07 billions in 1991. Some of this 
expenditure represented the cost of hiring new public employment for political reasons. 
The Total public employment increased from 182915 employees in 1991 to 304171 
employees in 1994. In this environment, it did not make sense to fire public enterprises 
employees because of privatization process (Al-Asaly, 2001). 
 
In 1994, civil war interrupted which caused a complete cease of privatization 
process. Moreover, defeating of Yemen Social Party did not result in resuming 
privatization process as it was expected. The victorious rolling party, GPC, moved 
cautiously toward privatization fearing of angering the supporters of YSP The third 
factor was the distortion of new laws after, regulation and institutions during the 
unification process and followed civil war. The joint committees, which were 
responsible for drawing the new constitution, laws, and regulations, did not have much 
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time and enough authority to come up with appropriate and consistence laws and 
regulations. Therefore, they added the two formal states constitutions, laws and 
regulations into the new state constitution, laws and regulations. 
 
 
A decade after the 1990 unification, Yemen was able to reach a good annual 
GDP growth rate (near 5.2 percent) and a fair 2 percent per capita growth rate. The 
unification of Yemen (North and South) helped increase the market size. In 1994, fresh 
oil wells were made, which helped increase oil production by a staggering 80 percent. 
Thanks to a hugely successful macroeconomic stabilization and reform program, which 
was introduced in the latter half of the 1990s, subsidies were reduced, and reforms in 
the financial sector, controlled inflation, combined the exchange rate and liberalized 
trade. Within the years 1995-1998, economic growth was at its peak (World Bank, 
2002).  
 
The latter half of the 1990s also saw a significant improvement in most aspects 
of governance (four from six) and a marked reduction in internal disagreements, which 
helped bring in more domestic private investment. Foreign direct investment did not 
play a supporting role. With a traditional approach towards trading and an undersized 
manufacturing base, Yemen‟s economy focuses more on services and accounts for 
nearly 50 percent of the GDP. It was hospitality, trade and transport within the services 
sector that helped contribute to the overall growth rate. The unification of Yemen also 
helped improve the rate of flow of goods, products and people between both regions. As 
the country stabilized under the program set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the fiscal deficit for that period also began to slowly but steadily reduce. Therefore, we 
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can see that majority of the country‟s growth stemmed from private sector investment 
(Al-Asaly, 2000). 
 
After 1999, there has been a steady decline in the GDP growth rate. There have 
been many reasons why the Government has been unable to keep up its rate of reforms: 
the start of antigovernment sentiment and rebellion in many parts of the State, and 
money in from the rapid increases in oil prices post 2000. In this period, there was also 
a deterioration of good governance. A number of reform initiatives never managed to 
pick up: introduction of a general sales tax, reducing petroleum subsidies, the 1999 
privatization law was never ratified, slow implementation of civil service modernization 
and reforms in the health sector, and wavering political commitment towards judicial 
and legal reforms. 
 
 After 2000, the terms of trade were made stronger thanks to increases in the 
strong oil prices, which helped the GDP average around 4 percent. This helped change 
the trend of the past decade. Post February 2000, there was an increase in internal 
conflicts. This preceded the attack on the USS Cole in the same year and turned over the 
lowering rate of violence of the past five years. In 1999, there was a marked decline in 
private investment, which continued until it was only 10 percent of the total GDP. This 
was 50 percent of the average amount during the reform period (World Bank, 2002). 
 
2.3.3. Reasons behind privatization in Yemen 
 
A. Overview of Economic development 
All the economic infirmities of the two former States along with the new State have 
been inherited by the new State economy. For instance, the Second Gulf War and 
Unification harmed the economy. The unification cost was steeper and during the period 
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1991 to 1994 the public outflow and expenditure were relatively high, amounting to 
44.07 in 1991 and 119.88 in 1995. The direct cost of unification is evident from the 
increased budget expenditure. The cost of employing new public that were appointed 
for certain political reasons was represented by the increased budget expenditure. 
 
Moreover, the cost of military spending as well as the political promotion 
campaign also represented the cost of unification. In comparison to the direct cost, the 
indirect cost was much more. Although no exact data were available regarding the cost, 
an estimation can be made about it. According to the government‟s claim, the total cost 
of the civil war was around 12 billion Dollars. By adding the cost of human harm and 
losses to the $12 billion, we can obtain the total indirect costs, which would be much 
more. 
 
Distorted and biased new laws, rules and regulations and establishments were 
the other components of indirect costs. The joint committees, which were given the 
responsibility for the laws and regulation and unified constitution did not have enough 
time and right to make the most appropriate and unbiased laws and regulations. That is 
the reason their works were imperfect, incomplete, contradictory and contained 
ambiguity as they reunited the institutions, regulations and laws of the two former 
States. 
 
The national interest and concern was completely overlooked and it made the 
Government choose a pro Gulf States and Saudi stance because these were the States 
that hosted more than 2 million Yemeni workers. Furthermore, substantial aid and 
support as well as loans for development were also given to Yemen by the pro Saudi 
and Gulf States.  
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The Government and the IMF generally believed that the massive inequities and 
imbalances in the aggregate/cumulative accounts caused the economic decline, which 
became apparent in 1995, when the government actually looked at the economic 
condition seriously. In order to handle this serious situation, the Government as well as 
the IMF identified the remedy, which was to come up with a policy and course of action 
that would enable them to reduce the budget deficit and thus help to stabilize the 
economy. This would help to bring back the economic growth and prosperity by 
achieving the equity in accounts. This view is clearly reflected in the policies of free 
economic reform (Al-Asaly, 2000). 
 
The Government made links with the IMF as well as World Bank seeking their 
support and aid, which was due to the need for international assistance as well as 
inadequate local resources. In the negotiations, the opposing parties were not included 
and the results of the negotiations were productive in a sense that it produced 
agreements that were significant to economic reform. 
 
Being comprehensive, the reform program comprised restructuring as well as 
stabilization policies. Measures and stabilization policies were taken to cut down the 
general expenditure, raise the public revenue and redesign the budget. Limits were 
imposed by the IMF on its finances as well as on the budget deficit. According to the 
IMF, the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. Moreover, the budget deficit must 
be covered by public borrowing and not by borrowing from Yemen‟s Central Bank. In 
addition, the Government decided to reduce the direct as well as indirect transfers, as 
well as the salaries and wages. As the major revenue is earned through taxes, the 
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Government had to change the tax code and make an effort to improve the tax collection 
systems of the Tax Authority (World Bank, 2002). 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the economy‟s performance during the period, in a 
summarized manner. This figure measures the economic growth and performance as 
well as other significant macro variables. According to all economic indicators, during 
the period 1990 to 1995 Yemen‟s economy was on the verge of decline. The oil sector‟s 
growth was positive whereas the non-oil sectors faced a very low growth. Looking at 
their growth rates, the real oil GDP grew at a rate of 7% on average, whereas, on 
average, the real non-oil GDP growth rate was near to zero. The real GDP growth rate 
was 1.4% on average. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Developments in main macro indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  Al-Asaly, 2000 
 
 
 
If we look at the non-oil sector closely (Table 2.1), we will find that, mostly, the 
sectors faced either fluctuated or negative growth rates with only some of the service 
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sectors having a substantially positive growth, however, these growth rates were not 
stable. That is the reason why the economy did not witness transient shocks and 
underwent permanent, deep and long lasting structural problems, which left a bad 
impact on almost all of the economic indicators (Al-Asaly, 2000). In addition, 
investments were stagnant and there was a decline in the private per capita 
consumption. Not only the domestic savings were negative but also the national savings 
were low. 
 
 
 
After the conflict and period of unification, although the biggest challenge for 
the Government was to swiftly grow the economy, Yemen‟s government inherited an 
over centralized public sector. This resulted in the dominant, inefficient and over 
regularized public enterprises and a number of private sector activities were restricted 
(Freeman et al., 2004). 
 
Table 2.1: Macroeconomic Indicators in Yemen, 1991-2000 
Year  GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Non- oil GDP 
(%) 
Oil Value 
added 
(%) 
Inflation CPI 
(%) 
Fiscal 
balance 
(% of GDP) 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
2.0 
8.3 
4.1 
2.2 
3.2 
11.7 
4.0 
-2.3 
-5.6 
-15.4 
4.2 
42.7 
44.9 
50.6 
54.8 
71.3 
-3.5 
-11.9 
-12.8 
-14.7 
1995 
1996 
1997 
10.9 
5.9 
8.1 
9.4 
4.5 
8.2 
19.9 
13.5 
7.5 
62.5 
40.0 
4.6 
-5.2 
-0.9 
-1.5 
1998 
1999 
2000 
4.9 
3.7 
5.1 
5.4 
2.9 
4.7 
2.5 
7.8 
7.2 
11.5 
8.0 
8.5 
-7.9 
0.1 
7.9 
Source:World Bank 2002 
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The condition of Yemen‟s economy deteriorated and it was not taken seriously 
by the Government until 1995, when the government realized and made efforts to 
eliminate the problem. With the coordination between Yemen‟s Government and the 
IMF, inequities in the aggregate account were observed and they believed that only free 
economic policies could bring stability in the economy and further improve it. 
 
Negotiations took place between the Yemen Government, IMF and the World 
Bank for getting aid and support in order to enhance the economic growth. The 
negotiations were settled by signing a contract concerning economic reform. The 
particular elements included reducing the expenditure, raising the public revenue as well 
as restructuring the budget (Al-Asaly 2001). 
 
The privatization program started in 1995, in Yemen, with the help of the IMF 
and World Bank. Privatization was found to be a significant factor in economic reform 
that targeted on privatizing 70% of the State owned enterprises (SOE) employment by 
2000. However, the large ventures remained under the control of the Government 
(World Bank 2002). Although the program moved at a slow pace, by 2007, more than 
100 ventures were privatized. 
 
B. Weak Performance Of Public Sector 
Unification of the North and the South in 1990 resulted in the consolidation of systems 
that were so apart, resulting in the duplication of functions at the greater civil service. 
The end of the Gulf War meant the return of around 800,000 Yemenis from the Gulf 
who had to be absorbed into the already full Government offices. In addition, the 
economic agitation of 1990-1995 ended in a very low salary for the civil service, with 
large and not-so-well qualified personnel being in office. 
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Parallel to this, planning of the expenditure and revenue was not properly done. 
With fiscal adjustments being made as emergency measures, the need for proper 
budgeting was strongly felt. The careless cuts in different expenditure, especially in 
maintenance expenditure, alarmed the continuing of various investments (World Bank, 
2002). 
 Yemen needs to improve the quality and quantity of services in financial 
constraints and limited capacity, as there have been reports of poor service provisions. 
For example, in 1997, a FIAS report stated that local civil servants did not provide 
foreign investors with full support or protection and security of their property through 
the implication of contracts. In addition, it was also pointed out that basic services, 
including education and health, were seldom available to people. Low admission rates 
at the primary and secondary levels, low life expectancy and high infant mortality rate 
are a few to mention. Above all, about half of the population does not have access to 
Table 2.2:  Social Indicators in Yemen and Comparator Countries, 1970 and 1996 
 Yemen   Comparators countries
#
  
 1970  1996  1970                1996  
Gross Primary Enrollment(% 
of age group)   
41  53  55  72  
Gross Secondary 
Enrollment(% of age group)  
8  23  9  21  
Adult Illiteracy(% of 
population 15years and 
above)  
90  62  79  54  
Access to Safe Water( % of 
population)  
5  52  na  42  
Life Expectancy* (years)    39 54 44 49 
Infant Mortality Rate* (per  
1000 live births) 
186  98 155 106 
Source: Country Assistance Review, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, Report 
No. 19030, 1999. For (*), 1998 figures from Yemen At-A-Glance. 
(#) 
average of Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo Dem Rep, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda, Zambia. 
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clean drinking water (see Table 2.2). Durable improvement in the management of the 
public sector is needed to compete with this challenge by careful usage of the limited 
financial and human resources. 
Here, a suggestive evaluation of citizen satisfaction is another issue that points 
towards the poor delivery of basic services.  The questions were posed to various family 
units as to whether they utilized specific basic services during the previous six months, 
what was the percentage of these services made available by their Government, as well 
as whether they had any satisfaction from those services.  
 
 The fact was that, as we can see in Table 2.3,  private service contributors had a 
fairly common presence as far as health care and waste removal was concerned. 
However, it was providing about 75% of these services. Apart from the phone services, 
which were practically being utilized by only a tenth of the entire family units, the 
degree of citizen satisfaction was quite inadequate. Even the judiciary system and 
policing services were only being utilized by an approximate ten percent.  
 
A staggering 75 percent were quite discontented by the judiciary and some 84 
percent were unhappy with the policy. Moreover, with regards to health care and 
education, fewer than 50 percent of the surveyed citizens showed any satisfaction. 
Through superior management of limited resources, sufficient financial support for 
maintenance and operations, an extra consideration while planning for local 
requirements, and specific services supplied by adequately encouraged, responsible and 
sincere government employees and public officials, many of the usual reasons for the 
discontentment could easily be dealt with (World Bank, 2002).  
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The citizens were also questioned about the type of services that were not being 
provided at present and whether the Government should provide to the under privileged 
class (see Table 2.4). 
Although the Government does not solely provide efficient services mentioned, 
such as employment opportunities and low-priced or subsidized food, the four major 
responses, namely, health care, education, electricity and water, could definitely be 
improved by superior management of the public sector and/or better enhanced public-
private partnership. Various other responses showed an immense apprehension towards 
more useful and efficient government aid and benefits than at present. 
 
 
Another essential point to note here is that the poor quality of public services 
creates further problems for the underprivileged citizens, as they do not have the means 
 Table 2.3: Access To and Satisfaction with Services 
 Service used 
in last 6 mth 
(% of HH) 
Service 
provided 
Satisfied 
with 
Services 
(%) 
 
Service by gvt (% 
of 
Main reason for dissatisfaction 
 services)   
Health 
services 
80 72 43 High cost, lack of concern of health 
staff, no medicines 
Schools 64 98 50 Poor quality, lack of desks/chairs, far 
away, disrepair, associated costs 
Water 62 78 35 Frequent cuts, low pressure, price 
increases 
Electricity 50 100 56 High prices, power cuts, poor service 
Sewage 40 82 50 Lines in disrepair, no service 
Garbage 
disposal 
29 72 28 Containers far away, negligence, 
dishonest employees 
Courts 12 100 16 Bribes required, no justice 
Telephone 11 100 81  
Police 11 100 26 Dishonesty, delays in resolving 
conflicts 
Source: Social and Institutional Assessment, Proposed Civil Service Modernization Project 
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and resources to afford private health care, education or, for that matter, electricity 
(World Bank, 2002). 
 
 
C.  Problems of Government Finance 
Three characteristics of government finance are examined firstly with Yemen‟s 
budgetary institutions responsible for the preparation, execution and control. The 
second part takes into account the efficacy and success of public spending projects 
towards developing an environment for continual advancement as well as poverty 
alleviation. The third and last part concerns the public revenue. 
Table 2.4: Unavailable Services that Government Should Provide 
 
 
Services, by grouping  Number of  
respondents  
Water, regulate water service  148  
Nearby health care, inexpensive or free health services, mother and child centers  102  
Electricity service, improved electrical apparatus  100  
Education, expansion of schools, free education, improved quality, school equipment  84  
and facilities, school for girls, transportation for students   
Food assistance, lower food costs  84  
Job opportunities  33  
Sewers  31  
Garbage collection, clean the streets  31  
Provide homes, repair old houses, enlarge houses  23  
Telephone services  21  
Pave streets  21  
Loans with easy conditions  16  
Improve electricity service  11  
Financial assistance, Clothing for the poor, Raise incomes, Provide cooking gas,  10 or less  
Each 
Lower costs of services, Provide security, Provide fishing boats, Gardens for  
children, Provide merchandise on installment, Provide agricultural services, Provide  
social welfare, Provide land, Take care of the environment and pesticides, Improve  
social welfare, Laws to resolve disputes, Police station, Youth clubs, Make available  
a just person to resolve problems, Provide harbor for boats  
Source: Social and Institutional Assessment, proposed Civil Service Modernization Project  
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I.  Budgetary institution 
 
In order to determine whether budgetary institutions provide support to good 
expenditure outcomes, three highly important questions need to be examined. Is overall 
fiscal discipline protected by budgetary institutions? Are there any guarantees from the 
institutions that the budgetary distributions would have calculated the priorities of the 
officials at the helm of the affairs? Do the institutions support proficient and successful 
utilization of resources while organizations use the funds assigned? The process of 
budget preparation, execution as well as budgetary control is examined in this part in 
lieu of the three aspects mentioned above. 
 
i.  Budget Formulation 
 
Earlier, there was a lack of a unanimous consent or harmony concerning decisions based 
on financial aggregate and covering the macroeconomic structure. There were no 
suggestions concerning the monetary restrictions under which the budget was to be 
formulated in the budget circulars. Moreover, the proforma documents used by 
government departments, which they had to fill in for investment schemes, were 
excessively detailed. Consequently, the concerned government departments presented 
over-cost budget requests (which they considered to be good for preliminary 
negotiations) and deficient proforma documents (usually leaving out very fundamental 
and vital details). 
 
Consequently, the budget schemes were reduced by a laborious, temporary 
procedure, which showed no sectoral concerns. Moreover, the procedure for the budget 
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was not integrated. The present budget was prepared by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the Ministry of Civil Service and Administrative Reform took a leading position on 
the salary portion. The Ministry of Planning and Development (MOPD) disjointedly 
arranged the investment budget. Earlier, the predominantly poor synchronization 
between the preparation of the investment and regular budget resulted in an 
unsuccessful and ineffectual distribution of resources (World Bank, 2002). 
 
In the past few years, a continuous struggle has taken place sustained by 
technical support from the IMF to resolve some of the issues. These exertions 
concluded in the introduction of a novel budget planning system for the budget prepared 
in 2000 (started in the summer of 1999 and it was sanctioned by Parliament in 
December 1999). It is worth mentioning here that the general duty for the budget has 
been delegated to the MOF. An integrated budget memo was distributed, which gave 
some recommendations concerning the maximum limit of expenditure inside a budget 
cover fixed by a mid-term macroeconomic agenda established in collaboration with the 
IMF. These recommendations, nonetheless, continued to increase, thereby giving partial 
tractability for the line departments to make distribution choices among budget 
chapters. Moreover, generally speaking, the line departments did not give limited 
budgets. As had happened in the past, the procedure of doing away with the proposal 
was carried out while the budget committee discussions were taking place (World Bank, 
2002). 
 
Although the problem of poor synchronization between the MOPD and the MOF 
had been resolved, further official aspects continued to hamper the efficient preparation 
of the budget.  These aspects involved: (i) constant misunderstanding, practically, on the 
duties of the line departments; (ii) meager wages of the civil servants and poor 
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administrative independence; (iii) no approximations for the next budget; (iv) extremely 
restricted tractability of the line ministries; and (v) the lack of an impartial standard on 
which the distribution decisions were made. 
 
Currently, a mid-term macroeconomic structure is being implemented; however, 
it is the same as that which was initially established in collaboration with the IMF. 
There exists no internal capacity to develop complete sectoral cover within which 
various spending schemes are to be organized. In the past, these units have been 
developed (in writing) by both the MOF and the MOPD. However, neither of these have 
the staff members nor skills to develop these schemes (World Bank, 2000). 
 
In order to prioritize the public expenses, sector planning is now taking place in 
main line agencies. The public spending should be brought in line with sectoral targets 
centered on this planning. Procedures for the development schemes have been made 
simple and work is being done to sustain a dependable database on investment schemes 
together with the information on materials required for the completion and the degree of 
physical completion. Over the past few years, the dearth of knowledge has made it 
difficult to prepare the budget. Furthermore, up till now, institutional misunderstanding 
regarding the duties of the line agencies and the (MOPD) has hampered the 
establishment of this database. 
 
Various features of the budget hamper the effectual usage of the budget resources. 
Some problems from amongst these require that they be resolved at the time when the 
procedure of the budget preparation is taking place. The “projects” in the budget fund 
the maintenance of current facilities. These projects should be reallocated to the present 
budget. 
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 A large amount of partially financed projects are included in the investment 
budget. For instance, instead of funding the construction of a complete school, 
capital is given to fund some parts of five different schools. There is a dire need 
that only those projects should be funded that are on top of the priority list and 
these should be given an adequate amount of funds. 
 There is insufficient financing of the working and upkeep. The issue is 
specifically prominent in the health, agriculture and education sectors. Sufficient 
supplies are required for operations and maintenance (O&M) and the transition 
between the start of a new scheme and the growing distribution to O&M should 
be carefully watched. 
 
Expenditure on defense rising (more than 20% rise totaling US$ 90 million; from 
this standpoint, this rise is equal to the entire budgeted aggregate for the Ministry of 
Public Health during the year 1999). The wage bill has amplified considerably 
(comprises 35% of the budget due to the cost associated with the execution of laws 
dealing with health care personnel and new teachers), while the investment budget for 
public is, in actual terms, around 20-25% greater than the previous year. It is 
improbable that the State can competently embark on this stage of public investment 
because they have not shown this ability at the lower levels of investment. 
 
When the budget was given to the parliament, it indicated a deficit of around 3.5%. 
This shows the amount that can be funded from sources other than the non-inflationary 
ones. Despite the fact that the budget preparation centered on oil prices at $17 per barrel 
(and the anticipated price centered on prospective market points to greatly probable case 
of about $19), further suppositions are improbable and cause the deficit to further 
increase (World Bank, 2000). 
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ii. Budget Execution 
 
The current processes for the issuance of resources to spending departments and the 
control on the expenses from the budget are a sheer waste of time, hard to manage, and 
inefficient. Consequently, checking of budget implementation is not done on time and 
there is inadequate information present for the effectual administration of cash. 
Moreover, the schemes for rearranging resources prevent the administrative function of 
forming legal changes in the expenses to accomplish stated goals. Temporary processes 
for additional resources do not allow planning with adequate urgency. 
 
Three individual accounts are maintained with the Central Bank for every 
spending unit, on the agency stage. There are separate accounts for revenue, 
development expenditure and recurrent expenditure. It is through these accounts with 
the Central Bank that the MOF can maintain records of the budget. 
 
There is, however, one down side. The above stated accounts fail to provide 
details regarding budget execution underneath levels. Once a month, the Ministry of 
Finance MOF has to allocate a certain amount of money for spending for every account. 
This calculation is based upon the cash flow data gathered from the Central Bank. 
Several controls have been put in place regarding allocations and the primary macro-
fiscal control in place is the rule that the total expenditure for every part does not exceed 
the Ministry of Finance allocated amount. On a monthly basis, agencies are required to 
send a statement of income and expense to the Ministry of Finance. More often than 
not, agencies wind up submitting their reports late because of tardy returns from the 
various governorate branches. While there is no all-inclusive commitment accounting, 
there is a broad commitment towards recording the data within statistics records. Many 
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different reforms have been detailed in order to correct the many information 
deficiencies in place and to shift several functions to the Ministry of Finance from the 
Central Bank.  
 
According to set principles, it is the General Director of Finance (an employee 
of the Ministry of Finance) whose responsibility includes controlling all budget 
executions of every spending unit. This is why all payments have to pass through the 
person in this position. Due to the dual reporting structure, lack of motivation on the 
part of the underpaid staff and staff who lack proper qualifications, a great number of 
opportunities are present where the control systems can be easily avoided.  
 
Looking back on the initial numbers regarding the 1999 budget implementation 
and the 2000 budget contents, it is clear to see that the Government‟s prioritization 
program had not been properly implemented in several sectors in 1999. Take for 
example the health and education sectors. The 2000 budget had several high priority 
plans based on programs that should have been completed in the previous year. 
Furthermore, in the agriculture sector, the Government had planned to move several 
“projects”, which helped in the financial maintenance of several existing facilities into 
the regular budget. Regardless of this, those projects continued to show up in the 
proposed programs of 2000 (World Bank, 2000). 
 
We can see related problems in the transportation and education sectors as well. 
While the 1999 budget was not fully implemented due to the fluctuating oil prices and 
the resulting uncertainties that cropped up in the general resources sector, there were 
several other problems as well. There were line ministries from the agriculture, 
education and health sectors who were told that, in March, after the resource allocations 
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were slashed, they would be informed how they would cut down standalone projects. 
They were not allowed to make adjustments in accordance with their prioritization 
program.  
 
iii. Budgetary Controls 
 
There are several necessary fundamental points missing from Yemen‟s budget control 
systems, such as: 
 proper organized and defined procedures that define the tasks that need to be 
performed and by whom and how; 
 independent and ex-post audits of all financial transactions, as well as thorough 
investigation and reporting of any irregularities that may exist; 
 qualified and motivated officers who are capable of proper supervision; and 
 properly defined guidelines and laws regarding financial administration and the 
punishments to be enforced for noncompliance. 
 
In accordance with Finance Law Number 8 of 1990 (article 56), it is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance to look after all financial controls, preparation 
of all government financial accounts, inspections and internal controls. Although it is 
the Ministry of Finance is responsibility to complete these duties, they often lack the 
right tools to do so. In addition, the Finance Law does not allow sanctions when any 
violations are brought to light (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Under The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) Act No 39 of 
1992, this governing authority has been declared as the ultimate auditing authority 
within Yemen. The COCA‟s responsibilities include: 
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1. conducting audits; 
2. developing accountancy and the auditing profession within Yemen; and 
3. controlling public funds. 
 
In order to reach these goals, the COCA has the authority to conduct performance, 
compliance and financial audits as and when the needs arise. They are supposed to 
conduct yearly financial audits on each and every authority and ministry in every 
Governorate. This includes any and all bodies and SOEs that are receiving government 
subsidies. Practically, they lack the necessary technical skills to do so and are also not 
capable of auditing every agency, every year. Lastly, their follow up process to audit is 
extremely weak (World Bank, 2000).  
 
There has been some misunderstanding regarding the internal audit because the 
Ministry has two units for internal audit. One of the units performs the pre-audit on the 
financial transactions taking place as well as reporting it to the chief accountant 
(indirectly COCA and MOF). Another unit headed by the General Director performs a 
technical as well as financial audit to ensure compliance with the regulations there are 
around 30 agencies in which units for internal audit are set up (World Bank, 2000). 
 
For example, in the Ministry of Housing and Construction, the financial internal 
audit involves three to four officers whereas the General Internal Audit involves 30 
workers, comprising five structural engineers who prepare about 80-90 reports per 
annum covering the details regarding financial as well as technical breaches of the 
regulations and laws along with identifying the accountable officers, for the Minister‟s 
verdict concerning whether or not to take action. Despite the fact that COCA has the 
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authority to access these reports, even then the copies are rarely given to the MOF/ 
COCA and are only used internally (World Bank, 2000). 
 
II. Expenditure 
 
Following are the four main causes as to why the public expenditure program of Yemen 
did not come up with the thorough prioritization required to utilize the limited resources 
effectively. If these problems are addressed properly, it may result in a positive impact 
of public expenditure over economic growth and also reduced poverty. 
1. For carrying out the prioritization of investment programs, the data available is 
insufficient, which means that neither the information regarding the level of 
physical completion is available nor the total cost details required for completing 
the current projects. 
2. A huge number of small projects are included in the investment program. The 
inclusion of low priority projects have caused great stress for the planners in 
order to satisfy the regional interests, even if it is only a token distribution. 
Therefore, we may say that the money is spent but none of the usable assets 
have been created, which indicates that the resources are thinly spread over most 
of the projects, which continues to remain incomplete every year. 
 
3. The sector strategy has not been reflected by the composition of a sectoral 
investment program. This may be due to the reason that there is a lack of 
comprehensive agreement on sectorial goals. If we take the example of the 
education sector, the government expenditure is so low that it does not reflect 
the importance of primary education, particularly for the girls and also in the 
areas that are under-served. Mostly, the investment is in the power and water 
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segments, which is financed by public money, despite the fact that there is an 
increasing role for the private sector in the power as well as water segment. 
4. The resources required for operations as well as maintenance are frequently 
inadequate in order to operate the existent facilities. This becomes even worse 
when providing a budget for Operations & Maintenance for upcoming facilities 
while the ongoing investment program is already facing insufficient resources. 
 
Most of the time, the donors and planners get around this by adding the projects in 
the investment programs, which is an instrument for financing the recurring costs. 
Therefore, in order to operate the existing facilities, the resources needed are severely 
understated in the budget. As discussed earlier, the lack of resources for operations and 
maintenance is one of the major reasons that caused the poor delivery in the health 
sector as well as in the primary education services (World Bank, 2000). 
 
The Government often to come up with an expenditure reform program in order to 
create sustainable growth together with poverty reduction. The expenditure reform 
program often to focus on maximizing the benefits from the investment spending, and 
cutting down the non-essential expenses. Not only this, but also it often to reorient the 
cash flow towards the priority areas. There are some areas in which current spending 
can be rationalized, which includes the remaining subsidies, huge public sector wage 
bills, and also the cumulative transfers to public entities/enterprises. Or, we may say 
that the current outlays can be redirected towards the education, operations and 
maintenance, health and social sectors and also reoriented towards the social safety net 
as well as vocational training programs (World Bank, 2000). 
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A comparatively high amount of expenditure has been made on development in 
recent years but it did not have a significant impact on the economic growth. In fact, it 
reflected that the often to productive projects were not being selected as well as 
weaknesses in monitoring the implementation. The Government often to ensure the 
selection of the most profitable and productive projects as well as monitor the 
implementation, in order to make the most of public investment. Moreover, the focus of 
development expenditure often to be the ongoing projects and not the new ones. Due to 
the persistent physical infrastructure needs, the development cash flows often to be 
maintained at a high level and the priority must be given to the basic education, health, 
water as well as wastewater, power, transport including ports, roads and airports, 
research as well as to the agriculture sector. The power and water sectors are usually 
financed by public investment, therefore, it often to be opened to private investment 
(Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, Yemen 2001). 
 
III. Revenue 
 
As with many of the government areas that need improvement, so does the tax 
administration, because in 1998, at only 10 % of the GDP, Yemen had the lowest non-
oil taxes in the whole region. Furthermore, the tax system was inefficient due to 
improper definitions of tax base, arbitrary exemptions, as well as taxes that produce 
very little revenue. 
 
In the structure of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ESAF/ the 
Extended Fund Facility EFF programs, since 1997, the Government of Yemen has 
entered into a program in order to increase the revenue from the non-oil sector as well 
as enhance its efficiency. Two new tax laws were presented to the parliament, which 
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systematically reformed the direct and indirect taxes. The direct tax reforms include 
consolidation of income from all sources, expansion of tax base, rationalizing tax 
brackets, and elimination of the ad-hoc exceptions/exemptions. Whereas the proposed 
changes for the indirect taxes include introducing an excise tax approximating a GST. 
This measure helped to avoid exports zero rating, cascading, as well as problems of 
indirect taxes and import duties. 
 
However, this system is just an initiator to a more broad general sales tax that 
the Government will plan in the upcoming years (Enders, 2002). The experience of the 
other countries in the area/region are helping the Yemeni Government to study the most 
appropriate GST system. Tax administration reforms consist of a series of measures 
from simple actions, such as introducing the tax identification number to the difficult 
steps, such as improving the customs working and simplifying the tax administration. 
Not only the training program for the tax collector is planned but also an awareness 
program for the tax payers is designed (Enders, 2002). The other indirect tax reforms 
comprise introducing ink-stamped packets used for domestic cigarettes as well as a 
bandroll tax for imported cigarettes and eliminating all the stamp taxes. Revisions in the 
investment laws were also made in order to reduce delays to the exemptions on duties 
and taxes (Enders, 2002). 
 
The modification in tax policy (reduced charges, little choice) together with tax 
management might be assist in decreasing the capacity for dishonest practices in 
revenue collection. The changes in the financial administration projects might be also 
assist in moving the inducements for a company to report manipulation instead of 
conspiring with the dishonest officers. 
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The solution to the Government‟s honest efforts is the justification of the public 
expenses because if taxpayers perceive that their hard-earned money is not being spent 
on worthwhile projects then tax evasion and dishonesty will rule. 
 
In the middle of 1997, the execution of a wide-ranging customs management 
reform started so that simple and effectual duty and clearance processes could be set up 
together with duty shortcomings and short-term admission processes. In 1997, after the 
introduction of the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HS), the customs clearance 
system was computerized using the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) 
system. The upgrade of customs operation at the Hodeida seaport and Sana'a airport, 
which was accomplished in 1998, will be slowly carried out in every customs office 
(Enders, 2002). 
 
 
D. Enhancing Private sector 
 
The private sector in Yemen is small and its comparative significance to the GDP kept 
on reducing during the late 1990s. In spite of facing problems in acquiring correct data 
on its mass and role in GDP, the present approximations exhibit that the portion of the 
private sector value-added in the total GDP was around 66% of the GDP of 1995 but 
kept on declining in the First Five Year Plan (FFYP). During 1996-1997, the private 
sector value-added reduced to 58%, increased to 66% in 1998 (exhibiting the fall in oil 
prices) before it declined to 55% in 1999 and even further to 44% in 2000. The 
productivity of the private sector as a ratio of GDP other than of oil sale rose from 77% 
in 1995 to 80% in 1997 and stayed at around 78% in the year 1998-1999 before it fell to 
66% in 2000 (Table 2.5). 
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A sudden rise was seen in the private investment (chiefly local) between 1995 
and 1997 and a sudden decrease in 1998-1999, but recovered in 2000.  
 
 
 
 
During the years 1992-2000, a trend can be seen in the rise in fresh investment 
schemes that were approved by the General Investment Authority (GIA). The projects 
from private overseas investors approved by the GIA continued to be YR6 billion in the 
years 1995-1999 and rose to YR22 billion in 2000 (Enders, 2002).Yemen‟s main 
challenge with regard to the creation of jobs is to augment the scope and size of the 
private sector not dealing with oil. In 2000, the manufacturing sector minus the gas, oil 
and refining had a share of 10% in the GDP.  
 
Out of this 10%, the non-oil industrial sector contributed a mere 5% to the GDP 
in 2000 (decreased from 12.6% GDP as recorded in 1995). In 2000, the private service 
sector, contributed 44% of GDP, however, nearly two-thirds of the sector comprised 
tourism, transportation and trade, which, conventionally, are not an area of high 
Table 2.5: GDP By Private/Public Sector, 1995-2005 
 1995  
Ratio to 
GDP 
(%) 
                         
2000 
                
 
 
Target 2005 
MN YR at 
2000 prices 
Ratio to GDP 
(%) 
 
MN YR at 
2000 
prices 
Ratio 
to GDP 
(%) 
Average 
Annual  
Growth 
Rate, (%), 
2001-2005 
Non-Oil Sector 
Oil Sector 
 
86.5 
13.5 
 
914,343                 
465,469                  
66.3 
33.7 
1,346,500                
465,500                    
74.3                    
25.7                    
8.0
0.0
Private Sector 
Public Sector 
(incl. Oil) 
66.2 
33.8 
605,131                 
774,681                  
43.9 
56.1 
973,132                    
838,868                    
53.7
46.3                                        
10.0 
1.6
Total GDP 100.0  1,379,812               100.0 1,812,000                 100.0                      5.6
Source:  Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development  
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performance or salaries. Notwithstanding the fact that the industrial sector gave a high 
yield and salaries (thereby giving improved standards of living resulting from the 
increased number of jobs in the industrial sector), the disturbing fact is that the 
industries hired a mere 2.5% of the total labor force in Yemen during the year 2000 
(Enders, 2002). 
 
In Yemen, the private sector companies are small in size and give low 
compensation packages. The progress in terms of size and remuneration is also 
sluggish. This indicates the existence of large hurdles in the advancement of these small 
companies. According to the Industrial Survey of 1999, only 288 companies (less than 
1% of the manufacturing companies) had more than 10 workers. Around 95% of 
companies had three or less workers and these figures were the same as in 1996.  
 
The majority of the private manufacturing companies in Yemen are owned by 
one or two individuals making small quantities of the product, selling/distributing to the 
clients directly having less contact with the middlemen. The ensuing incapacity to attain 
any economies of scale and scope together with the dearth of specialty skills is simply 
because though the admission in the sector is not difficult, the majority of the current 
companies are not expanding or are inefficient. Moreover, remuneration in the majority 
of such small companies was 50% less than that in bigger companies (Enders, 2002). 
 
Compactness is not related to the age of the firm because the typical age of a 
company is 14.2 years according to a latest study involving 947 companies in five areas. 
Besides being small, many of the companies have a single owner involved in less value-
added, simple actions like hairdressing, plumbing, shop keeping, car maintenance, 
welding shops and carpentry shops. The majority of the companies are designed as 
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proprietorships and limited partnerships whereas 28% of them are state-owned. The 
degree of foreign ownership amongst companies is very small and the majority of the 
companies are dealing with manufacturing for the local market (Enders, 2002). 
 
In Yemen, the arrangement of private sector action indicates the existence of 
main hurdles in the progress in specialization and value addition in the companies. A 
greater number of small recognized companies and large companies (fewer average 
sized firms) together with a considerable propensity of big companies to indicate the 
hurdles to progress imply that although access into the official division may be 
comparatively simple, commercial growth may be restricted by increased degrees of 
insecurity and risk, structural insufficiencies, management problems, increased 
competition and poor capacity of the company. These conditions are aggravated by the 
attitude of the already present big companies where considerable internalization of 
services and activities take place like transport, training, electricity generation and 
distribution, as can be seen in the largest companies (Enders, 2002). 
 
We can say that the commercial market prospects and services consistent with 
increasing production either do not exist for SMEs or the admission is greatly limited 
and/or very exorbitant. This successfully increases the production costs, and, basically, 
the least resourceful size for moneymaking companies in the private industries. An 
atmosphere of legal insecurity is created when there are high business costs associated 
with inadequate procedures for contract implementation and handling of business 
problems that foster limited progress potential (Enders, 2002). 
 
One of the most important and obvious barriers towards private sector 
development, which also impedes the growth in firm size in Yemen, happens to be 
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governance problems. Generally speaking, there is a lack of good opportunities to make 
profit for firms based in Yemen. There is also very little capacity for the expansion of 
product markets in the country.  In spite of this, the firmly rooted and older companies 
in the country have a history of being more successful than their younger counterparts. 
They not only have personal land holdings but are also engaged in export activities 
(Enders, 2002). 
 
  The reason behind the success of these old companies is said to lie in the fact 
that they have personal, widespread informal networks established. They easily bypass 
the various official marketing institutes in place and create a more integrated 
organizational structure that helps them avoid the institutional and governance failures 
present within Yemen‟s business environment. The problem is that these opportunities 
are limited to a very small number of firms in Yemen. Consequently, the poor working 
of the official institutes, who are supposed to support the market, wind up being a 
deterrent to new companies entering the business environment (World Bank, 2002). 
 
A survey by World Bank conducted in November 2001 on Yemeni private sector 
organizations showed that poor governance is clearly visible in the country. It can be 
seen in the: 
1. ineffective or completely absent market-supporting institutions, whose duties 
include the enforcing of contracts (tribunals, courts etc.), regulating the flow of 
information (e.g. credit worth of companies) 
2. poor public sector performance regarding the delivery of basic and necessary 
services 
3. amount of corruption present in the country and the inefficient manner of 
interaction between private organizations and public officers. 
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However, this indicates that much scope is available where growth constraints can 
be dealt with and removed, so that room can be created for small and medium sized 
companies to grow and proper formal alternatives to institutions can be developed to 
rival the informal measures used by the few, larger firms. The development and growth 
of small and medium sized firms in Yemen appears to be rooted in finding a way where 
these companies can have easy access to official substitutes to the exclusive, informal 
methods used by the more successful, older firms (World Bank, 2002). 
 
A number of studies have shown that governance has a great influence on the 
development of firms. One factor that has a significant negative influence on economic 
and investment growth rates happens to be corruption. In comparison, focusing on 
strong enforcement of proper official service delivery, strong rule of law and enforcing 
property rights can help promote economic growth and greater investment (Enders, 
2002).  
 
The linkages present between development and set governance measures remain 
constant for several economic indicators and are also acknowledged for several other 
development effects (such as income growth quality, literacy rates and infant mortality 
rates). Due to its weak governance performance, Yemen‟s growth and investment is 
significantly affected. 
 
Governance concerns have also been identified as a significant concern in 
Yemen‟s private sector. Private sector showed that a little more than 80% of the 
companies found corruption to be the biggest obstacle towards profitable development. 
A little more than half of the survey‟s companies pointed out the different problems 
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present in the legal, regulatory and administrative frameworks within which companies 
work and they also identified gaps in the available physical infrastructure (i.e. the 
electricity situation), which hindered their performance, manufacturing and distribution 
of their products and services (Enders, 2002).  
 
Two areas have been the most significant in the Yemeni business segment. First, is 
the uncertainty regarding macro and other rules as well as crime and disorder, while the 
second is administrative issues, such as taxes, corruption, smuggling and settlement of 
disputes. To some extent, the infrastructure and other input issues, such as access to 
land and electricity, is also of concern. For some firms, telecommunication problems 
and labor regulations are also severe barriers to growth. 
 
2.4. Privatization option in Yemen 
 
 
The Government drawing out from the service and production areas of the economy is 
one of the main components of the economic reforms. It includes the privatization of 
many public sector enterprises. The major challenge was to enhance economic growth 
for the Yemeni Government just after the unification period. Although the Government 
inherited the over-centralized public segment, a monopolized, inefficient and over 
regulated system can be observed in the public enterprises, which limits the activities of 
the private sector (Freeman et al., 2004). 
 
In early 1995, a privatization program was initiated by the Yemeni Government as 
a part of economic reforms. The objective of this program was to privatize almost 70% 
of 212 enterprises by year 2000, in terms of employment. It came to an end when the 
parliament did not approve the loan from the World Bank to fund the long-run 
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privatization program. After some time (years), the Government itself financed the 
privatization program. According to the April 2004 presidential instructions, the 
investors can enjoy the land at no cost. In addition, if the project capital exceeds 10 
million US dollars then it is exempted from profit tax paying. In the middle of 2003 to 
2004, almost eight companies became private and seven of them were publicly 
auctioned, whereas the remaining one shifted to the Yemeni Economic Corporation, 
also known as YECO. In 2005, according to the privatization officials, two of the 
enterprises were privatized by the Government and three more would be privatized by 
the end of 2006. It has also been announced by the Government of Yemen that it would 
privatize 15 of the factories suffering from economic stagnation by 2007. The airport 
services, pharmaceutical companies and also the cement factories remained top of the 
priority list for privatization (U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service & U.S. Department 
of State, 2008). 
 
The privatization program would help in growth concerning the development 
strategy focusing on improving the environment for private segment investment and 
also towards making the resource allocation efficient. In the past 2 years, the successful 
implementation of macroeconomic reforms helped the economy to stabilize and restore 
business confidence. Moreover, privatization commands to prioritize the rebalancing of 
the role of the private and public sectors in the economy. This will result in improved 
economic efficiency as well as quality of services, which contains budget deficits and 
liabilities, and also accelerates the private sector‟s growth and investment accelerates. 
The Government views the sound privatization actions as to be significant to attract the 
world market and the investors in order to draw their interest to do business activities in 
the Middle Eastern countries (World Bank, 2002). 
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2.4.1. Privatization Process 
 
According to this study, the term “privatization” means selling the public enterprises to 
the private investors as well as opening the government monopolized segments for 
them. 
The major points that will be argued in this part are public sector, legal procedures, and 
methods of privatization. It also includes the role of government agencies and the 
contribution of international organization. 
 
a. The Size of the Public Sector 
 
The Yemen Republic acquired a fairly large public region, mostly from the socialist 
south. Of the 192 enterprises listed in the survey, which was accomplished in the middle 
of 1996, more than 110 were positioned in the recognized PDRY. The different areas in 
which these enterprises are allocated are industry, tourism, agriculture, fishing, 
transportation, oil, trade and finance. These sectors are not good in generating economy 
and sometimes they even close down, which leads to heavy a load on the financial plan, 
because budget transfers or gathering of those amounts that are overdue must cover the 
operational losses (Enders, 2002).  
 
b. Labor Issues 
 
One fourth of the total civil servants were working with public enterprises .The total 
employees number almost 86,500. The salaries of these employees lead to a heavy load 
on the financial plan because of the operational losses. The decrease or threat of a 
decrease in the labor of particular public enterprises can cause severe employment 
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problems. The 18,000 employees associated with privatized enterprises receive their 
monthly salaries from the Government.  
 
There is labor union, which the Government controls. The contribution of this 
union in the privatization development is very restricted. The labor union has no right to 
be heard in the privatization process according to the law of privatization .The basic 
requirements of employees cannot fulfill their received salaries. If the relation of the 
employees with their enterprises is not mature they cannot look for new jobs. The labor 
law is very limited in making redundancies, which offers some security for employees 
of social enterprises. It prevents the redundancy of employees for economic motives, 
such as privatization. Additional security is added by the Privatization Law. This Law 
allows that the units provided for privatization can be hired or bought by foreigners or 
by any citizen.  
 
The investor with the winning bid to carry on the actions of the enterprises taken 
over will have enough land either on rent or on sale. The issue of the number of 
employees who will be hired to continue their job and the stipulations given to these 
employees must be as good as the existing ones in terms of salaries, bonuses, and other 
benefits has also been covered in the terms, which were discussed between the 
Government and potential inventors. The employees and these investors want a contract 
for their job to be guaranteed for at least five years, at the same time the remaining 
workers would be moved to the Civil Service Fund. The main objective is to secure 
workers, but the issue for many workers is that these position investors will not take a 
large number of recognized employees to evade being locked into long-term agreements 
(Al-Asaly, 2002).  
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It is essential for any potential buyer of any public enterprise to meet the technical 
recommendations indicating the number of current employees that they want to stay in 
the enterprises after privatization. The favorable choice is for the one who plans to keep 
the largest number of old employees. Other plans are also offered by the Government 
that could resolve the labor issues of public enterprises. The issues, such as condition of 
laying-off pay and bonuses, reducing the compulsory retirement age and supporting 
early retirement with maximum benefits for employees are focused in these plans. 
 
The undeviating motivation to prospective employees to keep the most favorable 
economic number of workers and offer large severance settlements straight to 
employees are more useful approaches. The workers are secure to look for another job 
or to begin their business (Al-Asaly 2002).   
 
c. Legal Procedures 
 
The Government of Yemen started the privatization of public enterprises in different 
areas of the economy by the end of the civil war in early 1995. The Government must 
establish the authorized processes to classify the enterprises to be privatized with a 
program. The Congress of Ministers published order number 150 in 1999. It also 
included some suggestions for the privatization process but this order is not very useful. 
The Council of Ministers also issued order number 8 in 1995, which included some 
rules regarding privatization. After that, order number 5 was issued in 1996, which 
included the issues of the required fields to privatize public and combined enterprises. 
The Prime Minister issued an announcement to develop a Technical Privatization Office 
(TPO) in 1996. 
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 The management of organizational and operational practices for privatization 
was the top priority of the Technical Privatization Office TPO. The Council of 
Ministers decided to settle the shut down enterprises in 1997. The Council of Ministers 
then supported privatization approaches in 1998. The Government and Parliament 
finally gave permission the Law of privatization in 1999 (Al-Asaly 2002). 
 
d. Methods of Privatization 
 
Different techniques have been occupied by privatization in Yemen. At least 60 small 
enterprises have been privatized by either hiring or returned to their recognized owners. 
Many Agricultural Rental Stations (ARS) were privatized to their employees. 
 
Table 2.6 Types of Privatization in Yemen 
 
Types Tourist 
enterprises 
% Cinematographic 
Enterprises 
% industrial 
& 
agricultural 
enterprises 
% 
Selling 15 32   4 10 
Leasing 9 19   3 8 
Liquidation 2 4   14 36 
Sharing     2 5 
Restitution 
to owners 
21 45 12 100 4 10 
Selling  the 
Individual 
Assets and 
leasing the 
land 
    11 28 
Conversion 
activity 
    1 3 
Total 47 100 12 100 39 100 
Source: Privatization Technical Office, author   
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A total of 98 enterprises of Yemen were privatized with the help of seven methods of 
privatization. These methods are shown in table 2.6. The 47 enterprises, which were 
privatized were tourist enterprises followed by 39 enterprises of industrial and 
agricultural enterprises, and, finally, 12 cinematographic enterprises were privatized.    
 
 Selling method 
This method of selling, which entails the transfer of the shares to an assured investor 
who has chosen by auction or interviews with the selected investors, has acquired to 
privatize 15 tourist enterprises and 4 industrial and agricultural enterprises. 
 
 Leasing method 
This method of hiring an enterprise, which includes contract signing between the 
Government, the owner and the individual recipient for taking charge of a public 
company for a certain duration, has taken over to privatize 9 tourist enterprises and 3 
industrial and agricultural enterprises. 
 
 
 Liquidation method 
This method of liquidation of an enterprise, which indicates that the material 
privatization of organized companies cannot be accomplished as the financial and 
economic standards do not allow this, has taken over to privatize 14 industrial and 
agricultural enterprises and 2 tourist enterprises.  
 
 Restitution to owner method 
This method of “restitution to owner”, which is very helpful in developing countries 
where many people were deprived with the introduction of socialist economy, has taken 
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over to privatize 21 tourist enterprises, 12 cinematographic enterprises, and 4 industrial 
and agricultural enterprises.  
 
 Selling the individual asset and leasing the land method 
The selling of ancestral goods, which may involve the individual assets of an enterprise 
without any kind of connection between them or assets that have some relationship with 
each other, has taken over to privatize 11 industrial and agricultural enterprises.  
 
 Conversion activity method 
This method of conversion activity, which means to free the movement and offer to the 
private sector, has taken over to privatize one industrial enterprise.  
The sell method has been used in the recent endeavors of privatization. Advertisements 
are placed in the press calling for local people of Yemen for bids as the appraisal of 
large enterprises are accomplished. The tender will be re-advertised if there are no bids 
after one month. The Technical Privatization Office TPO may discuss directly with 
potential buyers if there are still no bids after re-advertisement of tenders (Al-Asaly 
2002). 
Technical and financial offers must be submitted by any interested buyer of certain 
enterprises. The financial offer includes the bid amount and the method of its payment. 
Administrative circumspection according to financial and technical bids offers the final 
decision.  
 
e.  Government Agencies 
The privatization Law specifies the development of the High Committee and Technical 
Privatization Office TPO to make sure the completion of regulated, impartial and 
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transparent privatization methods because of the disagreement of coordinating between 
several ministries and enterprises. 
 
The Higher Committee (HC) was created in 1999 and held its first conference on 
June 7, 2000. The Prime Minister and Ministers of Planning, Finance, Legal Affairs and 
State were also included in this conference. The policies offered by this conference 
considered issues, such as the privatization program, favoring transactions and program 
designs, and hiring temporary executive board members to the state-owned units 
permitted for privatization. The Technical Privatization Office (TPO) is likely to act as 
an administrative unit for Higher Committee HC, which is responsible for maintaining 
records and other secretarial duties, such as formulation of privatization plans, mainly 
by reconsidering proposals and observing their implementation. Observation of 
operations includes, for example, the stipulation of advice and support to individual 
departments to achieve privatization transactions and also organizing the essential 
papers and contacts and directing all concerned institutions, for example, labor unions 
(Al-Asaly 2002). 
   
The Privatization Law focuses on the development of temporary boards 
signifying that each concerned department and its economic unit should be taken over 
for privatization. The privatization process of the concerned enterprises would be 
contributed by each committee under the administration of the higher committee. The 
responsibility of the departments of each sector is to complete the privatization 
operations of enterprises other than the larger ones in coordination with the Technical 
Privatization Office TPO. The Higher Committee HC has the full authority to approve 
large privatization transactions. The income of privatization will be deposited in the 
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special account of Central Bank allocated to finance, economic and social development 
missions (Al-Asaly 2002).  
 
f.  The Role of International Agencies 
 
Two international organizations supported the privatization process of Yemen. The 
privatization program of the government of Yemen gets assistance for the financial and 
technical perspective from the World Bank, which sanctioned a project. The basic plan 
of the recent IDA project is to offer support to attain successful and transparent 
government administration for the privatization program of Yemen. Three factors of this 
program are mentioned below: 
(1) The privatization of five large enterprises (Aden Refinery, Airport Passenger 
and Cargo Ground-Handling Service at six airports, General Land Transport 
Corporation, Yemen Corporation for Cement Production and Marketing, and Yemen 
Drug Company) (2) The approach of pre privatization towards three large enterprises 
(Port of Nashton, Public Telecommunications Company, Yemenia Airlines), and ( 3) 
Government allocated financial and legal support in the privatization of almost 50 small 
and medium enterprises. The agenda for the completion of the projects was on track in 
early 2002. Experts were selected for these five large enterprises, with the study of those 
experts likely to be done in the second quarter of 2001 for Aden Refinery, the General 
Corporation for Land Transport and the Yemen Drug Company, and for the Airport, 
Ground-Handling Services and the Yemen Cement Company at the end of the third 
quarter of 2001 (Enders, 2002). 
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2.4.2. The Status of Privatization Process  
 
The issues, such as position of privatization, the result of privatization and the 
consequences of privatization on the economy will be discussed in this section.   
The development of law making for privatization takes a relatively long time. 
Therefore, on many occasions, privatization programs have been delayed. More than 60 
small enterprises were privatized between the years of 1994 and 1997; 16 tourism 
enterprises – 8 by hiring and the other 8 by restitution; and 53 other enterprises, which 
mostly includes agricultural. These 53 enterprises were privatized through restitution to 
their original owner or also through liquidation. These privatization programs were not 
transparent due to the lack of an effective plan and strong institutional structure. In 
addition, these programs were mostly carried out through the judgment of the 
departments involved. There were also setbacks in the programs of the department‟s 
committees signifying the enterprises to be privatized because of overlapping 
accountabilities of different departments.    
 
There is no doubt that ministries severally developed their internal committees 
to privatize some of the enterprises under their authority. These committees of the 
ministries contributed in each and every action of the process (such as in approving the 
short list of consultants and the report that the eventual consultant submits) when the 
Technical Privatization Office TPO was accountable for privatization. This contribution 
caused disagreements between the Technical Privatization Office TPO and the 
concerned ministries, and also delays in getting the committee members together, which 
led to delays in getting the input of these members for the short listing report 
assessment. The privatization program was almost stopped in 1998-1999, at the same 
time the Government focused on creating a structure to carry out these programs in a 
more organized and transparent manner (Al-Asaly 2002).  
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Nothing was accomplished between 1995 and 2000. The Privatization Law was 
propagated after a long development period in November 1999, which was intended to 
manage and combine privatization procedures across state-owned economic 
components. Privatization plans for five large enterprises were organized and supported 
by the Government, involving completion steps and agenda. In 2002, Aden Refinery 
new shares would be available for capital investment by investors, and it is important to 
make sure the expert management over the enterprise by a globally recognized refinery 
operator. A contract was undertaken with the Wheat and Meal Silos. After the first 
month of advertising, there were no bids for Aden Wheat Silos and the Fish Canning 
Factory (Al-Asaly 2002). 
 
The Government of Yemen made several decisions regarding privatization. The 
Airport Ground-handling Services was privatized and both the private and government 
sector made a shareholding or revenue sharing venture. The General Land Transport 
Company project was funded by the Government and also by the employees. The 
project was to establish a strategic restructuring with a view to creating a liable joint 
stock company. The Government of Yemen is considering liquefying the small public 
enterprises that are generating less profit and going in loss.  The Government wanted to 
restructure these companies into more strong and profitable firms. The Government of 
Yemen concluded that the large profitable public enterprises would not be privatized 
after the clearly efforts of ongoing privatization even when their names are listed down 
in the privatization list. This was supported by many parliament members and by a large 
number of the public (Al-Asaly 2002). 
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The tourism sector, which was leased, was performing quite well. They kept 
their labor, which was specialized in their own sector. The Yemeni national bank was 
not supposed to be privatized to strategic investors and the Mill of soils in Hodeida was 
sold to an investor and the predication process is not completed as yet (Al-Asaly 2002). 
 
2.5.    Problem Statement  
     
In early 1995, the economy continued to get worse and was on the verge of 
downfall and decline. There were no serious efforts or steps taken by the Government 
until 1995 to boost the economic growth. After that, the Government started to realize 
the severity of the situation and figured out possible solutions to handle it. Yet again, a 
significant role was played by the political attentions while selecting the direction and 
improving elements, which is quite evident in the subsequent section (World Bank, 
2002). 
 
Due to Yemen‟s stance, the Gulf States stopped giving loans and aid and also 
dismissed more than 1 million Yemeni workers. Moreover, a new verdict was issued by 
the Saudi Government for special treatment and handling of Yemenis. This period‟s 
economic cost was immensely high. The shocks that Yemen faced after gulf war were 
so severe that the economy failed to make a recovery. The inefficient and ineffective 
Government as well as its institutions could not cope with the crisis and calamity due to 
poor synchronization and coordination, which constitute one of the reasons for not 
recovering from the shocks. The condition worsened due to the instant response and 
reaction of the combined Government to fix the exchange rates together with fixing the 
basic goods prices as well as the price of oil products (Freeman et al., 2004). 
. 
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 In light of current changes in many countries, as policies of liberalization and 
restructuring, shifting the state roles, strengthening the role of the private sector, 
openness economic, and the transition to a market economy comes the importance of 
research for the definition of privatization as an instrument of economic policy because 
of their advantages lies in the increased state revenues, to achieve competition and 
economic efficiency, and accelerate the shift to a market economy. The privatization 
program which applied by the Yemeni government in the context of economic reforms 
initiated in the implementation of mid-1995 with support from the IMF and World 
Bank, showed many questions about the feasibility of implementing this program.  
 
The Yemeni government believes that the privatization program aims to increase 
economic growth and improve living conditions, as well as encouraging private 
investment. A study about the effects of privatization policies on economic reform in 
Yemen prepared by the General Director of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry of Yemen and an economics professor at the University of Sana'a 
Mohammed Maitami, confirms that the economic justification for privatization did not 
achieve its objectives according to plans and leaving a net flow of foreign direct 
investment to Yemen between 1990 and 2005 negative. The growth of GDP remained 
lower than planned in the sense that objective of customization expected to raise the 
pressure on the state budget, and attract more investment channels to the Yemeni 
economy and higher rates of economic growth, remained an elusive goal (Al-Maitami 
2006). 
 
It is possible that privatization commands priority for re-balancing public/ 
private sector roles in the economy, improving economic efficiency and quality of 
services, containing budgetary deficits and contingent liabilities, and accelerating 
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private sector-led growth and investment. This means the privatization in Yemen could 
be viable.  
 
Moreover, the evaluation of privatization performance of the Yemen enterprises 
had not been done yet so this study is to fill the research gap by evaluating the 
enterprise efficiency, profitability, and labor market of the privatization program in 
Yemen.     
 
2.6. Objectives of the Study 
 
 
Yemen is acknowledged as being among the most corrupt countries in which the 
corruption is increasing by leaps and bounds each year. In 2001, it was 2.9 degrees, 
which was originally low grade but continued to get worse, in 2010 ( the end of the 
period of study for this research), it was 2.2 degrees, which was ranked as the 146 of 
total numbers of states in the survey which were178 countries. 
 
 
Therefore, the objectives of this study can be defined as follow:-  
   
1. To identify privatization methods, problems and obstacles that Yemen faced.   
From the problems faced in Yemen, the method of liquidation and restitution was used 
to liquidity the firms and companies. After the privatization, many companies stopped 
the functional units and work excluding all the shops and houses that were a self-
running system, or were the residence of owners. The labor is not an issue in these 
enterprises. The main problems in this case are the compensations of their occupants. 
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The government compensated some of the occupants through give them appropriate 
pieces of government lands.  
 
2. To determine the main motives and main goals of privatization in Yemen.  
Moreover, Yemen has a systematic institutional corruption the organizers of the system 
found in the capitalism their required, so that by the name of privatization, where they 
transfer many SOEs to personal or company ownership was done. This caused the 
socialists system in Public Democratic Republic of Yemen PDRY of patronization and 
production to exploit the property situation, which was originally private property. 
3. To identify the major bottlenecks, which are currently affecting the performance of the 
newly privatized sample enterprises.   
These privatization programs were not transparent due to the lack of an effective plan 
and strong institutional structure. In addition, these programs were mostly carried out 
through the judgment of the departments involved. There were also setbacks in the 
programs of the department‟s committees signifying the enterprises to be privatized 
because of overlapping accountabilities of different departments.    
 
4. To assess how does privatization affect firms‟ profitability, operation efficiency, capital 
expenditure, output, and employment.  
More than 60 small enterprises were privatized between the years of 1994 and 1997; 16 
tourism enterprises – 8 by hiring and the other 8 by restitution; and 53 other enterprises, 
which mostly includes agricultural. These 53 enterprises were privatized through 
restitution to their original owner or also through liquidation. 
5. To explore what major post-privatization restructuring measures they could adopt as 
solution and suggest some recommendations. 
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The study comes to answers the following questions: what are the stated key motives 
that encouraged government of Yemen to adopt privatization? Are there any hidden 
motives? What are the stated goals of the privatization program? Did the privatization 
program achieve the goals? What are the hidden goals? What are the types of 
privatization adopted? What is the viability of privatization in Yemen? Has the 
privatized enterprises performance lived up?   How does privatization affect the firm 
efficiency?  How does privatization affect the firm profitability? How does privatization 
affect the labor market? What are the major problems that affect privatization 
performance in Yemen?  
 
2.7. Scope of Study 
 
The scope of this study is to provide the existing literature because it explores the 
situation in a country in the Middle East region that had been lacking from the world 
literature. By evaluating the post-privatization program and recognize the trammels, the 
government could redraw the policy in which it will improve the program. It may help 
the enterprises under study in improving their performance. Finally, it could help 
another new study in same area of research. 
 Out of nine enterprises that are still working, three enterprises have been selected 
which are National Grain Silos Ltd, National Cigarette & Match Industries Ltd, and Al-
Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden (see appendices C5 & C6).  The 
timeframe for this study is the enterprises operation from the year 1995 until 2009 and 
seven years for the three enterprises (three years before the privatization and three years 
after privatization excluding the year of privatization). 
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2.8. Limitation of study  
 
The researcher encountered many difficulties being the most important lack of 
information and confidential data because of secrecy and very conservative officials of 
privatization to provide the researcher with sufficient information as well as some 
officials of the enterprises that have been privatized and is still continuing to work. 
Another difficulty is in distributing the questionnaire to the selected sample and then 
collecting the questionnaire. 
 
The study has a limitation due to a shortage of data, which restricted the 
numbers of enterprises to four enterprises and the period of study to seven years. Some 
of the relevant information are confidential and the researcher cannot access the 
information due to policy of the government, and it had limited the scope of the study in 
the accessibility and availability of the secondary data. 
 
It is not easy to get to the real attitudes of the participants in the questionnaire 
because of the impact on the view of participants in the questionnaire by political and 
social factors. This requires asking the respondents to fully cooperate, give the right 
opinion out of their political or social factors, and declare that the success of this 
research is closely dependent on their honesty and assured it is just a personal opinion. 
 
2.9. Organization of thesis  
 
The study comes in six chapter organized as follow:  
Chapter one provide an introduction that includes definitions of privatization in general 
them move to discuss privatizationin developing countries and MENA countries. 
Chapter two discusses the privatization in Yemen. It gives brief background about 
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Yemen economic and move to discuss the policy of privatization, reasons behind 
privatization and privatization option in Yemen. In addition, this chapter includes 
problem statement, objective of the study, scope and limitation of study. 
Chapter three discusses the literature review of this study. It discusses 
privatization and growth of state, theories of privatization, determinant, and modes of 
privatization. Chapter four is the research methodology chapter. It discuss the research 
approach and design, framework, sampling design, and data. Chapter five presents the 
finding of the study for the three enterprises and analyses result from the questionnaire. 
Chapter six presents the discussion and conclusion of study. It discusses the result of the 
study is relates to the objectives and literature review and ending with conclusion of the 
study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Privatization and Growth of the State 
 
Conditional explanations give an overview of governments existing policies, which are 
formed as a result of wars that were fought in the past or are still in existence. The 
concessions and compromises among the competing nations are also the reasons due to 
which government policies are affected. Conditional explanations are basically 
alternatives given to the deterministic theories. The deterministic theories narrowed the 
strategic interference of the government bodies. The results of the future battles are 
unpredictable because the power of the competing parties depends on a number of 
factors. The factors include different ideas, developing institutions and resources. A few 
of these factors can actually be manipulated, if rigorous actions are taken. Therefore, 
government policies play a vital role under such situations. 
 
Conditionalism basically means that the government has choices, however, these 
choices are restricted by a few factors, like environmental and economic conditions, 
power, control, policies and institutional laws.  Ideas, leadership, ideology, group tactics 
and shifting resources are a few short-term forces that affect the government choices. 
Focused change is made in structural parameters as well. When the government makes 
choices it rejects those perspectives that present only one solution for meeting the 
objectives and overcoming the environmental limitations. During the statistical analysis 
of policy outcomes, variations are taken into account on a compulsory basis. These 
variations are estimated using the independent variable, which relates to a number of 
factors ranging from primary to demographic (Wilensky, 1974). However, these studies 
define the government policies in simple budgetary terms. When issues that are linked 
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to the scope and timing of social welfare are taken into account, then the governments 
of different nations have freedom to respond as per their requirements. 
 
A government tends to change its policies because it wants more fruitful returns. 
Conditional explanations identify the unrestricted nature of the battle and then define 
the role of the public sector accordingly. In addition, conditionalism also believes that 
nations can take various forms and sizes as well (Feigenbaum et al., 1998). 
 
3.1.1. Deal with the problem of payment 
     
 In the 1970s, governments were of the view that the economic sector of the country 
required great intervention by the government in order to give positive outcomes. The 
state wanted to have public enterprises so that they could influence their plans, 
regulations, and even production and distribution of goods and services (Biersteker, 
1987).  In the 1980s, the condition of public enterprises was such that they were left far 
behind the private sector. This may be because the government would have gone too far 
with its intervention, thus leading the economic performance of the public companies to 
deteriorate. Many studies have shown that the performance of SOEs have been very 
poor in comparison to the private sector (Cowan, 1990; Cook and Kirkpatrick 1988; 
Vernon 1988). The state has failed to recognize these shortcomings because it was very 
busy with the industrial growth, which was taking place in different countries (Tanzi, 
1987). 
 
Privatization was found to be the only solution to bring the state out of the 
financial crisis (Vernon, 1988). SOEs were acting as barrier in resolving the problems 
of fiscal deficit, foreign debts and high inflation (Shepherd, 1976).  The financial crisis 
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led to the withdrawal of the government hold from the states industrial sector. Market 
price mechanism was given priority for the allocation of the resources in the states 
sector (Cook and Minogue, 1990). The failure of SOEs led governments to become 
more inclined toward privatization (Vernon, 1988). Nevertheless, the auction of SOEs 
brought revenues, which brought an improvement in the budgetary position of the 
nation.  
 
Many theorists consider privatization as a reaction to the financial crisis. These 
theorists include Clarke, Cull et al. (1998), Clarke and Pitelis (1990), Adam et al. 
(1992), Nellis, and Shirley (1994) etc. These theorists believed that had the 
development in economy been faster, the public sector would have survived. After the 
war, the post-independence development in developing countries came to an end. Public 
enterprises required additional funds, not for the expansion but for mere survival. SOEs 
reached to such a position that they generated no revenue but rather needed financial 
support from the budget. SOEs needed funds so that it could at least decrease the public 
liabilities even if it was unable to increase their assets. The sale of public enterprises 
could bring in a good sum of money to the state. Selling was a better option to regain 
financial stability rather than cutting down expenses, which were related to education, 
healthcare and so on. 
 
The sale of assets would just solve the financial problems of the state on a 
temporary basis; it would not look into the further serious matters that would come 
ahead of time. According to Adam et al (1992)., the sale of assets would create a 
neutrality affect for the nation. The price that the state would obtain after selling the 
assets would just be the discounted future profits that the entity would have obtained. 
Through sale, the private and public enterprises would only be able to adjust their 
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existing liquidity problems but the net worth would remain unchanged (Adam et al., 
1992). Only if the seller and buyer both have different valuations for the proceeds that 
they obtained from the sale of assets could the neutrality position be removed. 
Privatization can lead to many uncertain consequences, which is why it is considered to 
be a very risky business. The huge investment that has been made in the public 
enterprises is to be considered as sunk cost. The decision about the liquidity of SOE has 
always been a great political responsibility. 
 
A matter that requires great political responsibility would definitely be subject to 
government involvement. The government would try to get the finest possible deal for 
themselves; the best deal would be as cheap as possible. 
 
3.2.  Theories of Privatization  
 
The idea of government sowing the seeds from its own expansion is not a new one. The 
battle between government‟s thirst for control and power, and public liberty was a 
major concern of Western democratic theorists, namely Alexis de Tocqueville and John 
Stuart Mill. However, these concerns became less when a legal framework for the 
protection of citizen‟s rights and government bureaucratization was drawn up during the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century. The government was seen as a system that worked 
for the benefit of the citizens instead of constraining them while the institutionalized 
and professionalized civil services painted the government‟s image as that of a tool used 
for implementing the public goals (Putnam, Aberbach, & Rockman, 1981). 
Consequently, the growth of the government was seen as an expansion of the people‟s 
will instead of personal liberty.  
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Over a period of twenty-five years, many theories have surfaced that consider the 
government to be an independent element in the economy that can sustain force toward 
its expansion. Many sociologists have provided a base for this perspective in regards to 
organizational theory. Nonetheless, controversial theories have also been formed based 
on public choice and an autonomous state. According to Gormley and Gormley (1989), 
the bureaucratic authority or discretion was not seen as an issue in USA until the 
twentieth-century when the Progressive Movement began in the 1900s, which was 
further institutionalized during the 1930s and 1940s when New Deal took matters. 
According to Gormley, the progressive movement backed bureaucratic autonomy 
whereas the latter backed the bureaucratic empowerment. In order to establish Franklin 
Roosevelt‟s aggressive reforms, a strong and delegated presidential staff was provided. 
With the death of Roosevelt and the end of WWII, the White House was left without a 
strong leadership, which allowed the bureaucratic companies to freely ally with other 
sub government powers.  
 
According to Feigenbaum and Henig (1994), the analytical theories of social 
science and public administration considered bureaucracy as an independent element 
that not only exerted pressure but could pursue its owns goals and programs using the 
names of other people. Chester I Barnard was the first person to focus on organizational 
maintenance and was followed by Amitai Etzioni who extended his perspective to bring 
in behavior of the organizations. In later years, Wilson and Edward Banfield shifted the 
focus to the government because they thought that by focusing on political parties such 
as the partisan of the urban schematics, the interests of the government could be 
evaluated using the authority prerogatives in order to narrow the scope (Banfield and 
Wilson 1966). Wildavsky (1979) said that other authors have widened the perspective to 
include battles of bureaucracy budget. This perception of the bureaucracies, i.e. the 
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gradual reorientation of bureaucracy symbol, came into existence after the focus shifted 
from agency capture in which the perception of the units of government was that it was 
manipulated by purposeful and stronger private companies to those of so called iron 
triangles, as defined by mutual consent of the bureaucratic regulators, private investors 
and key legislators, as well as the regime that perceives the governmental units as 
equals in the coalition that not only protect their interests but also proclaim an 
allegiance for public betterment (Bernstein, 1977).  
 
When the governmental units are perceived as organizations that have their own 
objectives of expansion and maintenance, it is easier to explain the steady growth 
phenomenon in the public budgets. When it is assumed that non-material incentives, 
such as status, power and control, are of interest to the bureaucracies, the organizational 
theories can include regulatory expansion in their theories.  
 
Since the concepts of organizational theory are based on sociology, it naturally 
leads one to think that social units, such as bureaucracies, have their own interests, 
which are different from the public or individual choices. On the other hand, although 
the public choice theory, with its roots in economics, has created a concept of 
government expansion on the pursuit of individual self-interest, it has considered that 
the growth of government is directed by internal factors, such as those described by the 
organizational theory (Savas and Research, 1982).  
 
It is argued by the public choice theory that the activities of the governmental 
bureaucrats, politicians and voters are best understood in the same manner as the 
behavior of the consumers and business organizations explained by the economists. For 
instance, politicians in the same manner as that of the business organization, have a 
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certain product for sale. This major part of this product contains materialistic favors to 
the groups and areas of the government that constitute the involved politicians‟ 
constituency. In other words, if the politicians wish to be elected, they need to make 
new promises for governmental expenditure and deliver these promises if they wish to 
remain in the office. On the other hand, the bureaucrats will try to maximize their public 
reputation, patronage, salary, power, perquisites of the office, bureau output, ease in 
bureau management and ease of making any changes (Niskanen Jr., 2007), which are 
assumed to expand with the agency‟s budget. When conducting final analysis, the 
public choice theory makes almost the same predictions as the organizational theory 
regarding the behavior of the government, in that it has been seen that the impact is 
much greater. This is because of the stature accorded currently by many to economics 
instead of sociology as well as the readiness to mathematical and modeling methods 
adaptation that create a sense of sophistication and objectivity in straightforward 
accounts.  
 
Furthermore, the public monopoly concept is appreciated by the public choice 
theory, which assumes that the corporate monopolies are under low pressure to 
efficiently meet the consumer demands because of their dominance in the goods market. 
In markets where the government is dominant, such as utilities, elementary and 
secondary education and urban services, this situation is much worse.  
Even if the consumer is unhappy with private monopoly, they can choose not to 
purchase the service or product, but when the citizen is unhappy with the government 
monopoly, they still have to pay in the form of taxes for every service including those 
they do not use.  
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As the public choice theory is an extension of the classical liberalism theory, it 
supports the assumption that the term political can be best understood in relation to the 
rational self-interest of the individuals. Furthermore, it is also assumed that the personal 
aggrandizement is human nature‟s inherent objective that does not require any 
explanation. As such, these two assumptions have reported anti-statist conclusions as 
aforementioned.  
 
According to Carnoy (1984), the neo-institutionalists and Marxists have 
critically reviewed the state but not hostility. The scholars, in response to the Marxists 
perspective, elaborate using three elements: (1) Even though the economic elites 
preserve disproportion and influence the government operations, this influence is 
attenuated; (2) the interests of the state are different from the external supporters and its 
bureaucratic members; (2) the state, on its own, possesses the resources of power 
(Domhoff, 1990).  
 
The economic elite‟s influence is attenuated because of the uncertainty in 
relation to the capital interest and its constituencies in concrete cases, such as the 
interests‟ division in the capitalist class and working class as well as the non-economic 
interests in regards to different conditions that create a powerful counterbalance. It is 
assumed that the owners of the capital have a common interest for legal preservation, 
economic institutions and political parties in order for them to prosper. Nonetheless, to 
move away from such a common interest to division of interests, such as those of the 
concerted elite can cause problems in the world. It is important to question whether or 
not the progressive income tax will provide regressive benefit capital through the 
aggregate demand stimulation or spark a backlash. The ability of the elites to foresee the 
consequences of taking alternative course of politics is limited, which makes them 
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vulnerable to the public in relation to disagreement, hesitation and miscalculation. 
Moreover, the concept of mobile capital has different interests as those of the capital, 
which is constrained by the natural resource, labor or market requirements. According 
to Molotch (1976), the economic elites benefitting from the lands‟ value, such as 
mortgage lenders, landlords and realtors, have their way of finding their own interests, 
which diverge from those of the economic elites who have contingent commitments to 
specific locations. In the same manner, the declining industries and growing industries 
interests differ.  
 
As the state‟s institutional interests diverge from the interests of the powerful 
actors, the literature on the autonomous state suggests that sufficient resources are 
possessed by the state of its own, which enables it to pursue the interests effectively. As 
such, many of the resources of the state are linked to its formal status. According to 
John Mollenkopf (1989), even if the states are constrained, they are still sovereign 
having the power to use monopoly legitimately for force in order to create juridical 
grounds for the private property and develop the economy in different ways. Besides 
these formal powers of the state, the managers can also have different type of 
information monopoly; benefits from a certain expertise reputation, wielding the 
authority in their favor, and, in many cases, may be safeguarded from external forces 
and sources of revenue by civil service protection.  
 
Theories regarding the semi-autonomous states, similar to the public choice 
theories, assume that the states internal needs are its main engine for growth. In contrast 
to the public choice theory, this theory also assumes that the growth of the state is a 
response to the pressure from the interests of the business as well as the mobilized 
working class people along with the elites, which allow the managers of the state to 
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strategically create a maximum effect out of their own resources in relation to the fact 
that the state is dependent on the productivity of its economy as argued by traditional 
Marxists (Mollenkopf, 1989). 
 
3.2.1. Reconsider state theories 
 
Many of the state growth theories, even with their differences, all speak in the language 
of determinism and universalism. Given the time and tendency of the way of thinking, 
many nations had already developed modern as well as extensive social programs of 
government with government institutions that support them. In contrast, many nations 
were ahead in the transition phase.  
 
This imagery is challenged by the privatization, as stated by Feigenbaum et al. 
(1998). When we catch up to the concept of privatization, it can allow us to understand 
the methods in which the state growth may be considered conditional instead of 
determined as well as its divergence and shifting instead of being universal. It is argued 
by Feigenbaum et al. (1998), that the failure of the contemporary literature to 
understand privatization is because of its over-eagerness to construct a boundary of 
understanding considering that the privatization as a phenomenon represents a sharp 
edge with the past that needs to be wiped clean on the cognitive slates so as to unhinge 
the future state growth speculations from our previous growth understanding. 
Furthermore, Feigenbaum et al. (1998) pointed out that when the previous theories on 
the growth are discussed, it can provide insights that can lead to the understanding of 
privatization in a better way. 
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According to many commentators (Cowan (1990), Berg and Shilley (1987), … 
etc), the public enterprises have been less competent than the private entities. It has been 
pointed out by John Waterbury that this sector has been responsible for multiple tasks. 
The tasks include the employment regeneration, the improvement of infrastructure, 
advancement and absorption of modern technologies, supply of services and goods to 
the employees, providing financial support and the creation of competition with 
foreigners who trade in the same services and goods (Waterbury 1993). The state 
mostly keeps a safer side for the public enterprises, by providing them a position of 
monopoly in the market. Moreover, they have also been provided with protective tax 
rates and soft constraints as customers and suppliers of specific services and goods. 
With so many incentives already present with the public enterprises, their motivation for 
enhanced performance reduces and this eventually deteriorates their overall 
performance and profit margins. The greatest threat that these entities face comes from 
the international market. 
 
Privatization has proved itself as a phenomenon that does not bring quality of 
work, but increases productivity along with lower budgets. There are a few people who 
do not believe in the superiority of the private sector. They believe that private entities 
just have one sole purpose behind their existence and that is profit maximization. 
Therefore, they work their best to achieve it. It is even convenient to measure their 
performance in the light of just one objective. While on the other hand we see that the 
existence of a public entity is subject to a number of reasons. The public enterprises is 
basically used by the government to pursue various non-commercial objectives.  
 
The non-commercial objectives include generation of employment, keeping 
lower prices etc. Measurement of SOEs performance in comparison to the private sector 
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is difficult because here the measurement would be based on the non-economic goals of 
the entity. In addition, there is another issue of property rights. Within this issue we see 
that a number of shares in the SOE are owned by the general public who are dispersed 
in the locality. While on the other hand, the private entities are managed by one owner, 
thus enabling it to be more closely monitored. Close monitoring would definitely bring 
out more fruitful returns, while in the public sector the existence of the agency problem 
prevails. This agency problem can only be solved when the ownership is changed. 
However, the problem does not lie in the property rights; in fact it is the nature of the 
objective that affects the entity. Even a public enterprise can be treated as a private one; 
this can be done if the public entity is brought in an open competition environment, 
where its objective would be of profit maximization, the employees of the public 
company would also be given added incentives so that they can perform at their best. 
Multiple owners mostly own the private entities, and their agency tribulations are no 
different from the public enterprises. The managers who run the business are after all 
the employees of the owners (Shapiro and Willig, 1990). 
 
Analyses have revealed that public enterprises lack the check and balance 
mechanism, which is found in the private enterprises. If in an entity of a private sector 
the administrators do not carry out their duties properly, then the quality of products 
would eventually decline leading to higher costs and lower profits for the owners. In 
such a situation, the owners have an option, which is to immediately make a change in 
the working team and bring new employees onboard. The new team would then 
definitely bring good outcomes. If this is not done then the time would not be far when 
the company would become bankrupt or would receive takeover bids from other 
potential investors who have the confidence of bringing better results out of the entity. 
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The performance of a listed company can be clearly identified by the fluctuations in the 
share prices, which are openly displayed on the stock market (Adam et al., 1992). 
 
The idea to evaluate the performance of an organization on the basis of stock 
price on the stock market is not adequate to get the right calculation. Therefore, it is 
always criticized by the analysts. They predicted that the choice of the right mechanisms 
of incentives and regulations for public sector managers will entice the government to 
be an effective owner of a business like an individual or group of individuals.  Ideally, it 
is to the benefit of the government to acquire the ownership of companies that tend to 
maximize the profit ratio of the government. 
 
The performance of private sector firms is good compared to public sector 
organizations and the improvement in performance is because of the SOEs division, as 
described in many empirical studies (Galal and Shirley, 1994). However, it cannot be 
taken as the final provisions of the study. There is the need for a lot of research that 
would be able to give forth another perspective for developing a fundamental 
relationship between the public enterprise and the objectives of non-commercial 
enterprises that needs to be researched and elaborated. 
 
However, a government can generate its earnings through imposing taxes on 
private sector revenue if it is not able to have direct authority over state businesses. 
Whereas the social and political benefits of government are sometimes carried out in the 
favor of SOEs of private sector because of access to large volume of resources. 
Consequently, governments often seem conscious about the entry of new stakeholders 
in the private sector, which can affect the performance of SOEs in the achievement of 
non-commercial goals. This also becomes more important in the presence of high 
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competition and inefficient workforce in the public sector, which causes the lower profit 
volume of the government. 
 
The greater centralized control of the process is the idea that is reinforced by 
constant privatization related to the efficiency rationale. This is because of the fact that 
central government is responsible to set goals and objective for the businesses 
irrespective of the political benefits. To increase community income it is the 
responsibility of the central government to hinder zero revenue generation investment.  
 
The main objective of the government is to maintain stability in the national economy 
by increasing the net income through the production of goods and services. This is 
achieved by setting different goals and the relative policies that help to maximize the 
behavior of utility. This attitude of government helps to acquire objectives related to the 
political and social environment and the firm prevalence of the idea of government 
influence on private sector businesses and their relative future operations. The central 
measures against public sector firms help to stabilize the market price level, and 
maintain the balance in the supply and demand factors, services and labor opportunities 
and founding of new industries.  This would help to promote economic development, 
employment and social welfare and national security. Therefore, a change in policy 
from dirigisme to liberalization does not mean that the government is deviating from the 
attainment of goals, but rather adopting new policies and strategies to successfully 
achieve its goals. 
 
The important role of government in the management of economic activities in 
the state cannot be undermined, as it is considered that the government has the right to 
hold onto the business enterprises of the state and revenue generated from the operating 
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units of those businesses. In spite of having no share in the ownership of public sector 
business, the government still shares their revenue by charging taxes. In this way, the 
government shares a specific portion of the revenue earned by public organizations.  
Although this share of revenue varies according to the ownership structure and share 
available to the government, the significance of this portion of the stake cannot be 
denied during the process of privatization. This process does not deprive the 
government from its share, but rather modifies the structure of the state claims in the 
earnings of public sector organizations. 
 
However, it has been observed for many years that extraction of resources from 
SOEs via direct ownership has resulted in the support of these SOEs. This is especially 
seen in cases when SOEs do not seem profitable enough and others that are liable to 
have a share in revenue (e.g. suppliers of raw materials, product consumers and 
company employees, etc.). Thus, irrespective of the ideological preferences of the 
regime, be they liberal or statist, the government can choose the option of privatization 
based on other practical reasons. For example, in the Middle Eastern and North African 
countries the economic liberalization came into being without enforcement of new and 
irregular regimes. This revolution was led by the very politicians who were against 
liberal policies in the past but were forced to make changes according to new 
circumstances. 
 
Often in the emerging countries the straight proprietorship of an enterprise 
required restrictions on opposition, this provides an open honored admission 
subscription to underdone resources and customers for the SOEs. This leads to an 
anticompetitive situation in the markets, as the government does not want to track the 
dangers accompanying the opposition and has the capability to restrict it. The SOEs 
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were measured as an addition to the government contraption. Nevertheless, their own 
objectives experienced development of their individual. The inconsistency amongst the 
objectives of the government and those of the SOEs is not just due to the aspiration of 
each of the performers to take a “permitted trip” at the expenditure of the other. SOE 
executives, as the executives of any initiative, have an inducement to see their business 
develop as their routine is restrained by the effectiveness of the corporation. For the 
government, the over extension of a single SOE or a manufacturing subdivision may 
lead to negligence and declining presentation in other similarly important businesses 
and subdivisions. In an unchallenged situation, SOEs may advance severe independence 
from the government, place pressure on the political leaders and also try to figure out 
strategies and administrative consequences.  
 
In many occurrences, the community segment executives may become much more 
influential than their administrators in the government, both politically prejudiced and 
on individual revenue. During the post-transition period in Eastern Europe, one would 
have severe reservations if they had not substituted the “primary/negotiator” roles. In a 
few extreme cases, the development of the community subdivision had transported the 
singularity of cronyism as some SOEs had the benefaction and clientele as their balance 
from the very start, such as broad economic freedom, comprising monopoly influence, 
superior loans and agreements, and so on. In addition, they have been extended to 
preferred firms in return for political provision (Haggard 1988). Privatization in these 
situations leads to detaching expensive client based associations and recapture control 
by the administration over economic association. From this viewpoint, it is logical to 
imagine that a privatization approach-connecting preventive the contribution of the 
other related players in making the significant conclusion would be reliable with the 
task of combining the administration‟s consultant. 
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The development and the reduction of the community segment has been observed 
in the literature as the approaches of the governing leaders to modify the current 
political and social alliance and figure a new one rendering to the development of the 
government. Denationalization, as well as nationalization, has, therefore, been 
understood as an established form of “give and take” strategy as an outcome of which 
certain collections of people get advantage while others experience sufferers. The 
administration follows denationalization with the purpose of minimizing the impact of 
the upcoming and insures the provision of the previous. Bienne, Waterbury and other 
philosophers have revealed the alignments of the possible alliances that can be attended 
or destabilized by denationalization. At one excessive, they have found the mainstream 
combination of significance replacement based on a leading community division and 
including principally systematized employment, communal division executives and 
personnel with definite revenue, urban interest with prestige. Alliances endorsed the 
redeployment of revenue “from countryside to city inhabitants and from comfortable to 
minor income divisions, at the other excessive , they have come upon the local private 
businessman, exporters of manufacturing properties, commercialized unindustrialized 
manufacturers, the travel industry etc. (Waterbury 1989). “The previous association 
would include government personnel and beneficiaries of supported community 
services; the final would encirclement “entrepreneurs” large and small. In one situation, 
the government delivers facilities; in the other, it retails properties” (Ikenberry, 1990). 
 
The theories on denationalization have suggested that the participation of 
civilization in denationalization can barely be very dynamic. Frequently, collections and 
entities have indecisive assertiveness as the remaining advances are not undisputable. 
However, although denationalization may provide chances, it also needs thoughtful 
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determination on the prospective recipients` behalf, i.e. both to capitalize possessions 
and to route dangers with an extraordinary gradation of indecision. Entering in these 
kinds of assemblies is incompatible, so a clash of welfares might raise in manufacture 
the stability amongst the “winners” and the “losers” even more unpredictable. 
 
3.2.2.  Arguments for and against privatization  
 
The research of privatization has proven that large-scale regional private organizations, 
especially of the bigger ones and those that need innovative, technological and expert 
managing skills, usually comes out in cases as the key prospective customer of the 
divested SOEs. Normally, although all big organizations support privatization, they are 
unlikely to invest in any organization if there are no obvious possibilities for income far 
above the normal. It is noticed that most of the SOEs going through divestiture are 
money-losing organizations. These are effective ones too, but the condition would 
rather keep them for as long as possible they produce income. There is only one remedy 
to this situation, such as big online organizations would get divested SOEs only if these 
organizations are provided at a significant lower price, i.e. at a price well below their 
real value. That is why a variety of scholars have agreed upon one theory that 
privatization includes paying off personal industries and private companions on 
conditions a priori objectionable to the government (Starr, 1988). However, this does 
not seem to be reasonable – it is not even supported by well-organized and developed 
countries, such as the US, where, especially in all the initial community offers to the 
organizations, they are sold on for less than their real value and the IPO premium is a 
way to represent its difference, which is a reasonable gain for the client who is supposed 
to be a part of the risk when an organization goes public (Starr, 1988). 
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Another severe problem also exists that cannot be ignored. In the under developed 
countries, privatization is not so powerful as in developed countries because the private 
region cannot aggressively get involved in privatization. It does not have a sufficient 
economic platform (most companies are extremely utilized and rely on public industry 
financial institutions for funding of their present operations); it is cautious about 
revealing information about its functions, which makes it difficult to improve 
investment on the stock market; participation of private sectors and corporations in 
technological development and innovation growth has been relatively low.  
 
The basic problem here is the rent-seeking characteristics of the personal 
organization, which were designed by the state with agreements on preferential terms. 
Under the significant changeover technique, it was protected from competitors, both 
international and domestic, and would find it difficult to endure if it were introduced 
(Ramanadham, 1993). Moreover, many countries have introduced a tendency for private 
corporations under “unreported, unlawful or semi-criminal activities”; they are involved 
in “dysfunctional business activities, smuggling, economic and financial scandals, 
extensive tax evasion, and other [similar - BB] activities” (Ramanadham 1993). 
Through these justifications, scholars have concluded and believe that the assistance of 
regional private organization for privatization should not be avoided – it would take part 
only on their own conditions, which are likely to be different from those of the 
government. 
 
The end result of privatization comes in the form of the lowering of cost as the 
firms start to use the resources efficiently and produce goods at a lower cost, which 
enables them to sell at a lower price to the consumers. In the short run, the prices may 
go up as the subsidy would get removed off the goods and services, which previously 
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were subsidized but it gives them the freedom to buy the goods and services without 
facing any hassle of shortage of supply. It was inferred that the use of subsidization for 
a small portion is beneficial in developing countries that used subsidized services and 
goods (Galal and Shirley 1994). There are two reasons why the consumers do not 
support privatization, first there is a tradeoff involved in it. The tradeoff is between the 
lower costs in the long run and in the short run high initial costs of the previously 
subsidized goods. The second reason is that the consumers are scattered and that results 
in problems when a group action for privatization is to be taken.  
 
The foreign investors also have an important stake in the process of 
privatization. There are many expectations of the government of the country in which 
the foreign investors want to invest. Expectations from the foreign investors are the 
provision of capital to the countries short of capital, to bring in new technology in the 
country in which they are investing and to improve the external debt position of the 
country in which the privatization is being done.  On the other side, the investors will 
only invest in those companies that have a good past record, have a possibility to be 
profitable in the future and only in those business whose goods and services are 
demanded globally. The foreign investment can also lead to political problems in the 
host country of the companies/firms working under foreign investment. The foreigners 
can force the host country to sell the companies that are of strategic importance to the 
host country. It is rightly said by Cowan (1990) that in the case of the opposition being 
strong enough, it will most likely force the country to privatize the companies of 
strategic importance then the foreign investment can prove to be a strategy to lose.   
 
Another group that has an important stake in the privatization is the workforce 
of the companies. As privatization means an increase in the efficiency of the company 
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through methods, such as better allocation, mechanization, cost cutting by laying off the 
employees, etc., this will lead to an increase in the unemployment levels of the host 
country. These workers do not just lose their jobs but they also lose other benefits, such 
as social security, medical allowance, pension etc. For this reason of loss of the 
numerous benefits, the workforce of a country is least likely to support the government 
initiative of privatization. The high degree of presence of labor unions, etc., imposes a 
barrier in the way of privatization; this problem has been tackled by some governments. 
The governments have tackled this problem by taking into account and providing the 
benefits that the workforce will lose, and by providing a good remuneration package to 
those who decide to work for the privatized company.    
 
Another important issue in the process of privatization is the managers of the 
state-owned firms; their attitude towards privatization is quite unpredictable. A dire 
need for the managers to stay with the firm after privatization emerges as a result of 
their experience of managing the affairs of the company. Their presence after the 
privatization will ensure the proper management of the company. A number of 
managers at the state-owned enterprises are also employed as a result of political 
influence; those managers are merely employed due to the political influence instead of 
their competence for the position. Many managers of the companies prefer the 
protection given by the government because if the protection is given to them they do 
not have to worry about a number of factors. The factors, such as the competition, the 
inputs, production standards as they are quite flexible under the government protection, 
subsidies, protected markets, etc. in the process of privatization many state-owned 
enterprises go bankrupt because they are unable to perform effectively and efficiently 
due to the protection given to them. Privatization is a threat not only for the managers 
employed by political influence but is a threat for those competent managers as well.  
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For this reason, they do not support the process of privatization because of the loss of 
jobs and other benefits. They support divesture only when they see a possibility of their 
benefit in it. The buyout by the management of the company can result in many 
conflicts due to the interests of that management. The managers, when buying the 
company will pay the minimum amount possible. The reason for paying the minimum 
amount is that the managers will try to take the company towards bankruptcy and then 
the management will buy it for a very small amount of money irrespective of the value 
of the company (Cowan 1990). 
 
One of the methods for resistance towards privatization is bureaucracy.  As a 
result of privatization, those officials who have the status and power to have a direct 
control over the management and may lose their standing and power may not like it 
(Cowan 1990). In the case of privately owned companies, bureaucratic supervision is 
required but only those with a specific skill set, quite different from the ones required 
for SOEs. This scenario reduces the job opportunities as well as chances of corruption. 
Due to the limited supervision in the case of privatization, the number of seats held by 
bureaucrats on the SOEs board reduces. In addition, their own job is at stake. The 
literature review shows that although the protest by such bureaucrats is rarely verbal it 
is a considerable one. The tactics include raising hurdles in the way of potential 
investors, foot-dragging, and misrepresenting the government‟s actions in front of the 
public. This is done through organizing various meetings, loss of files and delaying in 
issuance of directives (Cowan 1990).  
 
Intellectuals seem to maintain a relatively indecisive attitude towards the 
privatization phenomena. Some of the reasons for their resistance towards the process of 
privatization include distributional disparity, insufficient liberty to initiate and 
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implement the policies. Although it is difficult to actually estimate the ultimate results 
of privatization on the part of intellectuals, they can modify the public opinion in order 
to support the interests of other groups. If we consider liberal intellectuals on the other 
hand, then these are very strong supporters of privatization since they consider the 
public sector as a problem creator, and believe in having liberty, similarly in the case of 
the economy and want civil society to be independent.  
 
It cannot be concluded which one of these two is a clear winner in the short run. 
In addition, the losing party will still have the capability to oppose governmental 
policies. They cannot be expected to support the privatization process; therefore, any 
such expression on the part of them is questionable by the theorists. Hence the 
privatization is least expected to produce a new electoral partnership. This imposes 
limitations over the speed and scope of a privatization plan (Onis 1991). Privatization 
can only be proved to have an impact over the coalition management if the government 
can associate it with a broad populist agenda (Onis 1991); if the public assets are 
available underpriced since it will ensure the divestiture (Suleiman and Waterbury 
1990); if the corruption by previous government is associated with the performance of 
public sector and divestiture is presented as a part of rupture (Haggard 1988); or if the 
debt to equity swap option with the foreign creditors is considered for funding the 
external debt (Reding 1989). 
 
To make any privatization successful, the efficient handling of the coalition is 
very important which is difficult for a government that wants a change.  Generally, as 
the majority of the stakeholders resist the privatization process, in order to play safely, 
political support should be sought out. The political involvement is likely to bring in 
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incentives in order to maintain loyalty of the partners involved in the coalition. In 
addition, it will also reduce the resistance of the stakeholders. 
 
We can conclude that there are many theories on privatization phenomenon and clearly 
there were five theories which specified the comparison between private and public 
enterprises as in table 3.1 (1)Agency theory (2) property right theory (3)Public choice 
theories (4)Organization theories (5) neoliberal theory. From those five theories there 
are three theories which is appropriate for the case of Yemen privatization that are (1) 
public choice theory, (2) organization theory and (3) neoliberal theory.  
 
TABLE 3.1 Theories on Privatization 
 
THEORY 
 
CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
 
IMPLICATIONS AS 
FIRMS MOVE FROM 
STATE TO PRIVATE  
 
STUDIES  
 
 
 
Agency theory 
 
 
- Agency problems and the 
solutions of the problems 
which correlated the type 
ownership 
- Agents assumed to maximize 
their own utility instead of firm 
utilities. 
 
 
 
- Changes in managerial 
incentives 
- Changes in corporate       
governance 
- Changes in control 
systems 
Aharoni (1981)  
Kay and Thompson (1986)  
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987)  
Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991)  
Caves (1990)  
Estrin and Perotin (1991)  
Martin and Parker (1997)  
Shapiro and Willig (1990)  
Bos (1991)  
Bos and Peters (1991)  
Laffont and Tirole (1993)  
 
Property right 
theories 
 
 
The more direct and 
unattenuated are the rights to 
property, the better the assets 
will be used 
 
 
- Incentives for 
management  
- Clear lines of 
accountability  
- Commercially oriented   
 
Alchian (1965)  
De Alessi (1980, 1987)  
Borcherding (1983)  
 
 
 
 
Public choice 
theories 
- Go after own utility by the 
politicians instead of public 
utility. 
- Enforcement happened of 
SEOs to gain political interest, 
which could lead to 
inefficiency. 
- Incentives for 
management 
- Clear lines of 
accountability 
- Commercially oriented 
 
Zeckhauser and Horn (1989) 
Haskel and Szymanski (1992a) 
Boycko and Vishny (1996) 
 
 
 
 
Organization 
theories 
- Concentrated on the 
organizational characteristics 
of private firms. 
- Like ;  incentives , control 
mechanisms, culture, 
objectives, organization 
structure, 
communications/reporting 
systems, nature and location of 
the business, management, and 
- Less political 
intervention 
- Increasing search for 
efficiency 
- Reducing social 
considerations 
 
Fernandez (1984, 1985) 
Perry and Rainey (1988) 
Ricart et al. (1991) 
Bishop and Thompson (1992) 
Parker (1993, 1995) 
Martin and Parker (1997) 
Walker and Vasconcellos (1997) 
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labor 
Neoliberal 
theory 
 
- The neo-liberal mainstream 
assumption about market 
failures asserts that they result 
from a lack of market 
functioning or else from too 
much regulation. 
- minimization of the State will 
create the conditions of 
“perfect competition”  
- Competition: 
individuals/business 
organizations/nations 
compete on an extending 
market 
 
Bourdieu  (1998; 2001) 
 Chomsky (1999) 
 Touraine (2001) 
  Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005) 
 Plehwe et al. (2006) 
Clarke, S. (2005 
Thorsen, D., & Lie, A. (2000) 
SOURCE : (Villalonga 2000)   
 
 
3.3. The Political Determinants of Economic Performance and underpinning of 
privatization 
 
The political impact on the economic reforms was a subject of theoretical inquiry in 
older studies before the privatization phenomenon.  In the political impacts on the 
economic reforms, the economic performance is highly influenced from the political 
regime characteristics and is considered as one of the most influential aspects. Political 
scientists had very different perspectives at different times in recent decades. Most of 
the time they were following the discipline mood. In the early decades of theorizing 
modernization in the 1950-1960s, when it appeared that “all the good things work 
together” most of the theorists of that time accepted a simple positive correlation that 
there is a relation of significant importance between the successful economy of the 
region and a liberal government and also vice versa such as between authoritarianism 
and bad economic performance. Mostly they only offered simple conclusions, and, very 
often, they compared countries not having the same set of denominators and also  
ignored the other possible reasons for the difference in the outcome. They failed to 
justify over the time the persistence of this simple correlation (Coleman and Almond, 
1960).   
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Samuel Huntington challenged this simple correlation perspective by arguing 
that instead of political liberalization it is political order that has the potential for 
producing economic progress. Moreover, the social dislocations are caused by economic 
and political modernization and that these social dislocations become an obstacle to 
future economic development.  This kind of criticism against simple correlation 
perspective started soon after the end of the 1960s and these scholars proved that “all 
the good things do not go together”. Moreover, Huntington also concluded that the state 
capacity to deal with these development targets should be the function of “the 
government form (dictatorship or democracy)” instead of as earlier practiced, “the 
degree of the government”. He concluded that the latter has less importance than the 
former method and also supported his conclusion with the history of industrial 
countries. “In the continental Europe, as the most contemporary modernized countries, 
they centralized power and rationalized authorities and all these necessary for both unity 
and for making progress. The opposition for this modernization came from the 
conventional and traditional interests: regional, religious, local and aristocratic. For the 
economic development, the rising of new social concepts and groups, breaking the old 
order, breaking down the privileged and restraining of feudalism and several other 
aspects the centralization of power was mandatory.” (Fukuyama and Huntington, 2006).   
 
Huntington and Fukuyama (2006) concluded that the initial need of developing 
countries is concentration and accumulation of power, not dispersion of these powers, 
and that this lesson is for Peking and Moscow and not for Washington. Both the U.S.  
foreign policy makers and leaders of developing countries took the prescriptions of 
Huntington‟s policy very seriously, in spite of huge criticism in academia about this 
point (Belev 2000). 
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Furthermore, it is clear that it would be hard to get a common solution to all 
these theories. In the 1970s, the conflicting ideological preferences and practical 
policies “the dependents and developmentalists” presented the existence of multiple 
intervening factors‟ (e.g. the civilian society, international environment, etc.), which 
influenced the economic performance and nature of the political regime. At this point, it 
would be better that instead of focusing on specific issues – growth investment and 
inflation – the main focus should be on the notion of economic performance 
deconstruction. This helps them in achieving better results of similar economic reforms 
cases and to explain the successful or unsuccessful experiences of development in a 
better way. 
 
Democracy and property rights are two major variables that are closely related to 
each other and are discussed on a theoretical basis. Property rights are of great 
importance for every country or government and have proper legal documentation. 
These rights sometimes become threats to the government as private sector people like 
labor, property less people do become a threat to the country regarding certain legal 
aspects of these rights. Governments do take serious action to protect these rights but 
somehow or the other the private sector violation causes threats to the state. It was 
stated by Engels and Marx in the nineteenth-century that the relationship between 
democracy and property rights are totally inverse because democracy is basically 
providing everyone with equal rights and under the case of property rights no equality 
of practice is observed regarding wealth (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993). However, 
according to the theorists of the twentieth-century, they said that authoritarian 
governments mostly face worse economic conditions because they have to deal with 
small society based problems while diplomacy increases in allotting the justice under 
property rights cases. Douglas North stated that rulers must be committed and try to set 
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the proper rules and regulations for the market. He also said that although property 
rights are crucial for the growth of the state economy they did not present any proper 
linkage of democracy and property rights (North & Weingast, 1989). In a continuation 
of his statement, Mancur Olson further stated that the government should complete its 
regime so that the rules and regulations should be followed accordingly and the leaders 
could prove their commitment to the state. According to him, the more the government 
is insecure the more corruption there will be among the leaders (Olson 1991). 
 
The state government should be particular in making free and moderate political 
rules and regulations. It should be obvious whether long-term expansion or short-term 
utilization is favorable, which can lead the people to discourage savings and results in 
the economic decline. It has been commonly observed that the large number of political 
parties‟ participation in the government increases the pressure on the government 
causing great damage to the economic growth. The government faces critical situations 
under these circumstances in which it has to hold back such demands by using 
alternative measures and isolating them from the support. If these measures are related 
to the scrutiny of democracy, then the government cannot prosper by following them, it 
can only continue by using those alternative measures that are against the demand of 
majority (Huntington and Fukuyama 2006). People who support this opinion to run a 
state favor dictatorship. According to them dictatorship is far better for such structural 
modifications that require large investments in the human as well as material resources, 
and which results in the huge decline in spending, providing the lowest living 
conditions in the developing countries. However, if the political parties opt for these 
measures they cannot succeed at all, no party can meet success on such sacrifices for 
their glowing future in democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). 
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 Up until now the discussion has supported the authoritarian style of leadership, 
which has not been challenged yet. According to Atul Kohli, if the authoritative rules 
and regulations could favor the growth and development in third world countries, as a 
renovated policy could only be followed by taking serious measures by the authority 
involving inferior levels of the government who are usually responsible for 
implementing the policies of government. Atul Kohli also stated that it had been 
observed that some of the authoritarian governments had succeeded to turn the 
centralized control towards development by using force to bring about remarkable 
changes in the behavior of societal groups (Kohli 1994). If the government control is 
improved then one of the state leaders should commit himself to complete the 
developmental projects according to the drawn policies. The point should also be 
considered that if that leader did not allow any other person, such as bureaucrats and 
other low-level officials, to be involved in such projects then soon he/she would lose 
power, which could lead towards the failure of the developmental project. Quoting the 
reference of Mobutu, many theorists, including Thomas Callaghy, explained that Zaire 
is a typical “predatory state” in which corruption and personalism is observed following 
the policies among the lower level bureaucrats (Evans et al., 1985). 
 
East Asian NICs are good examples of the authoritarian governments that have 
shown remarkable economic growth during the last part of the twentieth-century among 
the developing countries.  This success was because of some of the key abilities of the 
authoritarian governments by protecting policy making tasks and implementing them by 
required force, specifically, those relating to multinational industries, unions, and labor 
divisions, etc. This discussion helped a lot in making a comparison of the experience 
among East Asian NICs to most of the countries of Latin America. There are many 
favorable factors that make the authoritarian style of government popular, which include 
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that, “they enjoy the independence as they face less pressure and have great 
opportunities to get the maximum resources, easy access to public goods and also to 
impose short-term prices favourable for economic growth” (Haggard 1990). The 
essence of the above discussion is that the authoritarian style of ruling, i.e. not very 
liberal period, can be proved to be more successful than the democratic style, as we 
have observed the bad impacts of democratic regimes in developing countries 
(Przeworski & Limongi 1993). 
 
The research conducted during the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s on 
different government styles like democratic, authoritarian, etc., gave a thorough 
comparative study of the economic performance of states with the supportive hypothesis 
following in the last decade (Haggard et al., 1992). The researchers were very particular 
in their research work from the point of how the political factors affect the economic 
growth of the countries. Among those researches Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings 
(1989) gave logical differences faced by the authoritarian and democratic styles of rule 
in respect of conflicts and economic strategies followed by the state when “political 
adjustments are required for making problematic domestic policies for major economic 
reforms”, as was observed during the economic crisis of the 1980s including high taxes, 
low domestic expenditures along with debt liabilities Both of them discovered that in 
Mexico and Chile, etc., the authoritarian governments followed the old policies 
proposed by IFIs made by the most experienced technocrats having in depth 
neoclassical assurances. To follow such policies was not an easy task for the leaders 
having limited powers and in handling the influence of bureaucratic powers in 
controlling the protests of the majority sector (Stallings and Kaufman 1989). Whereas 
Costa Rica as well as Columbia are good examples of democratic rule where mixed 
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responses were observed in response to crisis. The following are the main dissimilarities 
and similarities with the authoritarian governments: 
1- Both the governments went for devaluation and credit restrictions as the 
democracies that were well-known were interested in bridging the gap between various 
interest groups and the government. The purpose was to build trust and moderate 
economic activities among the parties (Stallings and Kaufman 1989). 
2- The authoritarian governments went way beyond just restructuring their 
economies. 
3- All the regimes want to stay aloof from having conflicts with foreign creditors. 
 
Democracies that were in the process of evolution, such as, Brazil and Peru, 
often tried a heterodox package and embraced measures that encouraged consumption 
and counted on administrative controls instead of fiscal and monetary demand 
management in order to limit inflation, while jarring with local business classes and the 
IFIs action of reducing interest payments on the external debt (Stallings and Kaufman, 
1989). Stalling and Kaufman confessed to the consequences of the reform efforts, in 
that there might be numerous elements that should be taken into account, which 
includes the scale of the external shocks, the power of the national economy, the 
resources that are accessible, which might reduce the difference between the political 
governments. On the other hand, they determined that the nature of the government 
might have a conspicuous effect on economic performance. The transitional 
democracies, countries going through political liberalization, with the aspect of 
economic stabilization, “had a tendency of having considerable problem in budget 
deficits and high inflation” (Stallings and Kaufman, 1989); “recognized democracies 
possessed less than the average values, like right-wing authoritarian government in 
Chile”, but this was not the case for Mexico. In well-known democracies, to real wages, 
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“fiscal moderation was effectively pooled with fairly large real wage increases, in 
transitional democracies, higher increases were still seen” (Stallings and Kaufman, 
1989). 
 
 As for the rates of growth, the traditional belief that more authoritarian 
governments would earn more success, because of having more capability of favoring 
long-term investment, was not proved correct (e.g. Mexico had a bad record).  For the 
balance of payments, “as authoritarian governments are assumed to be having more 
capacity to fulfil domestic demand and produce surpluses, it is believed that they can 
reduce the size of their balance of payments deficits, better” through the promotion of 
exports and discussing debt relief (Stallings and Kaufman, 1989).  
 
Another theorist who studied the performance of various political governments 
was Karen Remmer. She looked at the performance of the political regimes on discrete 
economic indicators. She compared the performance of the policies of old and new 
democracies and authoritarian regimes in Latin America for 1982-1988 on numerous 
indicators (Remmer 1990). Her claim was in contrast to that of Stallings and Kaufman. 
She claimed that, generally, there were no major differences in democratic and 
authoritarian governments, and that democratic governments were more efficient in 
crisis management than authoritarian governments. In Latin America, new democracies 
set the best records in the area of employment for which the old democracies had a poor 
history. The average annual employment rate of the new democracies and authoritarian 
regimes seem to be the same, as no statistically significant difference between them has 
been found. 
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 In addition, a similar pattern in the economic growth, changes in government 
deficits with respect to GDP, and real wages, which are two opposite extremes, instead 
of two new democracies and the authoritarian regimes, was witnessed by Remmer.       
Unsatisfactory performance of SOE has been described (by Ayub and Hegstad 1978) as 
a vicious circle, in figure 3.1. The limitations of SOE managers in directing and 
deciding has led to poor investment choices, low productivity and too much influence of 
capital structures, which brought losses. It came from extensive government controls 
and organizing SOE combined with pathetic financial discipline. This is the reason why 
firms could not increase their resources. With the compulsion for achieving social goals, 
non-commercial responsibilities also became one of the reasons for the poor 
performance of SOEs. It was because these obligations were not clear as they were 
made of multifaceted preferences that were difficult to sort out in reality. Managers 
defended their bad results with reference to a gathering of social objectives. It has been 
anticipated by a number of governments that SOEs do not give high importance to 
financial profitability (Ayub & Hegstad, 1987).     
 
Privatization is believed to improve corporate performance and help countries to 
flourish, but what it actually does is still not clear.  According to a cross-country 
aggregate study (by Sachs, 2001) at a macro level, privatization alone does not lead to 
GDP growth, but when it is accompanied by in-depth institutional reforms it is seen to 
be giving positive results. A variety of outcomes has been seen from the surveys of 
privatization on the firm level. The outcomes ranged from no positive noticeable effect 
of privatization on performance (Bevan et al., 1999), to concluding carefully that 
privatization globally enhances the performance of the firms (D'souza et al., 2000), to 
being quite self-assured that privatization does improve performance (Shirley and 
Walsh, 2000) and (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
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Figure 3.1: Vicious Circle of Public Enterprise Sector Management 
    
Source: (Ayub & Hegstad, 1987) 
 
 
The reason for the different impacts of privatization on firm performance could 
also be that the studies were conducted on a different data set with limited access to 
corporate government issues (ownership structure and/or board of director 
composition), which produced inconsistent results.  
Both political and economic motives are involved in privatization. The economic 
motives, however, are broadly discussed in the literature, as the two are entangled. 
According to the authors, the governments want to bring an improvement in income 
distribution and so they diminish public service disparities in the country.     
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Mostly, governments look forward for permanence, both political and economic, in 
times of crisis and unrest in the country and so they go for privatization. A number of 
motives are directly concerned with a country‟s privatization success. Many authors say 
that the only way of measuring it is by comparison of the results against particular 
objectives and goals of the government (Aharoni, 1991; Domberger and Piggott, 1994, 
and Ramamurti and Vernon, 1991). 
 
The dependency on the private sector and market forces increases with 
privatization. It has been argued that during the shifting process of responsibilities from 
the government to the market, the institutional framework also gets altered because of 
privatization through which citizens, companies and organizations express, intervene 
and promote their individual and shared interests. Although the particular outcomes of 
such an institutional change are ambiguous, some doubt that major consequences would 
have to be borne. For some of the groups the interest would be clear and willingly 
promoted, while others will experience the opposite. The battle of goals and interests is 
what politics is all about. Various researchers have advocated that privatization is a 
result of either economic logic or a political objective (Feigenbaum et al., 1998). 
      
3.3.1. The administrative perspective 
 
Privatization has been presented by the administrative perspective as a sequence of 
existing options to public officials who are in the quest of making the government 
perform better. Specifically, in the United States, the “good government” orientation 
has been mirrored by the privatization discussion. This point of reference assumes the 
subsistence of a comparatively particular collection of public objectives. These public 
objectives are acknowledged as lawful, as they came into view by a democratic method, 
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consideration by recognized proficient, or affirmation by well known organizations. 
With public objectives obvious and acknowledged, the vital duty for public 
administrators is to follow judiciously the most resourceful and effectual way to those 
ends. 
 
The organizational viewpoint for privatization, corresponds to a “toolbox” of 
different methods. With the help of these methods the organization may choose the 
most suitable in order to achieve the required objectives. The tools that are presented are 
indenturing out, user charges, receipts, beneficial sales, and load shedding. The 
organizational viewpoint assumes that the government administration should try to 
work their best for public interest, keeping in consideration the restrictions propounded 
by unsatisfactory information and the imposition of personal unfairness. It also admits 
that the competence and usefulness of precise schemes could rely upon the 
administrative and monetary framework (Feigenbaum et al., 1998). 
 
Advocates of the organizational prospect look for denoting the situations below 
which various privatization tools are probably intended to work well (Bendick Jr., 
1989). The organizations say that no good way is presented by the government to 
practice the social good. In some conditions, the government may fully support and may 
unswervingly offer good assistance, while for various other conditions, the government 
may sponsor recipients who then acquire their preferred services from private creators. 
Aspects like the divisibility and tangibility of the assistance, the level of antagonism 
within the privileged supplier cooperation, the accessibility of information, and the 
administrative capability of government must be pondered while taking into account 
which method or technique to follow. 
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3.3.2. The economic perspective 
 
The economic viewpoint portrays privatization being the predictable outcome of the 
neoclassical fact that states the renunciation of an immense, invasive, and scrounging 
state. From this viewpoint, there are both comprehensive and micro rudiments. The 
comprehensive propose that configurationally there are constraints to the comparative 
bulk and invasiveness of the community, that faction away from those confines is 
continued merely for the short-term, and that an attempt to argue with this economic 
truth is unavoidably answered in debility and regression (Becker, 1992). 
 This analysis repeats the point of view of the right and left. The right, obviously, has 
constantly claimed that the expenditure of the wellbeing region direct to voracious 
taxation, as a result of which incomes are decreased and also the private investments are 
decreased. Whereas, the viewpoint on the left, is that the viewers claim that the 
wellbeing rules of Keynesian of the post-war time, essential mutually for the 
justification of capitalist government and like a urge to industrious speculation, endure 
from political methods that assign capital absurdly, as an answer to supremacy rather 
than necessity (O'Connor, 1973).Thompson highlights the extension of source of region 
in the self-concerned attitude of officials, politicians, administrators and beneficiaries 
that achieve more in their job as recipients than they mislay their job as taxpayers 
(Borcherding, 1977).  
 
This methodology portrays the territory sector as being created of entities 
judiciously following one‟s own material benefit, the summation of whose proceedings 
direct to a comprehensive level of ineptitude. Consequently, privatization is depicted as 
a process that acquires assets from the administrators and hands over those assets to the 
capable concealed hand of the market. 
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The economic viewpoint is likely to classify privatization proposals with three 
foremost principals: tenure, competition, and the arrangement of advantage to price. 
Transaction of state resources unreservedly is considered as the best mode of 
privatization, on the other hand, it decreases the public sector discrepancy, decreases the 
volume of governmental equipment, transfers verdicts to the private sector, which is 
most probably more familiar to market signals, and provides the opportunity to more 
people directly in endorsing economic expansion. Increasing the confidence of viable 
forces without altering tenure – while government contract out for public services – 
providing liability for adjusting and implementing objectives in the public sector, 
however, it seems to have the benefits of endorsing competence and decreasing the 
issue of bureaucracy. Arrangement of price with advantage – while services are 
subsidized by consumer charges rather than profits of general tax – is supposed to 
indirect obstruction growth of the government, by lessening the capability of the 
government to provide various services regarding true market worth to those who utilize 
them (Feigenbaum et al., 1998). 
 
3.3.3. Administration and economic perspectives limitations 
 
The disappointment with both the viewpoints comes from three bases. First, as an 
introduction to privatization frequently borrows notions and terms from these two, the 
chief grounds of the organizational and economic viewpoint are not in agreement with 
each other. While the organizational viewpoint assumes public organizations to be 
comparatively informed, aggravated by a beginning of wider interest, and performing 
with a level of freedom and prudence, the economic viewpoint observes the public 
administration as having no apparatus to charge market signals, aggravated by the 
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aspiration to fit a larger amount of the public worth for themselves, and, consequently, 
by financial and economic forces that act for their own reason. 
 
The two viewpoint‟s also have indistinct vital differences. The acceptance of a 
specific form of privatization can be of less importance than the differences in the path 
in which privatization is devised and put into practice. It is difficult to contract out 
undefined and ill-conceived projects, when administrations rely on the person who 
gives contracts for data activity, or at the time when workable providers are not present. 
In the same way, to sell SOEs are not only efficient, but have been rearranged to 
endorse more competition and this will be efficiently supervised by suitable equipment 
(Caves and Christensen, 1980). The other is to sell off the public valuables just to close 
a bit of, which is known as the short-term budget gap, to shift a public domination into 
private domination, or to give a sure gain to respected followers. 
 
Lastly, the two viewpoints do not highlight the political directions of privatization 
initiated in the disagreement of interest between the groups and classes having 
competition. The description of privatization as monetary adjustment is most limited 
and excessively deterministic; it minimizes the real variety in behavior of a region and 
the citizens having identical aim circumstances; it downplays the inspiring supremacy 
of non-monetary forces like ideology, ethnicity, nationality and race; it does not succeed 
in recognizing the indeterminacy and fluidity of the separation between public and 
privatization (King, 1987). Whereas, the description of privatization, like pragmatic 
adjustment, distinguishes privatization as a choice that may be selected or could be 
refused, it exaggerates the level of social agreement concerning the objectives and aims. 
By targeting the collective advantages, the expenses and advantages are divided among 
the racial and classes that are based on groups, it pays no attention to the potential for 
 118 
 
privatization roots to change the interests of politicians; and, in addition, it does not 
succeed in tackling the wider ideological arguments about being highly developed in the 
name of privatization (Barnekov et al., 1989). 
 
3.3.4. A political perspective 
 
The fundamental dispute is that the movement of wider privatization is, in most of its 
demonstrations, clearly understood as a political process rather than as a scientific 
process to alter circumstances or as an outcome of economic rights (Feigenbaum and 
Henig, 1994). Instead of dealing with privatization as an alternative between sources to 
attain familiar and wide social objectives, we debate that privatization frequently form 
of an approach to convert the state policy and rearrange organization and choice – 
forming a procedure to benefit the objectives of some groups over the challenging 
ambition of other groups. As shown in table 3.2, this political viewpoint varies from the 
organizational and monetary advancements in the main inspiration credited to political 
performers, the main unit of evaluation engaged, and the fundamental idea of 
privatization produced, planned, and logical (Schneider, 1990). 
 
 Privatization strategies  
 
There are at least three types of privatization strategies; pragmatic privatization , tactical 
privatization , and systematic privatization.  
 
 Pragmatic Privatization shows most of the properties regarding the organizational 
viewpoint but having one vital difference: while the organizational viewpoint shows this 
collection of properties as being applicable everywhere, the political viewpoint does not 
deem this privatization to be continuous context episodes. This type of privatization is 
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fulfilled by bureaucratic units that are derived from the push and pull of stresses by 
politicians. American municipal agreements for private stipulation of public jobs give a 
better picture. They are often familiarized as technological answers to fulfill an instant 
social issue.  
 
  The main players regard privatization as one of the many substitute ways 
through which they can support the familiar social concerns. While making a decision 
as to whether an enterprise should be privatized or not or the time when it should be 
privatized, little attention has been given to the political repercussions and philosophical 
stability. On the other hand, strategic privatizations are encouraged to accomplish 
immediate political objectives of specific parties, interest groups or politicians. They try 
to change the equilibrium of power by pleasing devotees and inviting partners. In 
several instances, privatization is strategically regarded as a type of differentiation in the 
political product. For instance, in France, during 1986-88, the Chirac government 
initiated the program of the sale of assets, which appeared to focus largely on getting the 
highest number of votes through the advertisement of a unique program, which was 
different from the routine traditional practices of the communists(Feigenbaum and 
Henig, 1994). 
 
Table 3.2 Privatization Contrasting Approaches 
 Administrative  Economic  Political  
Emphasized Goal Achievement of 
social defined goals  
Maximization of 
individual‟s utilities  
Redistribution of 
power and control  
Unit of Analysis  Discrete societal 
problem  
Individual/firm Group/class 
Concept of 
Privatization  
Tool box Preferred 
mechanism 
weapon 
Source: Schneider, 1990.   
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General privatization tactics similar to those prevalent in Eastern Europe these 
days, are aimed at restructuring the whole society by changing political and economic 
institutions together with the alteration of political and economic interests. General 
privatization tries to 1) reduce the expectations of the people about the performance and 
responsibilities of the government, 2) to reduce the mistakes of the state-owned 
enterprises and its implementation structure, and 3) to change the interest group setting 
so that its contribution to the progress of government decreases. In the context of 
Weberian practice, the typology have selected is a logical concept focusing on learning 
by conceptualizing main hidden aspects of the communal behavior (Feigenbaum and 
Henig, 1994). 
 
 Per se, it unavoidably has several shortcomings that are characteristic of sort. 
Initially, by stating particular groups as “pure”, it tries to minimize the intricacy of the 
case under consideration. Plans are frequently developed by many people having 
distinct purposes, therefore, particular privatization ventures hardly contain 
uncontaminated instances of any particular form.  
 
Several people may find a policy attractive because of its long-range 
ramifications; therefore, Margaret Thatcher supported privatization as a means to 
change Britain into a capitalistic society run by people. On the other hand, some like 
short-range electoral gains like putting moneymaking public organizations on sale so 
that a politically disconcerting discrepancy can be reduced (Feigenbaum and Henig, 
1994). Nau (1990) stated that impartial city administrators may, in order to deal with 
limited budgets, privatize the services of a city. He also added that the city managers 
may receive inspiration from the papers produced by the political lobbies. While others, 
having a desire to reach a higher position, may support privatization so as to be 
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recognized for creativity. Undeniably, the reason for a plea involves many explanations. 
Rules are made because they lure associations of people having corresponding yet not 
very similar interests. In this case, privatization is not a rare phenomenon. Similar to 
several typologies, the typology developed by us tends to study events in isolation and 
overlooks those instances that oppose the vitality of a political lifespan. Tactics can 
change and privatization ventures carried out to accomplish a group of goals might 
transform in nature when distinct communities organize to attain power, or, as main 
players, re-establish their interests keeping in mind the ever-changing circumstances.  
 
Lastly, while securing our typology in the inspirations of the main players, we 
are bringing attention to the effect of a single main aspect while the other main aspects 
having the real effect are being excluded. Even if the conditions were appropriate, there 
is a chance that things will not go as planned. We do not suggest that the struggle for 
privatization to bring changes in the system will have any greater effect even if the 
privatization policies were completely executed. The reason why we have chosen to aim 
for inspiration is that there exists a foundation for exploring the various types of 
sanctioned privatizations, their documented justifications and the associations endorsing 
them to obtain political motives. However, it is too early to conclude empirically the 
comparative impact of the latest privatization ventures. Whether these constraints offset 
the part played by a typology is based on the characteristics of its design and the manner 
in which it is used. Typologies should be presented as abstract tools for empirical 
research of significant occurrences rather than being posed as ends, because in so doing, 
they become damaging. The demonstrative worth of typology is stressed in the 
discussion without ignoring several intricate and dynamic characteristics of the 
instances under consideration. Moreover, we start adding onto our first typology by 
shifting from inspirations to the real effects. Keeping in view these changes, we provide 
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the critical view of the political groundwork of every type of privatization 
tactic(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). 
 
3.3.5. Pragmatic Privatizations 
 
During the start of the 1980s, Raymond Vernon came up with a practical justification 
for the presence of different privatization projects throughout the world: such policies 
emerged due to the reduction in the capital at that time (Vernon, 1988).  Although a lot 
of research related to policy learning about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
government intervention had been carried out, the policies did not mirror a fundamental 
philosophical move. Practical privatizations are short-range and most of the time 
temporary and quick solutions to the issues, for instance, the requirement for cash. 
Many of the subsidiaries of the Italian corporation IRI were put on sale for the same 
reason (Vernon 1988). In spite of the presence of an authorized rule not to privatize, St. 
Gobain in France did the exact opposite (Schmidt, 1988).  
 
The United States can be given the credit for carrying out most of the pragmatic 
privatizations, particularly at the metropolitan level. In early 1932, privatization of the 
user fees and the city services took place setting a standard for the manner in which the 
policies in the 1980s would be formulated. These diverse arrangements undertaken by 
the government represented a series of pragmatic adjustments rather than a broad 
unacknowledged privatization movement undertaken up until now. These arrangements, 
aimed at the expansion of the public sector rather than to shrink the governmental 
empire (Henig, 1989). The process of privatizing public services is based on an 
apolitical conception, which leads to the fact that the private and public sectors are 
surrounded by entirely different goals. The public sector is perceived as the one 
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delivering the civil service while the private sector is considered as a combination of 
hierarchically organized firms. The public sector stresses the protection of rights of the 
citizens, due processing, and administrative fairness. On the other hand, the private 
sector focuses on adopting new and innovative technology, economic efficiency and 
flexibility (Donahue, 1991). Privatization incurs a change within an organization for the 
attainment of goals for which the private forms are considered to be the most suitable. 
In fact, privatization provides an administrative solution to a functional problem. This 
ideology, which separates the domains of the public and private sectors, is superficially 
expressed in apolitical form (Sales, 1991). In the late nineteenth- to early twentieth-
century, this technocratic outlook was depicted in the local government of the United 
States, which is derived from the Progressive Era, and also in the French municipal 
elections of the “nonpartisan” good government slates since the 1960s (Suleiman, 
1974). Therefore, in comparison to Britain, these two countries had the probability of 
privatization occurring at the local level, while partisan politics made systematic efforts 
in drawing authority from Labor-dominated councils under Margaret Thatcher and thus 
remained out in the open.    
 
The examples of pragmatic privatizations mentioned above usually take place in 
environments that are not politicized to a great extent and portray trivial thoughts 
towards ideology. This implies that these are the areas that follow the famous 
expression by Schattschneider and are the ones that are insulated from the “mobilization 
of bias” (Schattschneider, 1975). 
 
Pragmatic privatizations occur in areas that have already been depoliticized and 
are in the process of reinforcing that depoliticization, rather than being completely 
apolitical. A conflict is privatized due to a lengthy list containing ideas relating to 
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localism, individualism, free private enterprise, economy and privacy in government. 
This is done in order to limit the scope of privatization and public authority for 
broadening the scope of the conflict. An enormous amount of conflict can be amicably 
controlled by making it private to such an extent that it becomes almost invisible 
(Schattschneider, 1975).  
 
This, however, does not imply that pragmatic privatizing authorities are 
considered insincere keeping in view their apolitical intent; instead they tend to view 
their actions in a way that is beneficial for their constituents or at least caters to the 
majority of them. Therefore, the city managers have the idea of saving money at the 
expense of hurting small groups, as privatization of garbage collections is harmful for 
public sector unions. This is due to the fact that private firms pay lower wages; 
however, the city managers are of the view that they can raise valuable funds for worthy 
purposes like education, by adopting this practice.   
 
Public firm managers use pragmatic privatization in situations where the 
allocation of stock to private shareholders or sale of subsidiaries would be beneficial in 
attaining short-term profits or instrumental in making long-term strategy (Feigenbaumet 
al., 1998). Mitterrand, the President of France, precluded the keeping of public firms, as 
his "ni . . . ni . . . [neither . . . nor .. .]" electoral promise conforms the electoral promise 
of neither new nationalizations nor new privatizations (Feigenbaum et al., 1998).  
Another form of pragmatic privatization occurs as a consequence of a crisis, intended at 
solving the internal budgetary crisis or catering to the deficit of the external balance of 
payments along with the devising of an austerity plan.  
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Third World countries depict this sort of pragmatic privatization. Mexico and 
Ghana also fall in the same category of pragmatic privatization (Feigenbaum et al., 
1998). Decisions are not based on any sort of emptiness; however, the motives here are 
not necessarily honest. Financial conditions might pressurize the external financial 
authorities to make the decision in favor of privatization (Babai, 1988). Most of the 
restricted areas and depoliticized undergo pragmatic privatization, while political 
scenarios experience tactical privatization. This privatization caters to the political 
benefits on a short-term basis and may also lend a hand in providing long-term impacts. 
Britain and France illustrate clear cut examples explaining the fact that rewarding 
political friends or providing benefits to the voter might be a core motive behind 
privatization policies.  
 
The Chirac government of 1986-88 in France depicted the clearest example of 
this fact by privatizing nationalized companies for tactical reasons. This act was 
justified by declaring that the state companies were being poorly run, although the profit 
and loss statements disapproved these usual justifications by presenting a positive 
performance under state management (Feigenbaum, 1989). Privatization provided the 
conservative party a big platform for elevating themselves above the socialists. The 
conservatives were not provided a chance to deploy their own ideas as the socialists had 
started to deregulate the economy, liberalize capital markets and reduce the taxes since 
1983. Although the deregulation was implemented for pragmatic reasons, the public 
sector was blamed for the problems occurring in France, particularly the 
nationalizations of the socialists (Loriaux 1991). The same electoral logic was also 
followed by the Thatcher government. Privatization turned out to be a useful tactic for 
the run-up to the first re-election campaign, although it was not considered to be a part 
of the initial economic agenda of the government. 
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During 1981, the application and use of monetarism was lost owing to the 
massive deflationary consequences. This made Sir Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher and 
Sir Geoffrey Howe formulate a policy initiative aimed at revitalizing the ideology of the 
free-market. Privatization opened a new era by drastically cutting down the increasing 
trend of unemployment and contracting the industrial production. It also responded to 
the party‟s natural constituency by enhancing the opportunities for attaining more profit 
(Wolfe, 1989).  
 
After the return of the Thatcher government, it decided to use privatization as a 
source of reducing public sector borrowing by risking crowding out private investment. 
This was done as the rising PSBR was becoming a source of political embarrassment 
(Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990). Another tactical advantage of privatizing the public 
sector companies was that the shares of newly privatized firms were sold at a discounted 
rate to the friends of the companies (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). This trend actually 
follows the first rule of politics according to which one reward one‟s friends while 
punishing one‟s enemies. This rule was followed by both France and Britain (Bauer, 
1988). Tactical policies were quite secret in Britain just like the private asset sales, 
although several motives favored various privatizations there. However, they were 
mostly covert, as Peter Self explains: It was clearly depicted by the Thatcherism 
strategy that private profits can run down the state as opposed to building it up much 
more quickly. Those who benefit from these strategies include city institutions apart 
from public industry, employees and management. The city institutions make immense 
benefit from the privatization strategy. Not only this, the main gainers are the 
households who get relief in tax payment, which is financed by the sale of public assets 
(Self, 1990). Pragmatic privatization targets the situations depicting poor performance 
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or the problems persistent in the surroundings, while tactical privatization is considered 
not to have an end in itself. Tactical privatization revolves around political opportunism 
and the amount of “booty” at stake. Therefore, in some circumstances, privatization is a 
target of opportunity. These cases usually are the ones where resistance is weak or 
strong allies are present at hand (Self, 1990).  
 
 The sale of national airlines favored by private transportation interests depicts an 
example of the latter, while the initiatives taken by the Bush administration for public 
housing illustrates the former. The motive of this strategy is to neutralize the short-term 
opposition in to a long-term project. These types of benefits are favored by the political 
weaknesses pertaining to minority residents with low income or public housing. Not 
only this, disarray, fragmentation and dispiritedness among the organizations that had 
taken up their cause in the past also benefit these initiatives. Therefore, offering shares 
to employees and managers at discounted rate further sweetens the concept of 
privatization (Letwin 1988). According to Self (1990), it is not necessary to use a 
frontal attack as part of the tactics, because such an attack would be a failure given the 
accumulated interests of the political parties. Instead, small transitional changes that 
offers political benefits to the groups who have been at a disadvantage because of the 
political system.  
 
 In contrast to this, Stuart Butler talks about the strategy of the British to bring 
down the coalition normally is likely to face opposition from the British Telecom sales 
saying that the break down was achieved by offering the key people discounted or free 
stock in addition to the below-market issue pricing so that immediate benefit to the 
stockholders can be realized through the appreciation of their stock holdings (Butler, 
1987).   
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 According to Babai (1988), a different tactical privatization may be used by the 
Third World countries because it is demanded by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund as a prerequisite for additional funding. Furthermore, Babai (1988) 
noted that even though the aforementioned lending institutions‟ demands may be 
satisfied by simply introducing the market principles in the public sector instead of full 
asset sales, this is marked as the price of the loan.  
 
 It is recommended by the World Bank to liquidate or divest the assets of the 
states in twenty-five of its thirty-eight structural loan adjustments that it forwarded 
between 1980 and 1986 to the developing countries. Furthermore, Feigenbaum and 
Henig (1994) stated that it is recommended in thirty-six out of thirty-eight loans to 
increase the market orientation of the state companies. Feigenbaum and Henig (1994) 
further stated that when the Third World leaders are provided with funds, a degree of 
legitimacy, and in-kind service, from the international financial community, they induce 
the local governments to liberalize their assets for tactical reasons even when the 
governments are not sure of any free market and long-term advantage for their citizens. 
Many of the privatization programs‟ inconsistencies are also explained using tactical 
privatization. For instance, the Thatcher government privatized the national gas 
company in order to create a single monopoly despite promising to adhere to 
competitive market principles. The government went through with this because the sale 
of monopolies offered the quickest possible sale, which was hoped to give the program 
of privatization a dynamic appearance after the October 1987 stock market crash. 
According to Feigenbaum et al. (1998), the chances of reducing the deficit was 
sacrificed by the French conservatives by selling their companies at discounts to rich 
political friends. 
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3.3.6. Systemic Privatization 
 
The impact of the systemic privatization is considered to be the most far reaching as 
well as the most ideological. This is because this privatization aims to change the class 
relations permanently instead of being a technocratic solution to address a limited 
number of problems. There are three types of systemic privatization.  
The first type of systemic privatization consists of non-transient change to pursue the 
interests of the mobilized agenda as they are conceived. When this situation arises, the 
state withdraws, which results in a non-ready and substantial reversible power decrease 
of the working class people in respect to the organized high people. According to Wolfe 
(1989), this may happen when the efforts of privatization functions basically to 
undermine the organized labor power, such as relocation of jobs to a non-union private 
sector from a union public sector. This type of systemic privatization is known as a 
power shift.  
 
 The second type systemic privatization involves a non-transient change in the 
culture, expectations and values of the active public, which results in the activities‟ 
sphere broadening, which was regarded as private and personal, and the shrinking of the 
activities‟ sphere, which was considered to consist of legitimate solutions for public 
intervention and scrutiny. In this respect, the privatization effect is to subtly 
delegitimize the public sector by combining the ideological perspective with broader 
constituencies that are already shared with the supporters of privatization. For instance, 
in Britain, the key actors were to permanently transform the relation of the citizens to 
each other by breaking down the class restraints. The basic reason was to change the 
Marxian British society to a Hobbesian society. According to Hall (1983), privatization 
replaces the use of “them” to “us”, which creates an equivalent that “they and we 
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combined equals we”. Further, privatization uses the concept of “we” to build capital 
using profitability and accumulation.  
 
 Ironically, Carnoy (1984) stated that the policies of privatization have become a 
mechanism through which a country can delegitimize itself as well as the elite class can 
enhance their cultural hegemony. This type of systemic privatization is known as a 
perceptual shift. In contrast, the third type of systemic privatization consists of a non-
transient institutional restructuring or arrangements within the society, such as legal, 
economic or political in order to achieve greater reliance on the market-oriented and 
private solutions is encouraged by the range of incentives offered to the groups or 
individuals. The aim behind restructuring is to change the responsibilities of the 
institutions so that the decision process shifts from the public sector to the private.  
An influential British supporter of systemic privatization, Madsen Pirie, pointed out that 
the public assets transfer to the private sector removes any political status as entities and 
transforms it into economic status entities (Pirie, 1988). Furthermore, Pirie (1988) 
pointed out that once these assets become economic entities, the decisions made will be 
economic also. This is known as an institutional shift of systemic privatization.  
  
 According to Wolfe (1989), the implication of this type of systemic privatization 
is to bring a change in the social control mechanism from the political and overt 
bureaucratic structure to a more subtle and less accountable force of the economic 
market. In order to evaluate any changes in the institutional accountability system, it is 
important to differentiate between non-democratic and democratic countries. Even 
though the nature of control is changed, the accountability also changes in various 
directions depending on the previous bureaucratic control form and regulatory system in 
place after privatization of the asset. 
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 As such, the process of privatization in previously non-democratic states may 
increase accountability of the bureaucracies if it was previously not the case. In contrast, 
according to Feigenbaum et al. (1998), the accountability loss in the democratic states 
may be improved if regulatory systems are setup by the states that can obscure the 
abuses of the private enterprises.  
 
 The motives of the privatizing may also be explained using the accountability 
paradigm in new democratic states. For instance, the rule of Franco was associated with 
the public ownership in Spain because of which privatization was preferred as a 
pragmatic solution by the neo-classic trained technocrats as well as the advancement in 
the status of democratization by the socialists (Bermeo, 1990).  The effect of the 
privatization is systemic whether it is motivated by democratic ideology or neoclassical 
thought. Sometimes, the changes in the class relationships are bought by the 
institutional rearrangement by developing new classes or interests. According to 
Feigenbaum et al. (1998), this has been seen in Eastern Europe where the privatized 
intuitions are being handed over to the citizens instead of foreign investors. This is 
because once privatized, these companies have their own interests, which are considered 
to diverge from the interests of the government. Feigenbaum (1989) stated that the 
Western experience has proved to be a guide for the private companies to influence the 
public policies for their own interest.  
 
3.3.7. Conceptualizing Political Interests 
 
When the economic and administrative perspectives are considered, the motives for 
privatization remain unanswered. This is because both perspectives assume that the 
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relevant intentions are unified, stable and apparent. Both the perspectives differ when 
each consider the different interests to be relevant. For instance, the economic 
perspective is based on the concept of individual interests that are defined privately 
while the economic interests are based on the public interests that are defined 
politically. When the political perspective is considered in relation to the 
aforementioned perspectives, it is based on the concept that the interests are not only in 
conflict with each other but also divided. As such, the latter perspective is assumed to 
be best suited for understanding the privatization battles that cause resistance by the 
organized political powers for delegation of privatization decisions to depoliticize the 
technical units institutionally.  The political typology depicting the differences between 
the privatization initiatives is presented in table 3.3. When the vertical dimension of the 
presented figure is observed, the economic and administrative perspectives place high 
emphasis on the government‟s choice.  
 
 According to Salamon and Lund (1989), the differences between the methods of 
privatization mentioned in the three columns, such as contracting out, asset sales, user 
fee and deregulation, although considered to be important, they are less significant when 
compared to the differences observed moving along the horizontal plane. 
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 The pragmatic type asset sale is similar to the terminology and applicability of 
the pragmatic deregulation initiative. Although, a pragmatically asset sale clashes 
abruptly  
in the beginning as well as the consequences that are assured by disciplined or systemic 
affairs. 
 
Table 3.3 The Political Dimension Of Privatization 
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 Pragmatic tactical Systemic 
Key motives  
 
Public sector 
“triage”  
 
- Reduce budget 
drain  
- adjust to changing 
circumstances  
Short-term shift in 
party or interest 
group clout   
-  attract voters 
- reward supporters  
- product 
differentiation  
Long-term shift in balance of 
power 
-  lower expectations of         
government    
- reduce government capacity  
- transform political stakes  
Asset sales  Shedding costly 
public enterprise 
where private 
provision has 
become a viable 
alternative  
Selling profitable 
public assets at 
discounted prices 
as a form of 
patronage  
Selling public housing in order 
to convert tenants to a (more 
conservative) homeowner‟s 
mentality  
Contracting 
out  
Competitive bidding 
among private firm 
to provide services 
where contracting 
agency has 
enforcement 
capacity  
Awarding 
“sweetheart” 
contract to 
campaign 
contributor  
Shifting government provided 
services to private providers to 
build new interest group that 
will lobby for further 
privatization  
Deregulation Deregulating sectors 
that are not natural 
monopolies , 
coupled with 
protection consumer 
interests  
Reduced 
enforcement of 
regulations that fall 
heavily on political 
supporters  
Across-the- board 
delegitimization of regulatory 
intervention and government 
capacity to oversee and 
enforce  
User fees  Raising new 
revenues and 
diversifying revenue 
alternatives  
Making it possible 
for the government 
party to cut (or 
provide raising) an 
unpopular tax  
Reducing the net progressively 
of public policies  
 Source : Feigenbaum, H., Henig, J., & Hamnett, C. (1998). Shrinking the state: The political 
underpinnings of privatization: Cambridge Univ Pr. 
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 The version of procedural privatization that is related to phenomena called 
power transfer is conventional and the divided models are critically well suited for 
analyzing this type of privatization. 
 
Accepting the capacity for apparent procedural changes in an institution raises 
the need for a methodical way that easily establishes political opinions, which are 
manageable as well as the organizational behavior that gives importance to some 
opinions over the others. 
The basic rules of the play have changed after the wider effects of procedural 
privatization and the influential individuals consider their choices and adapt their plans. 
According to Schattschneider (1975), by drastically changing the chances for personal 
capacity and degrading the organizational ability of the public sector to cater to the 
public needs, the procedural privatization ensures some individuals of working in an 
atmosphere where “mobilization of bias” prevails.  
 
Moreover Feigenbaum and Heing (1994) proposed the theory that even if some 
of the actors play their political games, the process of privatization also brings some 
new opportunities like giving birth to new private institutions and groups, and the 
selling of stocks to individual buyers and companies establishes a cluster of investors, 
which widens the scope of interests. These newly created power groups try to intimidate 
the policy makers when feeling dissatisfied with the government policy or seeing 
greener pastures elsewhere. According to Feigenbaum (1993), privatization perpetually 
alters the scenario of interests by which policy makers operate. The political 
entrepreneurs are able to assemble new nodes of collective action, this happens due to 
the opportunities that are created by non-incremental changes that take place in both 
society and state. Privatization can give relief to the government as far as a few issues 
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are concerned, but there would be other problems that would prevail. Today‟s public 
policies would achieve successful results but the future outcomes would definitely face 
obstacles. 
 
3.3.8. From Motive To Consequence 
 
The immediate appearance of privatization across the country is a matter that attracts 
particular interest. We have decided to provide greater motivation to the political actors 
with the anticipation that the distinct interests of dominant actors will disclose the 
mechanism of policy making and agenda formation. However, there is a possibility that 
the intentions of the political actors are not materialized. It is highly probable that the 
actions of the political actors may go wrong, even the endeavors made by them can fail, 
which are taken to encourage the structural realignments. Hawkins argued that the 
initiatives of the West German privatization of 1957 prefigured the Thatcher model in 
many perspectives (Hawkins, 1999). 
     
 The purpose behind the Thatcher model was to win at least a little support of 
the middle and the working class with respect to stock possession and to obtain greater 
adherence to market forces and capitalism. The long-term effects on the ownership of 
stock remained restricted (Esser 1988). Those objectives that do not involve systematic 
alterations are often not met due to the flawed strategies or inappropriate 
implementation approach. Efforts that fail in such a way do not have much impact on 
the role of the government, the perception of the citizens, the distribution of power and 
the influence of public organizations. There are cases, under which the consequences 
differ completely from the intentions of the principal actors.  
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 The policy makers have defined three different categories of privatization under 
the horizontal dimensions, while the vertical dimensions include the interest groups, the 
social classes, and the penalties of the government. Each cell consists of a brief 
explanation of the patterns of privatization. Our typology gives birth to new 
opportunities concerning the theoretical consideration and observed valuation, which is 
why it would not be wrong to take the typology as an analytical tool. Under what 
situations the state should take steps for the introduction of essential market oriented 
reforms, is still a question. Another question arises as to the logical initiation of 
privatization, which would develop a force that would help in realigning the state with 
the society. In order to get the answers to these questions the typology must come into 
action. As privatization sets out a firm footing, the policies relating to privatization 
would soon be scrutinized. 
 
3.4. Modes of privatization 
 
Well known techniques of privatization are present in developed as well as in 
developing and transition countries from Eastern and Central Europe. 
 
3.4.1. Privatization by Selling Shares to the Public 
    
 A public listed company issues shares to the general public. For the issue of shares 
there are a number of options like, for instance, the shares can be issued on a national as 
well as an international platform or even to a group or one person in particular. In most 
cases an issuer is hired who sells bonds at his own risk. This thus eliminates the risk of 
the state. The issuer can be an investment bank. There are situations under which only 
parts of the shares of the public entity are sold to the private companies, this is done in 
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order to raise the number of shares. This can only be brought in to practice if two 
conditions are satisfied (Romer, 1998). 
      
An entity that is to be privatized must have the potential to make profit in future, 
as then would it be an attractive factor for the invertors. There are a number of benefits 
that are obtained through the issuance of shares of public companies. It distributes the 
shareholding into the hands of a number of individuals, therefore not letting the 
shareholding to be concentrated in a few hands. This gives an open opportunity to the 
small investors, and this enables them to create popular capitalism. In addition to this 
privatization also brings transparency of the accounts (Kenawy, 2009). 
 
 Despite these advantages there are a number of demerits, which are attached to 
the issuance of shares (Ramanadham, 1995). One disadvantage is the complexity of 
issuing shares, if one company decides to issue shares it has to bear a huge transaction 
cost and would even have to devote a great deal of time. The cost is so high that it 
creates a crowding out effect. The crowding out effect basically explains the situations 
under which the access of a number of private investors becomes very hard. In countries 
that are not very developed the capital markets are not found to be that sound, therefore 
they do not have enough funds to support the companies financially. This causes the 
individual shareholders to lose their control over the managers who are supposed to be 
their agents. Those owners who have made big investments in the company have greater 
say over the management. 
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3.4.2. Privatizing Through Share-selling to Private Investors 
      
Under this process the shares are issued to selected investors rather than offering to the 
general public. This process is less complicated and is subject to less transaction cost. 
Those countries that do not have well established capital markets find this method more 
convenient. This practice is mostly adopted by those companies that are not very 
productive and require necessary expertise for the technological domain (Starr, 1990).  
If shares are being issued by this process then there should be proper selection criteria 
for potential buyers. The buyer should be competent, must have experience as well as 
financial power. Only if the buyer meets the criterion would he be able to become a 
successful new owner and bring about better results (Kenawy, 2009). 
  
   The future owners get more flexible with the upcoming policies of the 
companies. Apart from these advantages there are a few disadvantages as well, which 
are listed by (King and Levine, 1993). The disadvantages are as follows: 
     Propriety and revenue creates danger for the organizations. By acquiring shares the 
private investors gain control and possess the ability to throw the unwanted individuals, 
groups and institutions out of the domain.  The investors should be selected as per a 
specific criteria, if this is not done then it is highly likely that the chances of corruption 
would increase. Even greater transparency can be achieved if a proper mechanism is 
followed for the assortment of potential buyers. 
 
3.4.3. Management Buy-in Privatization (MBI) 
 
MBI is a new methodology adopted by the managers in which the managers buy the 
share stock of the enterprise as entrepreneur. This is an effective alternative to the 
previous buying procedure of the stock carried out by private sector investors. 
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MBI methodology is specifically designed for the enterprises where not only the capital 
is required but also the enterprise possesses high technology that is being used in 
different developed countries regarding the sales and marketing fields along with an 
effective costing system (Levine, 1999). 
 
3.4.4. Management and Employee Buy-out Privatization (MBO or EBO) 
 
MBO/EBO (management or employee buy-out) is the advanced methodology adopted 
by the management as well as the entire staff of the enterprise who themselves buy the 
company for privatization. MBO/EBO generally adopted by the public sector 
organizations. These organizations are mostly facing critical economic conditions but 
possess sound management, which comprises highly skilled and qualified workers who 
can run the organization effectively. Sometimes firms adopt this method for fulfilling 
the market demands by restructuring (Plane 1997), as discussed below: 
The sale of an enterprise depends upon the maintaining of the jobs that exist in the 
enterprise, without which the sale could not be done. 
 
The management of the organization must be highly motivated to handle all the 
new responsibilities of every staff member. In the method of EBO, the 
misunderstandings and distrust present among the workers against the management is 
restrained and there are also chances that external participation of personnel could also 
take place. 
 
Along with the advantages related to this method there are also several 
drawbacks, which are discussed below. The two main disadvantages given by 
McKinnon (1993) are: One of the drawbacks of this method is that it is not considered 
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to lead the enterprise towards the desired aims and long-term replacements of 
employees selected socially or politically. The power relating to bureaucracy remains 
the same as in the old system. The major point, which is not acceptable by the people, 
as it is very hard to believe that a professional enterprise manager selected from the 
system of the centralized economy could be hired on the basis of market demands.  
In such situations where the transference of ownership to the previous management is 
considered conservative it could lead to the reduction of the required capital and the 
economy of the running market.   
 
3.4.5. Privatization Through the So Called Phenomenon of “Leveraged-buy-out” 
 
The Leveraged-Buy-out is another method of privatization to MBO/EBO, which was 
known before these new methods. In this method of privatization a large number of 
workers, either including managers or not, are involved and their wages are so high that 
it can support the capitalization of funds as well as the external funds required by the 
organizations, involvement of credit companies, owners of the public enterprises or 
government. Warranties are also offered for organizations‟ equity or future income 
(Levine, 1999). 
 
3.4.6. Privatization through Selling of the Privatization Individual Assets 
 
This is also a new method of privatization by selling the privatization of individual 
assets. This method involves straight selling of goods regarding the individual assets of 
an enterprise, whether they are connected by any relation or not, also the assets 
correlated to each other involving different working organizations. Liquidation is also 
once involved in direct trade of patrimonial goods that is the privatization of materials 
of correlated organizations could not be possible economically as well as financially  
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Some of the cases involve the selling of isolated parts with the brain of the companies 
remaining untouched. Auctions, shares and communication mediums are taken under 
consideration for selling to the interested parties (Porta et al., 2002). 
 
3.4.7. Privatization Through Restitution to Former Owners 
 
This method is under practice in the former socialist countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, where with the restoration of the economy, many people were deprived of their 
assets. Therefore, returning these enterprises to former owners, will involve many legal 
complications while identifying the former owners and keeping them away, which 
makes the method more expensive in such circumstances (Beesley and Littlechild, 
1994).  
 
3.4.8. Privatization Through Coupons (Voucher Privatization) 
 
Privatization through direct selling has limitations in Europe because in these countries 
different forms of contributions have been evolved, which hinder the fast transfer of 
ownership rights associated with a certain social parity. The issuance of vouchers is one 
of the common factors of privatization that enables the citizens of countries involved in 
this process to receive an equal number of coupons, without any payment or at a little 
price, which can later be exchanged for shares of a public company or land (Kenawy, 
2009).  
 
Fast and low cost privatization is one of the benefits of this method (Cook and 
Uchida, 2003). In this type of privatization, political acceptance is projected because of 
the full participation of the population. Therefore, it is commonly considered a 
widespread technique. This process of privatization is in the interests of the public as 
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they become direct owners of the government property, and gain benefit in the form of 
future earnings and fiscal facilities rather than indirect participation.   
 
Conversely, through this method the dearth of internal economic resources is 
compensated. The initial cases have, by this time, ascertained that the bulk of 
privatization plays a positive role in the advancement of investment markets. The 
amount of swapped certificates for each company exhibits the worth the citizens attach 
to it. This also serves as a basis for deciding the price for the retained stock, for 
prospective selling on the external and internal capital markets. 
 
There are some drawbacks of this means of privatization: the government is 
unable to draw any revenue obtained from the selling of an organization and also the 
companies fail to acquire the financial stability required for executing the means of 
reorganization. Apart from this, at the initial stage, there exists a comparatively high 
difference in the rights of ownership due to the inability of the shareholders to 
efficiently control the companies. 
 
Ikram (1980) stated that due to the fact that shareholders do not have adequate 
knowledge of the way the financial position of a country is evaluated, the way financial 
statements are interpreted, the performance of the meeting of the shareholders and the 
administration of the company, it is quite difficult for them to protect their own rights. 
As a result, the dearth of financial efficiency and progress could be viewed after 
privatization has taken place. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the research approach, research design, sampling 
design, data types, data collection and interpretation methodologies involved in carrying 
out the research and to test the proposed research questions the statistical tools are used. 
 
4.1. Research approach  
 
Howe (1992) described that the research approach is referred to as the methodological 
examination into a subject to schedule action plan based on the discovered facts. A 
research approach can vary significantly depending on what must be researched if it 
would be appropriate to research methods or it is a scientific method or other scientists 
who have finished the experiment. The two common approaches of research adapted 
vastly by researchers are quantitative and qualitative research.  
 
According to Barbour (1998), qualitative research defines the meanings, 
concepts, definitions, metaphors, symbols, characteristics and descriptions of things. 
Qualitative research is a multi-method in focus consisting of interpretive and naturalistic 
approaches to its matter or subject. This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings trying to interpret or make sense of phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. Similarly, Warren, Carol and Karner (2005) described 
that qualitative research is efficient in obtaining particular cultural information about the 
behaviors, opinions, social contexts and values of specific populations. The strength of 
qualitative research is its ability to offer complicated textual explanations of how people 
undergo given research problems. Conversely, Krantz (1995) described that quantitative 
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research is closely associated with deduction and reasoning from normal principles to 
particular conditions. Quantitative research focuses on the considerations that underlie 
the positivist tradition within which educational research was originally located in terms 
of applying deductive logic, hypothesis driven, achieving objectivity and causal 
relationships. In contrast, Benz and Newman (1998) mentioned that quantitative research 
characterizes the phenomena numerically to respond to particular hypotheses or 
questions. Quantitative researchers place huge value on products and outcomes. The 
quantitative research tends to be based on theory from the onset because of its deductive 
nature. Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) explained that quantitative researchers look for 
context free generalizations. They are more concerned with standardized predetermined, 
designs and research procedures. Quantitative research is done to determine the causes, 
effects and relationships. Based on the various needs, quantitative research has its own 
paradigms and characteristics underlying the research. 
 
This study adapts quantitative research. Jick (1989) defined quantitative research 
as being originally developed in natural sciences to learn the natural phenomena. 
Quantitative research is an enquiry into a recognized issue identified using statistical 
techniques and based on testing theory measured with numbers. The quantitative 
method‟s aim is to decide whether the predictive theory generalizations hold true. 
Similarly, Morgan (1998) described that quantitative research tends to concentrate on 
proof and measurement. This research adopts a scientific approach. It is regarded on the 
premise that something is only applicable if it can be counted and observed. Its major 
characteristics are numerical data, which allows an extent of statistical analysis. There 
are many approaches to quantitative research, which consists of descriptive, causal, 
experimental and correlational comparison. Roberts (2000) explained that quantitative 
research is also based on variables measuring for individual people to gain numerical 
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values that are generated for statistical analysis for interpretation and summary. 
Quantitative research is concerned with the qualitative phenomenon, i.e. phenomenon 
similar to or including kind or quality. Quantitative research is more associated with 
deductive reasoning from normal principles to particular situations. The quantitative 
method employed here described as a “retrospective case study” which follows a way of 
gathering evidence after the events is occurred, to clarify the research problem (Stern & 
Kalof, 1996). Therefore, the questionnaires are oriented to investigate and explain, 
"Why did x exist?" (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Stern and Kalof 1996). It is focusing on a 
particular event, decision, institution, location, issue or piece of legislation (King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994). 
 
The quantitative approach adopted for this study is matches pairs to compare the 
performance before and after privatization policy is implemented.  
The tests which will be adopted in this study is the same technique of  (Megginson, 
Nash, & Van Randenborgh, 1994) to decide the performance change of privatization 
and in order to assess whether there is a significant difference in the parameters studied 
at the baseline and after three years, a paired sample test was applied using SPSS.  
 
4.2. Research Design 
 
According to De-Marrais, Kathleen and Lapan (2004), the research design is the 
structure, strategy and plan of investigation so formed as to obtain answers to the 
problems and queries of research. The phase of research design deals with the brief 
description of procedures that will be acquired to carry out the study of research. This 
kind of research is carried out irrespective of whether the study is carried out in the 
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laboratory or field, and provides the descriptions of the procedures of data collection 
and the analytical procedures selection to be used to acquire the objectives of research.  
Similarly et al. (1996) described that the research design is the detailed plan or blueprint 
for how a research study is to be finished, operationalizing variables so that they can be 
measured, gathering data to be used as a basis for analyzing outcomes and testing 
hypotheses and also selecting a sample of interest to study.  
 
The research design is a plan of action of a research proposal in which 
researchers characterize how they proceed and which methods and strategies they will 
adopt. Its components are the analysis and gathering of data the extension of theory and 
intended development and the process of generating reliability and validity. In contrast, 
according to Roberts (2000), the research design manages the matters, such as choosing 
participants for research and preparing for activities of data collection that consist of the 
research process.  
 
The purpose of research design is to offer answers to research queries and to 
control the variance. A good research design assists in interpreting and understanding 
the outcomes of the study and ensures that a researcher obtains usable outcomes. There 
are several types of research designs. Among the most commonly used research designs 
are exploratory research, descriptive research, experimental research design and case 
study research designs (Fry, Chantavanich and Chantavanich, 1981).  
 
 
 147 
 
Figure 4.1 shows two kinds of research designs – conclusive and exploratory research 
design. 
Figure 4.1: Types of Research Design 
 Research design
 
Conclusive design 
 
Exploratory design 
 
Casual design 
 
Descriptive design 
 
(Mostly qualitative in nature) 
(Mostly quantitative in nature) 
 
 
4.2.1. Exploratory research design 
 
According to Bryman, Stephen and Campo (1996) exploratory research is always 
conducted to explore the problem and is usually done when the alternative choices have 
not been defined clearly or their scope is unclear. Exploratory research permits the 
researchers to briefly explore problems to popularize themselves with the concept or 
issue to be studied. Leinhardt and Leinhardt (1980) explained that the exploratory 
research design is applied when the research objectives consist of the following:-  
1) producing a more accurate formulation of a vaguely recognized issue; 2) identifying 
issues; 3) formulating and identifying alternative action courses; 4) achieving researcher 
and management prospects concerning the character of the problem situation;  
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5) implementing priorities based on the essential significance of different issues; and 6) 
collecting information on the associated problem by doing conclusive research.   
4.2.2. Conclusive research design 
Manly (1992) described that the purpose of conclusive research is to check the research 
hypotheses. Conclusive research is often quantitative and may be generated to a 
sampled population. Conclusive research is the structured collection and data analysis 
belonging to a specific issue or problem. The purpose of conclusive research is to check 
the research hypotheses. Conclusive research is often quantitative and may be generated 
to the sampled population. Similarly, Singer and Willett (2003) explained that the 
conclusive research is the structured collection and data analysis belonging to a specific 
issue or problem. It is more focused than exploratory research and requires huge 
samples and numerous limited queries to provide quantitative data to make 
determinations. As shown in the above figure, the conclusive research design may be 
either causal or descriptive in nature.  
 
According to Maxcy (2003) descriptive research defines the kind of data 
analysis, research design and questions that are applied for a given concept. The 
descriptive statistics tells us what are the causes and effects of descriptive research. 
Descriptive research can be either qualitative or quantitative. Collins, Onwuegbuzie and 
Jiao (2007) described descriptive research as involving the collection of data that 
describe the events and then depicts, tabulates, organizes and describes the collection of 
data. This research attempts to implement responses to the questions of when, what, 
how and sometimes who. Here the researcher tries to explain or define a subject, often 
by creating a profile or a gathering of issues, people and events. The major need of 
descriptive research is the description of the state of affairs as it currently occurs. On the 
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other hand, Walliman and Walliman (2010) described causal research design as being 
used to examine the relationship of the cause and effect between the variables. Causal 
research recognizes the extent to which variables are interconnected with each other. 
Causal research design depends on experiments and the conduct of interviews. 
Similarly, Elliott (2005) explained that causal research design is appropriate when the 
research objective is to recognize a variable that affects the phenomenon being 
understood and identifying why they affect what is being affected.  
 
4.2.3. Research Design adapted in this study 
 
Descriptive research design is adapted in this study. According to Miller and Gatta 
(2006), descriptive research is mere description and is fundamental to research 
enterprise. It has added immeasurably to the shape and nature of knowledge of the 
society. Descriptive research empowers several sponsored government researches 
including the gathering of a vast range of economic and social information and census 
of the population. Similarly, Schwandt (2006) explained that descriptive research helps 
researchers to produce data that can explain the characteristics and composition of 
similar groups. These groups can be employees, customers, service providers and other 
organizations. Descriptive research can generate perfect understanding about the inquiry 
groups and the interrelationships among variables. Descriptive research is a quick 
identifying investigation with sufficient interpretation. 
 
 
 150 
 
4.3. Conceptual Framework:-   
 
The main framework in figure 4.2 explains that through the outputs of the privatization 
process we can discern the real motives and goals behind the privatization, which 
determine the future outcome of the privatization process. There are visible goals and 
motives of the phenomenon In contrast; there are hidden goals and motives. Which of 
those goals and motivations are driven the privatization process in Yemen? On the other 
hand, the sub-framework in figure 4.3 shows the comparing of the performance of those 
enterprises before and after privatization.  
Figure 4.2 Main Framework 
N
S
EW
Visible Goals of 
Privatization 
Visible Key 
Motives of 
Privatization 
Outcomes of 
privatization 
program
Viability of privatization 
Hidden goals 
Hidden key 
motives 
Reflect 
Reflect 
Sub-framework
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Enterprises 
performance 
before 
privatization 
Profitability
Operating 
efficiency
Capital 
Expenditure
Output
Employment
Enterprises 
performance 
after 
privatization 
Profitability
Operating
efficiency
Capital
Expenditure
Output
Employment
VIABILITY OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
Figure 4.3 Sub-framework 
 
 
4.4. Sampling Design 
 
According to Bohn and Wolfe (1992), the sampling plan or design is the method used to 
choose significant participants from the accessible population. A complete sampling 
design represents many samples and recognizes specific samples, for instance, the 
geographic positions where those samples are gathered or when the samples are 
gathered. Complete sampling design consists of justification and an explanation of the 
number and the timings/positions of the samples along with this information. Levy and 
Lemeshow (1999) described that a well prepared sampling design is directed to ensure 
that the resulting data are sufficiently representative of the target population and 
justifiable for their intended use. The effective use of human resources (HR), time and 
 152 
 
money are difficult assumptions throughout the process of sampling design. A better 
design must attain the study requirements with minimum expenditure of resources. The 
sampling techniques are of two – probability sampling and non-probability sampling.  
Cox, Cox and Ensor (1997) described probability sampling as applying the 
theory of sampling and consists of random sampling selection of units. An important 
feature of probability sampling is that every population member from which the sample 
was chosen has a known probability selection. Similarly, Elder, Thomson and Myers 
(1980) mentioned that statistical inferences are made about the sampled population from 
the data acquired from the sampling units when a probability sampling is used. Each 
probability of selection may be unequal or equal but it must be non-zero and should be 
known. The methods of probability sampling are: 1) Simple random sampling; 2) 
Cluster sampling; 3) Systematic sampling; 4) Multi stage sampling; and 5) Stratified 
sampling. 
Smith (1983) conveyed that samples that are not selected randomly are known as 
non-probability sampling. Here one selects customers based on the researcher‟s 
judgment, nonrandom samples or other convenience process. Since subjectivity is 
included in the sampling process, each probability of customers is not determined which 
is being involved in the sample. Similarly, Gore and Patil (1994) explained that as a 
result the sampling error is not measured and there is greater risk that the statistical 
inference related to non-probability samples are biased. The methods of non-probability 
sampling are: 1) Convenience sampling; 2) Snowball sampling; 3) Quota sampling; and 
4) Judgment sampling (Reason, 2006).  
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4.4.1. Population and Sampling  
 
This research made use of secondary as well as primary data for the study. For the 
primary data, it adapts probability sampling or simple random sampling. According to 
Gore, Patil and Taillie (1996), a simple random sample is the subset of a bigger 
population created in such a way that every population element has a common 
probability of being chosen for the subset. The procedure for drawing a sample to 
satisfy the simple random sampling definition is referred to as simple random sampling. 
Specific units of sampling are chosen using random numbers and entire available 
selections of a given amount of units are similarly probable in simple random sampling. 
Similarly, Mode, Conquest and Marker (1999) explained that the simple random 
sampling is simple to understand and the formulas for deciding the size of the sample 
are similarly straightforward. Simple random sampling is very useful when the 
population is similarly homogeneous. The benefits of simple random sampling are that: 
1) it is simple to implement and simple to understand; 2) it offers unbiased calculations 
of proportions, variability and means statistically; and 3) the calculations of data 
analysis and sample size are very straightforward. 
 
 In contrast, Muttlak (1995) mentioned that, in some cases, the implementation of 
simple random sampling is more critical than some other kinds of designs due to the 
criticality of accurately recognizing random geographic places. Additionally, simple 
random sampling is more expensive than other schedules if criticalities in acquiring 
samples because of the location affects of extra effort expenditure.    
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The target respondents are the people from the privatization committee, labor union, 
academic committee, and ruling and opposition parties of Yemen as it show in figure 
4.4. Questionnaires distributed to various managers and board director of the Technical 
Privatization Office, those whom were members of the privatization committee, ruling 
party, opposition parties, labor unions, and academic.   
 
The study sample was selected from among those because they have a close 
relationship to the privatization process. The Office Technical privatization had a role 
overseeing the privatization   process and the entire text of the law so that, TPO has the 
important information about the privatization program. The Members of the 
Privatization Committee were who doing the privatization procedures of the enterprises 
concerned. They have a fully information of the situation of those enterprises before the 
privatization process, and also to the problems and constraints faced during the 
privatization process, whether related to methods , procedures or related to the pressures 
and interventions during the evaluation process. Political parties, both ruling party and 
opposition parties, the choice were to the members of parliament because the has full 
information of the legal aspect of the privatization program and the problems of 
approval and suitability of the situation in Yemen, as well as a fully understanding of 
the problems subsequent to the privatization process.  
 
 Labor Union representing the supervisory authority that is keen on the workers‟ 
demands and solve their problems, including those problems resulting from the 
privatization process. 
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Finally, academics were selected from those who have the attention of the 
administration, economics, law and knowledge of the international experience 
theoretically and in practically. Therefore, they can compare the Yemenis‟ privatization 
experience of with others then appointed the differences and the weaknesses in 
administrative and legal aspects as well as policies. 
 
 ACADIMIC 
 RULING PARTY 
(50% FROM PARLIAMENT) 
(50% FROM GOVERNERATE) 
TPO & members of the privatization committee
OPPOSITION PARTIES
(50% FROM PARLIAMENT) 
(50% FROM GOVERNERATE) 
 LABOR UNION
QUESTIONAIRE  DISTRIBUTION
FIGURE 4.4 Questionnaire distribution
 
A questionnaire has been developed from al-Sayani (1996), Ismail (1998), Al-Saidi 
(2002) Habtoor (1997), and Al-Rubaie (2001).  
The sample size for the quantitative study is 177 and the data was collected by 
distributing questionnaires to the respondents by hand. 
 
 156 
 
A pilot study was carried out to test the questionnaire to improve the quality by 
distributing it to 30% of the total 405 respondents which is 121 respondents. 
Subsequently, the questionnaire was revised before being distributed to all the 
respondents. This study was sent to 234 respondents which were different from the 
returned 30%, however, only 177 questionnaires were returned as we can see in table 
4.1 therefore giving a response rate of 75.64% and Cronbach‟s Alpha to the 
questionnaire was 0.703. Cronbach‟s alpha is a test reliability technique that requires 
only a single test administration to provide a unique estimate of the reliability for a 
given test and it does not provide reliability estimates for single items. 
 
When using Likert-type scales it is imperative to calculate and report 
Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient for internal consistency reliability for any scales or 
subscales one may be using. The analysis of the data then must use these summated 
scales or subscales and not individual items. If one does otherwise, the reliability of the 
items is at best probably low and at worst unknown. 
 
Conventionally, editors and reviewers consider a measure with alpha equal to or 
greater than 0.70 as reliable for research purposes (Bland & Altman, 1997) and this is 
frequently a criterion for publishing the outcome measure. But should this always be the 
case? Helms et al. (2006) suggested that this value is required for unspecified reasons. 
 
Furthermore, Cronbach‟s alpha, being a statistical tool, requires data to meet 
specific assumptions for the reliability estimates to be accurate and meaningful. 
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Otherwise, the reliability of the outcome measure might be underestimated. Therefore, 
Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) proposed that the reported reliability should be 
evaluated by taking into account the specific circumstances of each study before 
claiming lack of reliability for a developed outcome measure. 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Questionnaire 
 
Participators category 
Number of 
participators 
Number of 
Questionnaire 
distributed 
Number of 
Questionnaire 
collected 
1- TPO& members of 
the privatization 
committee 
 
40 
 
40 
 
35 
2- Academic 40 30 24 
3- Labor union 24 24 20 
4- Ruling party 228 100 70 
5- Opposition parties 73 40 28 
Total 405 234 177 
 
4.4.2.  Primary data  
 
Chisholm, Rupert and Elden (1993) described primary data as being collected directly 
from the researcher for some particular purpose or study. It may be gathered by 
methods, such as questionnaires and/or personal investigation. The primary data were 
gathered with the help of questionnaires for this research. A questionnaire is a vehicle 
used to pose queries, which the researcher needs the respondents to answer.  
 
In this research, sliding scale questions were used since the research used 
quantitative analysis. Sliding scale questions asked the respondents to scale predefined 
answers that are closest to their viewpoints. sliding scale questions are more simple to 
respond to and tabulate than open ended but they do not permit respondents to 
elaborate. 
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The first step is to specify the information needed. A continual review of the 
earlier stages of the research project, particularly the specific components of the 
problem, the research questions, and the objectives, will help keep 
the questionnaire focused and the other steps are listed in figure 4.5. 
Questionnaires should also be designed with the target respondents in mind, 
taking into account their educational level and experience. The language used and the 
context of the questions must all be familiar to the respondents. Keep in mind the 
characteristics of the respondents, particularly their experience.  
Problem definition 
Exploratory interviews with those 
knowledgeable about the problem itself or 
matters directly related to it
Review of personal experience and that 
of colleagues 
Search for secondary data 
relevant to the problem 
Writing of specific research 
objectives
Listing of research questions 
Development of questionnaire
Source Crawford, I. M. (1997)
Figure 4.5 the steps preceding 
questionnaire design 
 
The content of the questionnaire is divided into six sections evaluating these categories: 
1- General aspects            ( Q1 to Q10) 
2- Procedural aspects       (Q11 to Q13) 
3- Objectives aspects       (Q14 to Q19) 
4- Progress aspects          (Q20 &Q21)  
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5- Ownership aspects      (Q22 to Q24) 
6- Evaluation aspects      ( Q25 to Q30) 
4.4.3. Secondary data  
The sampling selection depended on      
1- Availability of data 
2- Privatized  time 
3- Existing and continuing of enterprises  
Three enterprises have been selected out of nine enterprises which are stay working as 
we can see in table 4.2. 
1- National Grain Silos Ltd 
2- National Cigarette & Match industries Ltd 
3- Al- Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden 
 
The time period for these enterprises operation is from 1995 until 2009 and seven 
years for the three enterprises (three year before the privatization and three year after 
privatization excluding the year of privatization).   
The data collected for this study is a secondary data like financial and accounting 
data for the case studies, published journals and materials written on the topic, including 
Yemeni policy documents, government reports, documents and government websites, 
annual reports for the three-years pre-privatization requested from the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, also the data for post-privatization requested from Technical 
Privatization Office and other relevant reading material.    
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According to Megginson, and Randenborgh (1994) in the developing countries the 
enterprises sampling number usually ranged in between 3 to 12.  
So that we can see many studies have sampling were between these ranges. For example 
Galal, and Vogelsang in the world bank study named “Welfare consequences of selling 
public enterprises” have a sample of 12 companies, Afeikhena Jerome (2008) in his 
Ta b l e  4 . 2  S t r a t i f i e d  P u r p o s i v e  S a m p l i n g
3  E n t e r p r i s e s selected where d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ****** 
9  E n t e r p r i s e s still working***** 
2 7   l i q u i d a t e d  &  N o  
l o n g e r  e x i s t * *
27  Before 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n
proces s***
3 5   a r e  n o  
l o n g e r  
w o r k i n g * * * *
9 8  E n t e r p r i s e s *   
 
*          See Appendix C1 
**         See Appendix C2 
***       See Appendix C3 
****     See Appendix C4 
*****   See Appendix C5 
******  See Appendix C6 
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study about privatization performance in Nigeria has sampling of three enterprises, and 
Ramamurti (1996) in his study about privatization monopolies survey seven enterprises.     
Because the sample size is small, the evidence cannot generalize so that questionnaire 
has adopted in order to fill the gap of small size sampling and to make general evidence 
about the privatization in Yemen.  
 
This study employed secondary data using the following measurements as 
explained in table 4.3 and the symbols A and B in the Predicted Relationship column 
represent after and before. 
 
 
a) PROFITABILITY 
 TABLE 4.3  Variable Predictions  
Variables Proxy Predicted 
Relationship 
 
 
Profitability 
 
Return on Sale(ROS)=net income/sale 
 
Return on Assets( ROA)=net income/total assets 
 
Return on equity(ROE)= net income/total equity 
 
ROSA >ROSB 
 
 
ROAA > ROAB 
 
ROEA > ROEB 
 
Operating efficiency 
 
Sale efficiency(SALEFF) = Sale / total employment 
 
Net income efficiency(NIEFF) = Net income / total           
employment 
 
SALEEFA > SALEEFB 
 
NIEFFA > NIEFFB 
 
 
Capital expenditure 
 
Capital expenditure to sale(CESA) = Capital  expenditure/ 
sales 
 
Capital expenditure to assets (CETA) = capital expenditure 
/ total assets 
 
 
CESAA  > CESAB 
 
 
CETAA > CETAB 
 
Output 
 
Real sale (SAL) = Nominal sale / consumer price index 
 
SALA > SALB 
 
Employment 
 
Total employment(EMPL) = Total number of employment 
 
EMPLA < EMPLB 
 Source: (D'souza and Megginson 1999)  
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 Return on Sales 
The return on sales is used to calculate the operational efficiency of an organization. 
Return on Sales is also referred to as operating profit margin of an organization. It is 
evaluated using the formula (Hills and Jones, 2007): 
Return on Sales = Net income (Before interest and tax)/Sales 
 Return on Assets 
Return on assets is the point of how profitable an organization is common to all its 
assets. Return on assets gives an idea as to how effective management is at using its 
assets to produce earnings. The return on assets is represented as a percentage and it is 
known as return on investment (Wisner, Tan and Leong, 2008). The return on assets can 
be calculated by using the formula: 
Return on Assets = Net income/Total Assets 
 Return on Equity 
According to Walton and Aerts (2006), ROE is the sum of excess revenue acquired as a 
percentage of shareholders equity. ROE measures corporation profitability by showing 
how much gain an organization produces with the cash shareholders have spent. The 
ROE can be denoted as percentage and evaluated by the formula: 
Return on Equity = Net income/Shareholder‟s equity 
 
 
b) OPERATION EFFICIENCY 
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 Sales Efficiency 
The sales efficiency, i.e. the ratio of sales per employee is used to contrast organizations 
that are common. Organizations with greater figures of sales per employee are assumed 
as being more effective than those with smaller figures. The ratio of greater sales per 
employee represents that an organization can perform with less overhead costs, and, 
therefore, do more with fewer employees, which always translates into successful gains 
(Zu, 2008). The sales efficiency can be calculated by using the formula: 
Sales efficiency = Sales/Total employment 
 Net Income efficiency 
The ratio of net income divided by total employment is known as net income efficiency 
(Bernstein, 2000). The net income efficiency is calculated by the formula: 
Net income efficiency = net income/total employment 
c) CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
 Capital Expenditure to sales 
Capital expenditure is divided by sales. The extent gives a sense of how an organization 
is spending for the future (Agar, 2005). The capital expenditure to sales is represented 
by the formula: 
Capital Expenditure on sales = Capital expenditure/sales 
 
 Capital expenditure to assets 
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The capital expenditure to assets is the ratio of capital expenditure divided by total 
assets (Vause, 2009). The capital expenditure to assets is represented by the formula: 
Capital expenditure to assets = Capital expenditure/total assets 
 
d) OUTPUT 
 Real Sale 
The real sale is the output of nominal sale divided by consumer price index (Jarvis, 
Ramesh and Wu, 2011). It is calculated by the formula: 
Real Sale = Nominal sale/consumer price index 
 
e) EMPLOYMENT 
 Total Employment 
The total employment is common to total number of employment (Taylor, 2006). The 
formula for total employment is: 
Total employment = total number of employment 
 
 
4.5. Analysis and Interpretation of data  
 
 165 
 
The data analysis and interpretation consists of the objective material in the researcher‟s 
possession and his subjective reaction and desire to derive from data the inherent 
meaning in their relation to the issue (Crowther and Lancaster, 2008).  
 
Statistical tools employed 
The statistical tools that are used for the analysis of the primary data to be collected   are: 
i. graphical method 
ii. sample percentage method 
iii. weighted average method 
The process of denoting the collected primary data in visual form or in the form of 
figures is known as graphical. This study uses bar charts for representing data.  
The analysis of a simple percentage is used in comparing between more than two 
collections of data. In this method, the percentages are used to represent relationship 
percentages and can be used to compare similar terms. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 × 100 ÷ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠  
This research makes use of the statistical techniques, such as the Karl Pearson 
Correlation test, to check the proposed hypothesis. The Karl Pearson Correlation test 
gives a result of a variable by the name coefficient of correlation, which helps in 
identifying the relationship between the quantitative dependent and independent 
variable (Weiten, 2010, p 44). The correlation coefficient is denoted by the symbol “r”.  
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The correlation coefficient “r” is evaluated by applying the formula below: 
 
Where n = number of elements 
r = correlation coefficient 
x = Variable  
y = Variable 2  
The weighted arithmetic average removes the items bias and gives a better measure of 
central tendency. The weighted average method is calculated by: 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 ÷ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠       
In any research, the obtained results are validated with the help of two parameters using 
reliability and validity. 
 
According to Karras (1992), reliability is the degree to which the measures yield 
stable results and are free from error, i.e. the measurement procedure stableness. 
According to Healy and Perry (2000), validity is referred to as the measure that tests 
whether it measures what it claims to measure. The measure is valid if it measures what 
is does so cleanly and is supposed to measure, without including these factors 
accidentally.  
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The study of correct and incorrect action is known as ethics. It implements what the 
researcher must do when confronted with a condition where the personal beliefs, rights, 
societal rules and values are in conflict.  
In summary the limitation of the research is that  
i. This research sample size is only 177, owing to time constraints 
ii. The respondents were not that cooperative with providing the answers and they 
had to be given much pressure. 
The research design adapted in this study is descriptive research and the sampling 
technique used is simple random sampling. This section, besides explaining the 
statistical tool required for testing the proposed research hypothesis, has explained how 
the researcher managed to maintain validity and reliability despite several limitations 
involved in conducting the research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. First, this chapter presents a brief history 
of the three enterprises under study. It also provides an analysis and discussion of the 
results concerning the performance of these enterprises before and after privatization in 
terms of profitability, operating efficiency, capital expenditure, output, and 
employment.  
 
Second, it will provide a descriptive analysis in connection with topics, such as 
questionnaire, response rate, and the distribution of frequencies. Next, the study 
hypotheses are tested using ANOVA analysis of variance and regression. 
 
5.2.   Brief history and analysis of the enterprises under study  
 
Three enterprises have been selected in this study as stated in chapter 3 – National Grain 
Silos Ltd, National Cigarette and Match industries Ltd, and Al- Esayi Beverages 
Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden. 
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5.2.1.  Brief History of case study enterprises    
 
 
(i) National Grain Silos Ltd. 
National Grain Silos was established as one of the components of the Yemeni General 
Organization for Grain, which was created by Law No. (126)/1976 and then joined the 
General Corporation for Foreign Trade in 1987.    
 
The new institution began exercising the functions and powers that were vested 
in both the previous institutions, including the management and operation of grain silos 
that operate with a storage capacity of 30,000 tons, the subsequent suction and 
discharge equipment, and packaging of fixed and mobile equipment. 
 
However, starting from 1992, the role and functions of the institution have 
substantially decreased for several political and economic reasons and those relating to 
grain silos following:   
1 - Abolition of the government support for wheat and flour, and leaving the field of 
marketing to the private sector.  
2 - The private sector creates fixed and mobile equipment for packaging in each of the 
ports of Hodeida, Salif, Aden, resulting in reduced activity of the Grain Silos. 
 
According to (Committee established by decision of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
2002) the balance sheet for the year 2000, the losses of the institution were 369,635,667 
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riyals and the 2001 data prepared by the institution indicated that the losses would 
increase to 750 million riyals. On the other hand, it estimated that the size of the actual 
losses were at least 2 billion riyals because of the lack of differences in calculating the 
exchange rate for the value of the remaining installments to the institution with the 
benefits of foreign loans owed by the institution.  
In addition, the report noted that the cash balance of the institution in April 2002 
did not exceed 120 million riyals, and the Committee expected that the amount be used 
to meet the salaries and wages and certain general expenses to the maximum extent until 
the end of July 2002 (Committee established by decision of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
2002).  
 
The Committee concluded that the appropriate option to address the situation of 
the institution was liquidation. The legal justifications relied upon by the Committee 
was the earlier privatizing of the Grain Silos under Cabinet Resolution No. 142 of 2002 
of $ 7.5 million.  
The new company became an independent company on behalf of the National 
Company for Grain Silos Ltd and proceeded for expansion and progress. Where before 
privatization they had a storage capacity limited to only 30000 tons, this had now 
increased to 90000 tons, and, in the future, it is expected to increase to 120000 tons in 
addition to the plan for the establishment of flour mills. 
 
The new company began their improvement with the establishment of five silos, 
storage, accessories for cranes, conveyor belts, high precision scales and the capacity of 
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each silo was 12000 tons. In addition, the automatic vacuum system was updated in 
order to convey this storage capacity, which increased the former productivity by more 
than 50% for two years in a row. 
 
The data were collected for the variables under study of the National Grain Silos 
Ltd for a period of three years prior to the privatization process (1999, 2000, and 2001) 
as well as for three years after the privatization process (2007, 2008, and 2009).  
 
From figure 5.1, we can see that the performance of the National Grain Silos Ltd 
during the period of the study in general was not good. The results of the profitability 
showed that there were negative changes after privatization for all indicators (return on 
sale, return of asset, and return on equity). In addition, other indicators decreased and 
only sale efficiency, capital expenditure to sale increased after privatization. On the 
other hand, employment of the enterprise decreased as it should be after privatization.  
 172 
 
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
-200000
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
2009, sale efficiency 
, 1725086.93
profitabil
ity 
return on 
sale 
return on 
assets
return on 
equity
operating 
efficienc
y 
sale 
efficienc
y 
net 
income 
efficienc
y
capital 
expenditu
re
capital 
expenditu
re to sale 
capital 
expenditu
re to 
assets
output real sale
employm
ent
1999 0.047 0.027 0.179 1099537. 51594.47 0.953 0.547 0.000002 484
2000 0.064 0.032 0.236 1045600. 66405.48 0.936 0.474 0.000001 496
2001 -0.289 -0.046 -0.333 425233.7 -122705. 1.289 0.205 -0.00000 380
2007 0.082 0.049 0.354 1653751. 135547.6 0.918 0.548 0.000002 365
2008 0.087 0.047 0.382 1683613. 146527.0 0.913 0.492 0.000002 365
2009 0.098 0.051 0.442 1725086. 169171.5 0.902 0.467 0.000002 365
Figure 5.1 : National Grain Silos Ltd Performance
 173 
 
 
By looking at the percentages change in figure 5.2 we recognize that the sale efficiency 
was the highest increased percentage change by 299.96% (32% of the indicators) 
followed by capital expenditure to sale which record 27.75% (3% of the indicators) by 
contrary the other indicators records negative percentage changes. Net income 
efficiency and return on equity registered the highest decreased by -138 % (14% of the 
indicators) and -132.94% (14% of the indicators) respectively followed by return on 
sale and return on assets which decreased by -110% (11% of indicators) and -101.28 
(11% of indicators) respectively.   
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Figure 5.2 : National Grain Silos Ltd Percentage change 
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(ii) National Cigarette and Matches industries Ltd 
The national cigarette and matches industries were established in 1978 by merger of the 
Arabian Match Company Ltd (AMCO), which was established in 1970, and the 
National Tobacco and Cigarettes Ltd, which was established in 1973. The company 
produces two kinds of cigarettes and imports roll your own tobacco, and tobacco papers 
from Europe.  
 
It was within the mixed sectors where the Government contributed 80% of the 
capital and 20% private sector contribution; moreover, the Government occupied the 
company administration instead of the private sector as a result of the nationalization 
law, which was practiced in South Yemen before unification, through which a lot of 
private properties were confiscated for the Government. 
 
After unification in 1990, the private sector increased the capital of the company 
with an amount of USD3,000,000 as a result the percentage was edited so that the 
private sector got 60% and the Government got 40% and the administration of the 
company returned to the private sector starting from 1991.  
 
Accordingly, the factory returned to the original owner, who, in turn, began to 
improve and develop the factory in terms of updating machines, increasing the size of 
production, and the establishment of a new factory for tobacco in 2003 at a total cost 1 
billion and 400 million riyals. 
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The data were collected for the variables under study of the National Cigarette 
and Matches Industries Ltd for a period of three years prior to the privatization process 
(1987, 1988, and 1989) as well as for three years after the privatization process (2007, 
2008, and 2009).   
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1988 0.054 0.040 45.55 302753 16269 0.946 0.702 0.040 350.00
1989 -0.003 -0.003 -2.96 336439 -1057 1.003 0.996 0.040 350.00
2007 0.099 1.026 6116.96 233742182303073 0.901 9.384 0.100 332.00
2008 0.087 1.075 5530.92 239273042082424 0.913 11.277 0.100 332.00
2009 0.098 0.831 6744.11 258928692539198 0.902 7.640 0.100 332.00
Figure 5.3 National Cigarette and Matches Industries 
Performance
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The performance of this enterprise after privatization was better than before. From 
figure 5.3, we can see that almost all indicators were increase during the years after 
privatization and only one indicator that was decrease, which was the capital 
expenditure to sale.   
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Figure 5.4 : National Cigarette and Matches Industries Ltd  percentage 
change
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From figure 5.4, we can observe that most of the indicators recorded increasing in the 
percentage change. Net income efficiency record the highest percentage increased by 
24857.98% (40% of the indicators) followed by return on equity which record 23574% 
(38% of the indicators) and the capital expenditure to sale was the only indicator has 
decreased which record -6.63% . 
 
(iii) Al-Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden 
 The factory, which ran from July 26, 1961, consisted of four sections, a section to 
generate steam, Processing Section, Department of Production, and Department for 
carbon dioxide. The factory continued to work efficiently until 1972 when the 
Government issued Law No 8/1972 for the establishment of the National Foundation for 
the packing of soda water. The Act provided nationalization of four companies, 
including Al-Eisayih Company (Canada Dry) and its affiliated facilities and devolved 
ownership to the people represented by the National Endowment for the mobilization of 
carbonated water.   
 
After the unity between the two parts of Yemen, the State started to re-
nationalize property to their respective owners so that the former owners provide a 
request to return their previous property. Thus, the Yemeni Government agreed to return 
the company to their respective owners in 2001 and renamed it the Al-Esayi Beverages 
Co., Ltd. The new company started to work with an appropriate economic and business 
performance while at the same time implementing updates and improvements at all 
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levels of production, mechanization, management and keeping up with recent 
developments in its field.  
 
The data were collected for the variables under study of the Al-Esayi Beverages 
Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden for a period of three years prior to the privatization 
process (1999, 2000, and 2001) as well as for three years after the privatization process 
(2007, 2008, and 2009).  
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The enterprise showed improves in its performance because of the privatization policy. 
From figure 5.5 we can declare that most of the indicators under study were has 
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Figure 5.5 : Al-Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry 
Performance 
 181 
 
increasing during the years of privatization and there is only one indicator record 
decreased which is the capital expenditure to sale.  
 
From figure 5.6, we can observe that the enterprise showed improves in its 
performance as all indicators increased except capital expenditure to sale. The highest 
change indicators was the net income efficiency which record 9690% (76 of the 
indicators) followed by return on equity with percentage change of 1360% (11% of the 
indicators).  
return on sale 
249.93%
2%
return on assets
1019.72%
8%
return on equity
1360.04%
11%
sale efficiency 
96.95%
1%
net income 
efficiency, 
9690% , 
76%
capital expenditure 
to sale 
-14.01%
0%
capital expenditure 
to assets
22.93%
0%
real sale
194.49%
2%
employment
-19.49%
0%
Other
2.509076472
2%
profitability return on sale 
return on assets return on equity
operating efficiency sale efficiency 
net income efficiency capital expenditure
capital expenditure to sale capital expenditure to assets
output real sale
employment
Figure 5.6 : Al-Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden 
percentage change
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5.2.2. Analysis of the enterprises under study 
 Previously, it was noted that the research aimed to test the performance change of the 
enterprises under study after privatization with respect to the change in the mean and 
median values in terms of profitability, operating efficiency, capital expenditure, output, 
and employment. Figure 5.7 demonstrates the result with the sub-framework in Figure 
4.3, which compares  the performance change for the three enterprises under study.  
 
Figure 5.7 : Enterprises Performance Change Result 
Enterprises 
performance 
before 
privatization 
Profitability   
ROS (.06 )
ROA (0.07) 
ROE (9.44)
Operating 
efficiency
SALEFF (713789.80)
NIEFF (71456.13)
Capital 
Expenditure
CESA (0.94)
CETA  (0.61)
Output
SAL (0.63)
Employment
EMPL (314.44)
Enterprises 
performance 
after 
privatization 
Profitability
< ROS (.05 )
> ROA (0.34)
> ROE (2043.42)
Operating 
efficiency
> SALEFF (9985284.57)
>  NIEFF (793365.94)
Output
> SAL (0.81)
Employment
< EMPL (273)
Capital 
Expenditure
> CESA (0.95)
> CETA  (3.35)
VIABILITY OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
t (-0.044) p(.965)
t (1.52)    p(.166)
t (1.988)  p(.082)
t (2.49)  p(.037*)
t (1.79)  p(.11)
t (.045) p(.96)
t (1.79) p(.11)
t (3.16) 
p(.013*)
t (-2.6)
p(.032*) 
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This section will present and discuss the results of analysis using unadjusted 
standard measurements of performance for the selected sample consisting of the three 
privatized companies.  
The empirical results for the three enterprises under study are represented in table 5.1 
and figure 5.7 and discussed as follows  
 
I. Profitability Changes  
 As mentioned previously, the theoretical and experimental studies have shown that 
when ownership transferred from the public to the private sector, this should lead to 
increased profitability of enterprise since the attention of management in the private 
sector is to increase profit in contrast to public sector management.  
The measurement of profitability uses three proxies – return on sale (ROS), return on 
assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) – with a net income measure of profit.   
From table 5.1 we can see the results of the profitability mean changes of the 
privatization as follows: 
 The return on sale recorded decreased insignificantly by -0.003.  The t-test statistic was 
-0.045 and its corresponding p-value was 0.965> 0.05. Since the p-value is more than 
0.05, we can conclude that there is no significant difference between the means of return 
on sale at the baseline and three years after privatization.  
 
The second proxy, which was the return on assets, recorded an insignificant 
increase of 0.271.  The t-test statistic was 1.522 and its corresponding p-value was 
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0.166> 0.05. Since the p value is more than 0.05, we can conclude that there is no 
significant difference between the means of return on assets at the baseline of three 
years before privatization and three years after privatization. 
 
 The third proxy for the profitability, which was the return on equity also recorded an 
insignificant increase of 2033.271.  The t-test statistic was 1.988 and its corresponding 
Table 5.1 : Performance indicators 
 Mean value 
Before 
Privatization 
(Median) 
Mean value 
after 
privatization 
(Median) 
Mean 
change 
due to 
privatization 
T test statistic 
for significance 
of change 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
P(value)  
Profitability  
return on sale  
 
return on assets 
 
return on equity 
 
.06  
(0.05) 
 
0.07 
(0.03) 
 
9.44 
(1.05) 
 
0.05 
(0.09) 
 
0.34 
 (0.05) 
 
2043.42  
(0.38) 
-0.003 
(0.0333) 
 
0.271 
(0.0168) 
 
2033.98 
(-0.6576) 
 
-0.044 
 
 
 1.52 
 
 
 1.988 
 
0.965 
 
 
0.166 
 
 
0.082 
operating efficiency 
sale efficiency  
 
net income efficiency 
 
713789.80 
(684511.4) 
 
71456.13 
(51594.47) 
9985284.57 
(3873981.33) 
 
793365.94 
(146527.02) 
9271494.76 
(3189469.93) 
 
721909.81 
(94932.55) 
 
 2.491 
 
 1.794 
 
0.037
* 
 
0.111 
capital expenditure 
capital expenditure to 
sale 
  
capital expenditure to  
assets 
 
0.94 
(0.95) 
 
0.61 
(0.52) 
 
0.95 
(0.91) 
 
3.35 
 (0.49) 
0.003 
(-0.033) 
 
2.746 
(-0.0245) 
 
 0.045 
 
 1.794 
 
0.965 
 
0.111 
Output 
real sale 0.63 
(0.56) 
0.81 
(0.85) 
0.18 
(.30) 
 3.169 0.013
* 
Employment 
Total employment 314.44 
(350) 
273  
(332) 
-41.44 
(-18) 
-2.600 0.032
* 
*  indicated significant at .05 value  
 185 
 
p-value was 0.082> 0.05. Since the p-value is more than 0.05, we can conclude that 
there is no significant difference between the means of return on equity at the baseline 
of three years before privatization and three years after privatization. 
 
The tests of the three profitability indicators are insignificant at the 5% level, 
which provides insufficient evidence to conclude that there has been an increase in the 
mean (median) due to the privatization program. In other words, this result shows that 
the enterprises have not changed in their profitability after privatization, which indicates 
that those enterprises are facing trouble in their financial management. This finding is 
somehow different from the findings of many profitability studies (e.g. Cowan, 1990; 
Yarrow, 1986; Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Boubakri and Cosset, 1999) that showed an enhancement in the 
profitability of the enterprises after privatization.  
 
II. Operating Efficiency Changes  
 
In order to measure the change in efficiency, two indicators were used – sale efficiency 
(SALEFF) and net income efficiency (NIEFF).  
Both scales showed an improvement of enterprises after the privatization process as it 
recorded a significant increase in the mean (median) of the SALEFF from 713789.80 
(684511.4) before privatization to 9985284.56 (3873981.33) after privatization; 
recording an increase in the mean (median) of 9271494.76 (3189469.93), respectively. 
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The t-test statistic was 2.491 and its corresponding p-value was 0.037< 0.05. 
Since the p value is less than 0.05, we can conclude that there is a significant difference 
between the means of sale efficiency at the baseline of three years before privatization 
and three years after privatization. 
 
The mean difference between the baseline and three years after privatization for 
net income efficiency recorded an insignificant increase of 721909.810.  The t-test 
statistic was 1.794 and its corresponding p value was 0.111> 0.05. Since the p-value is 
more than 0.05, we can conclude that there is no significant difference between the 
means of net income efficiency at the baseline of three years before privatization and 
three years after privatization. 
 
Meanwhile, the sale efficiency (SALEFF) and net income efficiency (NIEFF) 
indicators are insignificant at the 5% level, which provides sufficient evidence to 
conclude that there has been no increase in the mean (median) due to the privatization 
program.  
 
These findings are inconsistent with the foregoing mentioned in the literature review 
(e.g. Cowan 1990; Yarrow, 1986; Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994; 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Boubakri and Cosset, 1999) on the improvement of 
the operating efficiency of the enterprises after privatization. The finding indicates that 
the enterprises inefficiently invested financial and human resources and technology in 
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spite of the presence of competition and the cut of the support that was previously 
provided by the government. 
 
III. Capital Expenditure Changes  
 
For the change in capital expenditure, two ratios were used to measure the change 
expected from the privatization process – capital expenditure to sale (CESA) and capital 
expenditure to assets (CETA).  
 
Both scales showed an improvement in the enterprises after the privatization 
process as it recorded an increase.  The mean capital expenditure to sale for the three 
years before privatization was 0.94 with a standard deviation of 0.16 and the median 
value was 0.95. The mean capital expenditure on sale for the three years after 
privatization was 0.95 with a standard deviation of 0.06 and the median value was 0.91, 
recording an increase in the mean by 0.003. However, the median did not increase but 
decreased by -0.033. The mean value for capital expenditure on assets was 0.61 with a 
standard deviation of 0.27 and the median value was 0.52. After three years, the mean 
was more compared to the baseline 3.35 recording an increase in the mean by 2.746 
with a standard deviation of 4.65 and the median value was 0.49, which decreased by -
0.0245.  
 
The mean difference between the baseline and three years after follow up for 
capital expenditure to sale recorded an insignificant increase of 0.003.  The t-test 
statistic was 0.045 and its corresponding p-value was 0.965> 0.05. Since the p-value is 
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more than 0.05, we can conclude that there is no significant difference between the 
means of capital expenditure to sale at the baseline of three years before privatization 
and three years after privatization. 
 
The mean difference between the baseline and three years after follow up for capital 
expenditure to assets recorded an insignificant increase of 2.7456.  The t-test statistic 
was 1.794 and its corresponding p-value was 0.111> 0.05. Since the p-value is more 
than 0.05, we can conclude that there is no significant difference between the means of 
capital expenditure to assets at the baseline of three years before privatization and three 
years after privatization. 
 
Therefore, this result is at odds with many writers (e.g. Cowan, 1990; Yarrow, 1986 
Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Boubakri and Cosset, 1999) in that the new leadership of the enterprises that have been 
newly privatized tended to increase investment spending in order to enhance the 
performance of the enterprises. The extent gives a sense of how an organization is 
spending for the future so that a reasonable indication of this result is that the new 
leadership of these privatized enterprises did not put in their mind the future of the 
enterprises.  
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IV. Output  
 
Only one indicator was used to measure the output, which is the real sale (SAL). From 
table 5.1 we can observe that the mean real sale for the three years before was 0.63 with 
a standard deviation of 0.17 and the median value was 0.56. For the three years after, 
the real sale was 0.81, which is more than the baseline value with a standard deviation 
of 0.11, and the median value was 0.85.  
 
The mean difference between the baseline and three years after follow up for 
real sale recorded a significant increase of 0.180.  The t-test statistic was 3.169 and its 
corresponding p-value was 0.013< 0.05. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, we can 
conclude that there is a significant difference between the means of real sale at the 
baseline of three year before privatization and three year after privatization.  
 
This finding is similar to the findings of many profitability studies (e.g. Cowan 
1990; Yarrow, 1986; Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Boubakri and Cosset, 1999) that showed an enhancement in the real 
sale of the enterprises after privatization.  
 
V. Employment  
 
For measuring employment, one indicator was used, which is the total employment 
(EMPL) of the enterprises under study during the period of three years before and three 
years after privatization. From table 5.1, we can observe that the mean total employment 
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at the baseline was 314.44 with a standard deviation of 141.9 and the median total 
employment was 350.0. The mean total employment after three years was 273.0 with a 
standard deviation of 114.29 and the median was 332.0.  
 
The mean difference between the baseline and three years after follow up for 
total employment recorded a significant decrease of -41.444.  The t-test statistic was -
2.600 and its corresponding p-value was 0.032>0.05. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, 
we can conclude that there is a significant difference between the means of total 
employment at the baseline of three year before privatization and three years after 
privatization. This finding is similar to many studies, which ended with a decrease in 
the employment of the enterprises after privatization.  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of some increase in 
the measured variables, the performance of these enterprises after the privatization 
process was not better than before the privatization process. This confirms the view of 
the researcher, which is that the privatization process in Yemen is not viable, which 
prompted the researcher to move towards an empirical study on the questionnaire 
design to find out the real reasons behind the lack of feasibility of the privatization 
program. This will be explained in the next section. 
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5.3.  Analysis of Questionnaire  
From the following Table 5.2 we can observe that 39.5% of the respondents belonged to 
the ruling party. The following bar chart also shows taller bars indicating the same. 
Table 5.2 Questionnaire Respondent 
 Frequency Percent 
Academic 
Labor Union 
Opposition Party 
Ruling Party 
TPO 
Total 
24 13.6 
20 11.3 
28 15.8 
70 39.5 
35 19.8 
177 100.0 
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5.3.1. Inferential statistics   
 
In order to determine whether there is a significant difference between different party 
groups and constructs determining general, Policy, Procedure, Objective, Progress, 
Ownership and Evaluation a one-way ANOVA test was applied.  
 
The table 5.3 shows that there was a statistically significant difference between 
different party groups and constructs determining general, at a significance level of 0.05 
with 4 degrees of freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). 
The critical value of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 5.569, which is more than the 
critical value. 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining policy. The table shows that 
there was a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
constructs determining policy, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of freedom 
and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value of F is 
2.42. Since its computed value is 12.971, which is more than the critical value. 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining procedure. The table shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
constructs determining procedure, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of 
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freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value 
of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 2.859, which is more than the critical value. 
 
 
Table 5.3 : ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
General Between Groups 3.533 4 .883 5.569 .000 
Within Groups 27.277 172 .159   
Total 30.810 176    
Policy Between Groups 6.380 4 1.595 12.971 .000 
Within Groups 21.150 172 .123   
Total 27.530 176    
Procedure Between Groups .945 4 .236 2.859 .025 
Within Groups 14.215 172 .083   
Total 15.160 176    
Objective Between Groups 1.955 4 .489 4.621 .001 
Within Groups 18.195 172 .106   
Total 20.150 176    
Progress Between Groups 7.663 4 1.916 14.998 .000 
Within Groups 21.971 172 .128   
Total 29.634 176    
Ownership Between Groups 1.469 4 .367 4.891 .001 
Within Groups 12.916 172 .075   
Total 14.385 176    
Evaluation Between Groups 4.382 4 1.096 7.564 .000 
Within Groups 24.913 172 .145   
Total 29.295 176    
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 A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining objective. The table shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
constructs determining objective, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of 
freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value 
of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 4.621, which is more than the critical value. 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining progress. The table shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
constructs determining progress, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of 
freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value 
of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 14.998, which is more than the critical value. 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining ownership. The table shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
constructs determining ownership, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of 
freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value 
of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 4.891, which is more than the critical value. 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was applied to test if there is any significant difference 
between different party groups and constructs determining evaluation. The table shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between different party groups and 
 195 
 
constructs determining evaluation, at a significance level of 0.05 with 4 degrees of 
freedom and 172 for within group mean squares (variance estimate). The critical value 
of F is 2.42. Since its computed value is 7.564, which is more than the critical value. 
 
5.3.2.    Questionnaire analyses  
 
The next section discusses objectives 1 – 3 & 5 of this study, which is reflected in the 
content of the questionnaire, which is divided into six categories:  
a) General aspects   
 Reasons for deterioration in the public sector management  
The deterioration in the public sector management can attributed to  
1- lack of skills  
2- inefficient administration  
3- lack of supervisor skills  
4- political and administrative corruption 
   From figure 5.8, we can observe that 81.4% of the respondents disagreed for 
lack of skills as the reason for the deterioration in the public sector management, 61.5% 
of the respondents disagreed for inefficient in administration as the reason for 
deterioration in the public sector management, that 71.2% of the respondents disagreed 
for lack of supervision skills the reason for deterioration in the public sector 
management, and 59.9% of the respondents agreed for political and administrative 
corruption as the reason for deterioration in the public sector management.  
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It appears to be objective reasons that make unjustified deterioration in the 
public sector due to political corruption and administrative. The list of these reasons 
include taking senior management positions in production enterprises by a political 
decision without taking into account the efficiency of managerial or experience and 
scientific level required for those positions, the existing administrators are not being 
efficient or lack the scientific qualifications required to sit at the top of the 
administrative structure for production enterprises, which impacted negatively on the 
basis of the administrative structure. 
 
Note: 
Q1.1 lack of skills 
Q1.2 inefficient in administration  
Q1.3 lack of supervision skills  
Q1.4 political and administrative corruption 
 
 
 
Also, improvement  in management decisions and random production plans and 
the lack of attention to the quality and quantity of outputs and weak in the 
Q1.1 Q1.2 Q1.3 Q1.4
strongly agree 2.8 13.6
agree 17.5 35.6 28.8 59.9
diagree 81.5 61.6 71.2 26.6
strongly disagree 1.1
2.8
13.6
17.5
35.6
28.8
59.9
81.5
61.6
71.2
26.6
1.1
0
10
20
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40
50
60
70
80
90
Figure 5.8 : Reasons For Deterioration In The Public 
Sector Management   
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administrative and productive control. Furthermore, weakness of the organizations for 
control and the inability to exercise its power effectively, which lead to the widespread 
embezzlement of public money and properties (Alsayani, 1996). 
 
 Characteristics that should be available in the administrative body responsible 
for privatization                                                                                                                        
 
From figure 5.9, we can observe that 76.8% of the respondents disagreed that free from 
administrative constraints should be available in the administrative body responsible for 
privatization, 62.7% of the respondents disagreed for free from the constraint of routine 
should be available in the administrative body responsible for privatization, 58.8% of 
the respondents agreed that no third party intervention should be available in the 
administrative body responsible for privatization, and 64.4% of the respondents 
disagreed that fair distribution of privatization opportunity should be available in the 
administrative body responsible for privatization.  
 
Therefore, the ranking of the characteristics that should be available in the 
administrative body responsible for privatization became as follows: 
1- no third party intervention 
2- fair distribution of privatization opportunity   
3- free from the constraint of routine 
4- free of administrative constraint  
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Note: 
Q2.1: free of administrative constrain 
Q2.2 free from the constraint of routine    
Q2.3 no third party intervention 
Q2.4 fair distribution of privatization opportunity  
 
 
 
 The privatization law provides a suitable legal environment  
 
From figure 5.10, we can observe that 80.2% of the respondents disagreed that the 
privatization law provides a suitable legal environment to handle the privatization 
program and only 17.5% agreed.  
 
Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 Q2.4
strongly agree 0.6 4.0 4.0 2.3
agree 22.6 33.3 58.8 33.3
disagree 76.8 62.7 37.3 64.4
strongly disagree
0.6
4.0 4.0 2.3
22.6
33.3
58.8
33.3
76.8
62.7
37.3
64.4
Figure 5.9 : Administrative Body Characteristics 
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Note:  
Q3: The privatization law provides a suitable legal environment  
 
 The government of Yemen developed a more comprehensive privatization 
policy and a more aggressive strategy for implementing the privatization 
program. 
 
From figure 5.11 we can observe that 56.5% of the respondents disagreed with the 
Government of Yemen developing a more comprehensive privatization policy and a 
more aggressive strategy for implementing the privatization program followed by 
27.1% of the respondents strongly disagree and only 15.3% of the respondents agreed. 
 
 
 
Q3
agree 17.5
indifferent 0.6
disagree 80.2
strongly disagree 1.7
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Figure 5.10 : Suitability of legal Environment 
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Note: 
Q4: The government of Yemen developed a more comprehensive privatization policy 
and a more aggressive strategy for implementing the privatization program. 
 
 The privatization policy has been effectively implemented 
 
From figure 5.12, we can observe that 66.7% of the respondents disagreed that the 
privatization policy had been effectively implemented followed by 23.7% of the 
respondents strongly disagree and only 9.6% of the respondents agreed that the 
privatization policy had been effectively implemented. 
 
Note:  
Q5: The privatization policy has been effectively implemented 
Q4
strongly agree 1.1
agree 15.3
disagree 56.5
strongly disagree 27.1
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Figure 5.11 : Development of Policy & Strategy for 
Implementing Privatization 
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Figure 5.12 : Privatization Policy Effectively 
Implemented 
 201 
 
 Acceptability of the privatization policy  
 
From figure 5.13, we can observe that 58.2% of the respondents disagreed that, overall, 
the existing privatization policy is acceptable followed by 22% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed and only 19.2% agreed. 
 
 
Note: 
Q6: the overall existing of privatization policy is acceptable 
 Privatization program open to all enterprises  
 
From figure 5.14, we can observe that 81.4% of the respondents disagreed that the 
privatization policy/program is open to any enterprise that wants to be privatized 
followed by 16.4% agreed that it was. 
 
 
 
Q6
strongly agree 0.6
agree 19.2
disagree 58.2
strongly disagree 22
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Figure 5.13 : Acceptability of The Privatization Policy 
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Note: 
Q7: the privatization policy/program is open to any enterprise wants to be privatized 
 
 The privatization program should continue  
 
From figure 5.15, we can observe that 72.3% of the respondents agreed that the 
privatization policy should continue and 26% disagreed that the privatization program 
should continue. 
 
Q7
agree 16.4
indifferent 1.1
disagree 81.4
strongly disagree 1.1
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Figure 5.14 : Privatization Program Applies to all 
Enterprises 
 203 
 
 
Note: 
Q8: the privatization policy should continue  
 
 Intervention of State in the privatization program and policy  
 
From figure 5.16, we can observe that 80.2% of the respondents disagreed that the 
State‟s intervention in the privatization policy should reduce and only 18.1 agreed with 
the intervention of the State. 
Q8
strongly agree 1.1
agree 72.3
indifferent 0.6
disagree 26
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Figure 5.15 : Continuation Of The Privatization Program 
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Note: 
Q9: the state‟s intervention in the privatization policy should reduce 
 
 Privatization is a partisan issue 
 
From figure 5.17, we can observe that 49.2% of the respondents agreed that the 
privatization is a partisan issue, however, 48.6% of the respondents disagreed that 
privatization was a partisan issue.  
 
Q9
strongly agree 0.6
agree 18.1
disagree 80.2
strongly disagree 1.1
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Figure 5.16 : Intervention Of State In The Privatization 
Program And Policy
 205 
 
 
Note: 
Q10: the privatization is a partisan issue 
 
b) Procedural aspects  
  The best methods to carry out the privatization process 
 
From figure 5.18 we can observe that 80.8% of the respondents disagreed that 
total sale is the best method to carry out privatization process, moreover, 71.8% of the 
respondents disagreed that partial sale is the best method to carry out the privatization 
process. In addition, 81.9% of the respondents disagreed that liquidation is the best 
method to carry out the privatization process, and 52.0% of the respondents agreed that 
management contracts are the best method to carry out the privatization process.   
 
Q10
agree 49.2
indifferent 0.6
disagree 48.6
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Figure 5.17 : Privatization Is A Partisan Issue
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Note: 
Q11.1: total sale  
Q11.2: partial sale 
Q11.3: liquidation  
Q11.4: management contracts 
 
 
 The procedures were clear and appropriate  
 
From figure 5.19, we can observe that 85.9% of the respondents disagreed that 
the procedure was clear and appropriate, and only 12.4% of the respondents agreed that 
the procedure was clear and appropriate. 
Q11.1 Q11.2 Q11.3 Q11.4
strongly agree 0.6 1.1 1.1
agree 18.1 26 15.8 52
indifferent 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.1
disagree 80.8 71.8 81.9 45.8
strongly disagree 1.7
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Figure 5.18 : The Best Methods To Carry Out The 
Privatization Process
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Note: 
Q12: The procedures were clear and appropriate  
 
 
 The Procedures were followed when the Government assesses the possibility of 
privatization  
 
From figure 5.20, we can observe that 87.6% of the respondents disagreed that the 
procedures were followed when the Government assesses the possibility of 
privatization, however, only 9.6% of the respondents agreed that the procedures were 
followed.  
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Figure 5.19 : Clearly and Appropriately Of Procedures 
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Note: 
Q13: The Procedures were followed when the Government assesses the possibility of privatization  
 
c) Objective aspects  
 The objective of privatization program is to improve the Government’s 
financial flow 
 
To determine and analyze the ways that the Government improved its financial flow through the 
privatization program three aspects were asked, as follows.  
1- Rising revenue from the sale of assets and shares. 
2- Reducing the need for operating subsidies and investments capital 
3- Increasing tax revenue as a result of increasing enterprises performance  
From figure 5.21, we can observe that 37.9% of the respondents agreed that raising 
revenue from the sale of assets and shares is the objective of the privatization program 
to improve the Government‟s financial flow. In addition, 58.2% of the respondents 
agreed that reducing the need for operating subsidies and investment capital is the 
Q13
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agree 9.6
indifferent 1.1
disagree 87.6
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Figure 5.20 : Followed of  Procedures  
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objective of the privatization program to improve the Government‟s financial flow. 
Nevertheless, 48.0% of the respondents disagreed that increasing tax revenue because of 
improved enterprise performances is the objective of the privatization program to 
improve the Government‟s financial flows. 
The respondents only agreed with two objectives that can improve the Government‟s 
financial flow, which are: 
1- raising revenue from the sale of assets and shares 
2- reducing the need for operating subsidies and investment capital  
While they disagreed with increasing tax revenue as a result of improved 
enterprise performance as an objective of the Government in order to improve 
financial flow.       
 
Note: 
Q14.1: Rising revenue from the sale of assets and shares  
Q14.2: Reducing the need for operating subsidies and investments capital 
Q14.3: Increasing tax revenue as a result of increasing enterprises performance  
 
  
Q14.1 Q14.2 Q14.3
strongly agree 9.6 11.3 3.4
agree 37.9 58.2 33.9
indifferent 3.4 2.3 5.1
disagree 36.2 23.7 48
strongly disagree 13 4.5 9.6
9.6 11.3
3.4
37.9
58.2
33.9
3.4 2.3 5.1
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Figure 5.21 : Privatization To Improve The 
Government’s Financial Flow
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 Political Objectives of Privatization Programs 
 
In order to determine the political pressures that led to adopting privatization, three 
aspects are stated as follows:  
1- budget deficit  
2- the deficit in the balance of external payments 
3-  the pressure from foreign financial authorities e.g. IMF& WB 
From figure 5.22, we can observe that 55.4% of the respondents agreed that budget 
deficit is the objective of the privatization program as one of the political pressures to 
solve urgent problems. In addition, 44.6% of the respondents agreed that the pressure 
from foreign financial authorities is the objective of the privatization program as one of 
the political pressures to solve urgent problems. However, for the question about the 
balance of external payments, we can observe that 50.8% of the respondents disagreed 
that the deficit in the balance of external payments is the objective of the privatization 
program as one of the political pressures to solve urgent problems. 
 
Note: 
Q15.1: budget deficit  
Q15.2: the deficit in the balance of external payments 
Q15.1 Q15.2 Q15.3
strongly agree 6.8 4.5 23.2
agree 55.4 25.4 44.6
indifferent 5.6 9 3.4
disagree 25.4 50.8 19.2
strongly disagree 6.8 10.2 9.6
6.8 4.5
23.2
55.4
25.4
44.6
5.6 9 3.4
25.4
50.8
19.2
6.8 10.2 9.6
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Figure 5.22 : Political Objectives Of Privatization 
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Q15.3: the pressure from foreign financial authorities e.g. IMF& WB 
 
 
 Objective of privatization program are to achieve short-term political goals of 
particular political parties/politicians 
From figure 5.23, we can observe that 44.6% of the respondents agreed that the 
objective of privatization program is to achieve short-term political goals of particular 
political parties/politicians, and 32.2% of the respondents disagreed that the objective of 
the privatization program is to achieve sort-term political goals of particular political 
parties/politicians.   
 
 
Note: 
Q16: Objective of privatization program are to achieve short-term political goals of particular 
political parties/politicians  
 
 
 The objectives that have been achieved from the privatization process 
 
From figure 5.24, we can observe that 93.8% of the respondents disagreed that 
increased production efficiency is achieved from the privatization process. In addition, 
Q16
strongly agree 16.4
agree 44.6
disagree 32.2
strongly disagree 6.8
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Figure 5.23 : Short-term Political Goals
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84.2% of the respondents disagreed that reducing the budget deficit is achieved from the 
privatization process. In addition, we can observe that 89.3% of the respondents 
disagreed that attracting foreign and immigrant capital is achieved from the 
privatization process. In the end, 74.6% of the respondents agreed that none of the 
above was achieved from the privatization process.    
 
 
Note: 
Q17.1: increase production efficiency  
Q17.2: reduce the budget deficit 
Q17.3 attract foreign and immigrant capital 
Q17.4 none of the above 
 
 The motive behind the privatization process 
 
From figure 5.25, we can observe that 52.5% of the respondents agreed that political 
motive is the motive behind the privatization process. However, 85.9% and 60.5% of 
Q17.1 Q17.2 Q17.3 Q17.4
agree 4 13.6 9.6 74.6
indifferent 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.6
disagree 93.8 84.2 89.3 23.7
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Figure 5.24 : The Objectives Achieved From Privatization
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the respondents disagreed that social motive or foreign motives are the motive behind 
the privatization process.   
 
 
Note: 
Q18.1: political motives 
Q18.2 social motives  
Q18.3 foreign motives  
Q18.4 other motives 
 
 
 Policymakers, agency officials and other stakeholders agreed that the goals of 
the privatization have been achieved  
 
From figure 5.26, we can observe that 74.6% of the respondents disagreed that 
policymakers, agency officials and other stakeholders agreed that the goals of the 
privatization have been achieved and only 22% of the respondents agreed that 
policymakers, agency officials and other stakeholders agreed that goals of the 
privatization have been achieved.  
Q18.1 Q18.2 Q18.3 Q18.4
strongly agree 7.3 6.8
agree 52.5 13 31.6 22
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Figure 5.25 : Motive Behind The Privatization Process
 214 
 
 
Note: 
Q19: Policymakers, agency officials and other stakeholders agreed that the goals of the 
privatization have been achieved  
 
 
d)  Progress aspects   
 The reason for the privatization process  
 
From figure 5.27 we can observe that 49.2% of the respondents agreed that the process 
of privatization is to lay off staff, 56.5% of the respondents agreed that the process of 
privatization is to disintegrate enterprises, and 48.0% of the respondents agreed that the 
process of privatization is to increase bureaucratic power.  
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Figure 5.26 : Policymakers, Agency Officials And Other 
Stakeholders Agreed That Goals Of The Privatization 
Have Been Achieved 
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Note: 
 Q20.1: lay of staff 
Q20.2: disintegrate enterprises 
Q20.3: increase bureaucratic power 
 
Therefore, we can rank the reasons of the privatization process as follows: 
1- disintegrate enterprises 
2- lay off staff 
3- increase bureaucratic power   
  
 Who played a major role in the privation process? 
 
When asked about who played the major role in the privatization process we can 
observe from figure 5.28, that 55.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that advocacy 
groups play a major role followed by 50.8% of the respondents strongly agreed that 
private entrepreneurs, private lobbies play a major role in the privation process, and 
42.9% of the respondents agreed that economic/budgetary factors played a major role in 
the privatization process. In contrast, we can observe that 72.9%, 66.1%, 62.1%, 45.8, 
Q20.1 Q20.2 Q20.3
strongly agree 11.3 19.2 12.4
agree 49.2 56.5 48
indifferent 4.5 3.4 8.5
disagree 29.9 17.5 26
strongly disagree 5.1 3.4 5.1
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Figure 5.27 : The Reason Of Privatization
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and 35.6% of the respondents disagreed that, respectively, the union and professional 
organizations, general public opinion, the media, legal factors, and bureaucrat/civil 
servants played a major role in the privatization process. 
 
Note: 
Q21.1: private entrepreneurs, private lobbies 
Q21.2: union and professional organizations  
Q21.3: advocacy groups 
Q21.4: bureaucrats/civil servants 
Q21.5: the media  
Q21.6: general public opinion 
Q21.7: legal factors  
Q21.8: economic/budgetary factors 
 
 
The major role-playing is as follows: 
1- advocacy groups 
2- private entrepreneurs and private lobbies 
3- economic/budgetary factors 
 
Q21.1 Q21.2 Q21.3 Q21.4 Q21.5 Q21.6 Q21.7 Q21.8
strongly agree 50.8 4 55.9 18.1 6.2 3.4 7.9 22
agree 26.6 14.1 22 29.4 13.6 12.4 25.4 42.9
indifferent 7.3 7.3 6.2 15.3 13.6 11.3 18.1 13.6
disagree 14.1 72.9 14.1 35.6 62.1 66.1 45.8 20.9
strongly disagree 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 4.5 6.8 2.8 0.6
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Figure 5.28 : A Major Role Player In The Privatization Process 
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e) Ownership aspects   
 
 All investors have equal opportunities to invest in the privatization program 
 
From figure 5.29, we can observe that 87.6% of the respondents disagreed that all 
investors have equal opportunities to invest in the privatization program and only 8.5 of 
the respondents agreed that all investors have equal opportunities to invest in the 
privatization program. 
 
Note:  
Q22: All investors have equal opportunities to invest in the privatization program 
 
 
It is clear to us that the choice of the investor is not in the correct way as some investors 
have the opportunity to invest while there is another investor that does not have the 
opportunity.   
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Figure 5.29 : Opportunities To Invest In Privatized 
Enterprises  
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 The criteria considered in the investor’s choice 
 
From figure 5.30, we can observe that 49.7% and 67.2% of the respondents agreed that 
social criteria and political criteria, respectively, had been considered in the investor‟s 
choice. For the financial criteria 64.4% of the respondents disagreed that the financial 
criteria had taken at the investor‟s choice.     
                                      
Note: 
Q23.1: financial criterions 
Q23.2: social criterions  
Q23.3: political criterions 
 
 
 The preferred investor to own the enterprise after the privatization 
 
For the question to which investor you preferred to own the enterprise, figure 5.31 
shows that 57.6% of the respondents agreed that putting the company‟s shares for 
public subscription is preferred to own the enterprise after the privatization. Whereas, 
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Figure 5.30 : The Investor’s Choice Criteria 
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85.3%, 78%, and 61% of the respondents, respectively, disagreed that foreign investor, 
single investor, and management and employees at the facility are preferred to own the 
enterprise after the privatization. 
 
Note: 
Q24.1: single investor 
Q24.2: management and employees at the facility  
Q24.3: foreign investor 
Q24.4: people – put the company shares for public subscription  
 
 
 
f) Evaluation aspects   
 
  Scared of the privatization program 
 
From figure 5.32, we can observe that 59.9% of the respondents agreed that many 
people were scared by the privatization program and 23.2% of the respondents 
disagreed that many people were scared by the privatization program. 
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Figure 5.31 : The Preferred Investors
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Note: 
Q25: many people scared from the privatization program 
 
 The reasons that restrain investment in enterprises to be privatized 
 
From figure 5.33, we can observe that 58.2% of the respondents agreed that the 
security constraint is the reason that restrains investment in enterprises to be privatized. 
Whereas 87% and 75.1% of the respondents respectively disagreed that the existence of 
alternative investment and lack of information is the reason that restrains investment in 
enterprises to be privatized.  
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Note: 
 Q26.1: lack of information  
 Q26.2: security constraints 
 Q26.3: the existence of alternative investment  
 
 
 The government did not seek to monitor the enterprise after privatization 
 
When asking about the attempt of the government of monitoring the enterprises after 
privatization, the following figure 5.34 shows that 60.5% of the respondents agreed that 
the government did not seek to monitor the enterprise after privatization and only 12.4 
of the respondent disagreed. Also 23.7 of the respondents strongly agreed, 3.4 strongly 
disagreed that the government did not seek to monitor the enterprises after privatization.  
Q26.1 Q26.2 Q26.3
strongly agree 1.1 15.8 11.9
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Figure 5.33 : Reasons That Restrain Investment In 
Enterprises  
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Note: 
Q27: The government did not seek to monitor the enterprise after privatization 
  
 
 The performance of the enterprises after privatization 
 
For the question about the enhancement of the enterprises performance after 
privatization, the results from the following figure 5.35 shows that 54.2% of the 
respondents disagreed that the performance of the enterprises is enhanced after 
privatization followed by 29.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed. However, 13% 
of the respondents agreed that the performance of the enterprises is enhanced after 
privatization.  
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Note: 
Q28: the performance of the enterprises enhance after privatization 
 
 That the whole program of privatization in Yemen is acceptable  
 
From figure 5.36, we can observe that 49.7% of the respondents disagreed that the 
whole program of privatization in Yemen is acceptable followed by 37.9% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed. In contrast only 11.9% of the respondents agreed that 
the whole program of privatization in Yemen is acceptable.  
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Figure 5.35 : Enterprises Performance After Privatization 
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Note: 
Q29: That the whole program of privatization in Yemen is acceptable  
 
 
 
 The effect of the privatization program in Yemen 
 
The question concerning the effect of the privatization program in Yemen contains 15 
categories and we can observe the answers of the respondents from the following figure 
5.37, which showed that the respondents only agreed with four categories, as follows: 
52.0% of the respondents agreed that an increase in the power of the bureaucrats is the 
effect of privatization, 45.8% of the respondents agreed that an increase in the power of 
the personal goals of public servants rather than the nation benefitting from 
privatization is the effect of privatization, 42.9% of the respondents agreed that 
politicians maximize utility is the effect of privatization, and 40.7% of the respondents 
agreed that politicians gaining popularity is the effect of privatization. In contrast, the 
respondents disagreed with the remaining categories as follows: 61.0% of the 
respondents disagreed that increased employment opportunity is the effect of 
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Program  
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privatization, 55.4% of the respondents disagreed that better quality of goods for public 
is the effect of privatization, 54.8% of the respondents disagreed that increase in foreign 
investment is the effect of privatization, 53.1% of the respondents disagreed that better 
control of privatization mechanism and procedure is the effect of privatization, 51.4% of 
the respondents disagreed that reduced accountability of leader and politicians is the 
effect of privatization, 49.7% of the respondents disagreed that more competition 
among enterprises is the effect of privatization, 49.2% of the respondents disagreed that 
increase in productivity of enterprises is the effect of privatization, 47.5% of the 
respondents disagreed that increase in efficiency of enterprises is the effect of 
privatization, 46.3% of the respondents disagreed that increase in domestic investment 
is the effect of privatization, 45.8% of the respondents disagreed that increase in 
performance and profit of enterprises is the effect of privatization, and 45.2% of the 
respondents disagreed that an increase in domestic consumption is the effect of 
privatization.  
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Note: 
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Q30.2; reduce accountability of leader and politicians  
Q30.3: increase power of bureaucrats  
Q30.4: increase power of personal goal of public servants rather that nation benefits of 
privatization  
Q30.5: increase performance and profit of enterprises 
Q30.6: increase employment opportunity  
Q30.7: increase efficiency of enterprises  
Q30.8: increase productivity of enterprises  
Q30.9: politicians maximize utility  
Q30.10: politicians gains popularity  
Q30.11: better control of privatization mechanism and procedure 
Q30.12: more competition among enterprises  
Q30.13: better quality of goods for public  
Q30.14: increase foreign investment  
Q30.15: increase domestic investment 
Q30.16: increase domestic consumption 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1.  Discussion  
 
 
The condition of Yemen‟s economy deteriorated, and it was not taken seriously by the 
Government until 1995 when the government realized and made efforts to address the 
problem. The Government and the IMF generally believed that the massive inequities 
and imbalances in the aggregate/cumulative accounts had caused the economic decline, 
which became apparent in 1995, when the Government should to look into the 
economic condition more seriously.  
 
In order to handle this serious situation, the Government in conjunction with the 
IMF identified the remedy, which was to come up with a policy and course of action 
that would enable them to reduce the budget deficit and thus help stabilize the economy. 
This would help bring back the economic growth and prosperity by achieving the equity 
in the accounts. The Government made links with the IMF as well as the World Bank in 
seeking their support and aid. This was due to the need for international assistance as 
well as inadequate local resources. In the negotiations, the opposing parties were not 
included and the results of the negotiations were productive in a sense that it produced 
agreements that were significant for economic reform. Being comprehensive, the reform 
program comprised restructuring as well as stabilization policies.  
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In order to support the economic reform, it is a recommendation from IMF to 
government of Yemen to cut down the general expenditure, increase the public revenue 
and redesign the budget, the stabilization policies took various measures. Limits were 
imposed by the IMF on its finances as well as on the budget deficit. According to the 
IMF, the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. Moreover, the budget deficit must 
be covered by public borrowing and not by borrowing from Yemen‟s Central Bank. In 
addition, the Government decided to reduce direct as well as indirect transfers, together 
with reducing salaries and wages. The major revenue is earned through taxes; therefore, 
the Government had to change the tax code and make an effort to improve the tax 
collection system of the Tax Authority (World Bank, 2002).  
 
With the coordination of the Yemeni Government and IMF, the inequities in the 
aggregate account were observed, and they believed that only free economic policies 
could bring stability in the economy and further improve it. Therefore, the Yemeni 
Government adopted the privatization program in the hope of overcoming these 
problems. Although these were the stated motives, as is clear from the results of this 
study, we find that there were hidden motives behind the privatization program in 
Yemen. The experience of privatization in Yemen failed in achieve its objectives and 
goals, which was illustrated by studying those enterprises that have been privatized, 
which amounted to about 100 enterprises from 1995 to date. This study demonstrated 
that most of these enterprises stopped working with a few exceptions; however, these 
enterprises suffer from a lack of efficiency and performance. 
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In this section, we are going to discuss the findings of the study and link it with the 
study questions.  
 
6.1.1. The motives for privatization in Yemen  
 
In early 1995, a privatization program was initiated by the Government of Yemen as 
part of the economic reforms in the hope that the privatization program would help in 
growth concerning the development strategy focusing on improving the environment for 
private segment investment and also in making the resource allocation efficient. 
Moreover, privatization was intended to prioritize the rebalancing of the private/public 
sectors role in the economy. This will result in improved economic efficiency as well as 
quality of services that contain budget deficits and liabilities, and accelerate the private 
sector‟s growth and investment. The Government views the sound privatization actions 
significant to attract the world market and the investors in order to draw their interest to 
conduct business activities in the Middle Eastern countries (World Bank, 2002).  
 
Those were the stated motives, however, from the results of this study we find 
that there were hidden motives behind the privatization program in Yemen. Through the 
answers to the questionnaire, we determined that the motives behind privatization were 
political motives.  For the question concerning the reasons for the deterioration in the 
public sector management, 59.9% of the respondents agreed that political and 
administrative corruption is the reason for the deterioration in the public sector 
management. It appears to be objective reasons that make unjustified deterioration in 
the public sector due to political corruption and administrative. The list of these reasons, 
include taking senior management positions in production enterprises by a political 
decision without taking into account the managerial efficiency or experience and 
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scientific level required for those positions. This is because the existing administrators 
are not being efficient or qualified to remain at the top of the administrative structure for 
production enterprises, which has impacted negatively on the administrative structure. 
This has led to improvisation in management decisions and random production plans, 
the lack of attention to the quality and quantity of outputs and weak administrative and 
productive control. Furthermore, weakness of the organizations for control and the 
inability to exercise its power effectively has led to the widespread embezzlement of 
public money and property (Alsayani, 1996).  
 
By looking at the response concerning the motives behind privatization, 52.5% 
of the respondents agreed that political motive is the motive behind the privatization 
process. This can be supported by looking at another response. For the criterion 
considered in the investor‟s choice, 49.7% of the respondents agreed that social criterion 
considered in the investor‟s choice and 49.2% of the respondents agreed that 
privatization is a partisan issue, which may be the kind of bonuses that are given to 
relatives, friends and political allies in order to achieve political goals. Moreover, 81.4% 
of the respondents disagreed that the privatization policy/program is open to any 
enterprise that wants to be privatized and 85.9% of the respondents disagreed that the 
procedures were clear and appropriate, which means that there was a specific selection 
on some of the enterprises that may have a benefit for a certain group of investors. In 
addition, 87.6% of the respondents disagreed that the procedures were followed when 
the governments assess the possibility of privatization. In doing so, clearly the methods 
that have been followed were not only active in transfer those institutions from the 
cripple to the success but also methods to get rid of those institutions and their 
consequences.  The question concerning the best method to carry out the privatization 
process confirms that view, in that 80.8% of the respondents disagreed that total sale is the 
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best method to carry out the privatization process. Moreover, 71.8% of the respondents 
disagreed that partial sale is the best method to carry out the privatization process. In 
addition, 81.9% of the respondents disagreed that liquidation is the best method to carry 
out the privatization process, and 52.0% of the respondents agreed that management 
contracts are the best method to carry out the privatization process. 
The preferred ranking of the methods to carry out the privatization process are as 
follows:   
1- management contracts 
2- partial sale  
3- total sale  
4- liquidation  
 
Through what was discussed in the literature review, it is clear that the Yemen 
privatization law has addressed the known privatization method and at the same time 
given the privatization committees the right to choose from among those methods, as 
well as any other method the Committees deems appropriate.  In addition, we can see 
the rank of the methods that were used for privatizing industrial and agricultural 
enterprises is as follows: 
1- liquidation  
2- selling the individual asset and leasing the land  
3- total selling 
4- restitution to owner   
5- leasing  
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 This is confirmed by the consensus among the respondents that the procedures were not 
clear and appropriate, and the procedures were not followed when the governments 
assess the possibility of privatization.  
 
Furthermore, when asked about who played the major role in the privatization 
process, 55.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that advocacy groups play a major 
role followed by 50.8% of the respondents strongly agreed that private entrepreneurs, 
private lobbies play a major role in the privation process, and 42.9% of the respondents 
agreed that economic/budgetary factors played a major role in the privatization process. 
This means that those groups are the first beneficiaries of the privatization process in 
Yemen, where the benefit takes the form of material return to those groups directly or to 
satisfy some political allies or to gain political loyalties.   
 
In addition, the response about policy matters supports that the political motive 
is the motive behind the privatization program in Yemen. A total of 80.2% of the 
respondents disagreed that the privatization law provides a suitable legal environment to 
handle the privatization program, 56.5% of the respondents disagreed with the 
Government of Yemen developing a more comprehensive privatization policy and a 
more aggressive strategy for implementing the privatization program followed by 
27.1% of the respondents strongly disagree and only 15.3% of the respondents agreed. 
On the other hand, 66.7% of the respondents disagreed that the privatization policy has 
been effectively implemented and 58.2% of the respondents disagreed that the overall 
existing privatization policy is acceptable followed by 22% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed and only 19.2% agreed. Moreover, 49.2% of the respondents agreed that the 
privatization is a partisan issue.  
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By looking at the reality of the actual experience of privatization in Yemen, we can see 
that most of the institutions were privatized in the period between 1994 and 1999, which 
was before the issuance of the privatization law that has passed through several stages 
as follows:  
 
The council of ministers also issued order number 8 in 1995, which included 
some rules regarding privatization. After that, order number 5 was issued in 1996, 
which included the issues of the required fields to privatize the public and combined 
enterprises. The Prime Minister issued an announcement of developing the Technical 
Privatization Office (TPO) in 1996.  
 
The management of organizational and operational practices for privatization 
was the top priority of Technical Privatization Office TPO and the council of ministers 
decided to settle the shutdown enterprises in 1997. The council of ministers then 
supported privatization approaches in 1998. The Government and parliament finally 
gave permission for the Law of privatization in 1999 (Al-Asaly 2002). 
 
Therefore, it shows us that the privatization law had no role in the organizing 
mechanism for privatization of a wide range of enterprises that have been privatized, 
and this prompted the respondents to say that the privatization law provides an 
unsuitable legal environment to handle the privatization program. In addition, most of 
the respondents disagreed that the Government of Yemen developed a more 
comprehensive privatization policy and a more aggressive strategy for implementing the 
privatization program, the privatization policy has been effectively implemented, or that 
the overall existing privatization policy is acceptable. On the other hand, the 
respondents agreed that the privatization program was a partisan issue and was not open 
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to any enterprise that wanted to be privatized but they agreed that the privatization 
policy should continue and should not reduce the intervention of the State in the 
privatization program/policy. Through the above, clearly the fault is not in the 
privatization law, but in those who are in charge of it. 
 
Although everyone agrees that there were defects in the privatization process in 
Yemen, which led to the ineffectiveness of the privatization law, this does not prevent 
continuing the privatization law and state intervention in the future if it is not a partisan 
issue.  
From the results on pages 191 to 224, it can be concluded that there was a hidden 
motive behind the privatization in Yemen as follows:  political motive, political and 
administrative corruption, pressure from foreign financial authorities, political advocacy 
groups, and private entrepreneurs, private  
  
 
6.1.2. The goals of privatization in Yemen  
 
According to the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 5 /1996 the goals of the 
privatization program in Yemen are as follows:  
1- Relieve bleeding budget resources through the provision of subsidies that the 
State presented to public enterprises that faced a deficit in financial resources.  
2- Rise, increase the efficiency and performance of public enterprises, and activate 
the competitive decisions. 
3- Ending the totalitarian role of the State in the management of the national 
economy and a shift to market economies and not to enter or participate in any 
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new investments except in certain investment cases like strategic projects, which 
are required for the public interest. 
4- Take advantage of the net outcome of the privatization process in the 
development of the sector itself and the payment of installment debts guaranteed 
by the state, as well as use in compensation for termination of employment 
surplus.    
5- Broaden the ownership base of public and state-owned enterprises and distribute 
the ownership of these enterprises to the private sector either completely or in 
part and to encourage ownership and investment in these enterprises by the 
private sector with a competitive form that does not lead to monopoly.   
6- Ensure the flow of new investments, modern sophisticated technology, and 
administrative and regulatory expertise through the contribution/participation of 
the private sector in the ownership of these institutions.  
 
The above, which were the stated goals for the privatization program, could be a 
very great benefit to the Yemeni economy for the advancement of the slump, which 
took place during the period of post-unity and the returning tide of Yemeni workers 
from the Arab Gulf States as well as the civil war that took place in 1994. However, this 
study shows as that there were hidden goals behind the privatization program in Yemen.  
 
By looking at the political pressure that led to privatization, 55.4% of the 
respondents agreed that budget deficit is the objective of the privatization program as 
one of the political pressures to solve urgent problems. In addition, 44.6% of the 
respondents agreed that the pressure from foreign financial authorities is the objective of 
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the privatization program as one of the political pressures to solve urgent problems. 
Since the budget deficit and the pressure from foreign financial authorities ranked as the 
urgent problems that made the objectives of the privatization program one of the 
political pressures, we can say that the privatization program in Yemen is a pragmatic 
type related to the internal crises as the deficit in the state budget. Adopting 
privatization policy provides money spent on those public enterprises in addition to the 
money return from the privatization process without regard to the condition of those 
enterprises. 
 
 As evidenced by the question about the ways that the government improved its 
financial flows, which resulted as follows: 37.9% of the respondents agreed that raising 
revenue from the sale of assets and shares is the objective of the privatization program 
to improve the government‟s financial flow. In addition, 58.2% of the respondents 
agreed that reducing the need for operating subsidies and investment capital is the 
objective of the privatization program to improve the government‟s financial flow. 
From that, we can observe that most of the respondents agreed that the financial 
situation of the State is the most important reason for the country heading toward a 
privatization program. Which leads us to say that the privatization program is a tactical 
goal in which the consensus was on the financial return from the sale or reduction of 
support from the Government and the yield on the long-term goal of improving the 
performance of enterprises, which feed the State treasury tax revenues, did not receive 
support as one of the goals of the privatization program.  
 
Many of the enterprises that have been privatized were operating satisfactorily 
and could have been rehabilitated to operate effectively, but politicians tended to 
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privatize these institutions in order to cover up the failure in fiscal policy, which 
resulted in political and administrative corruption.  
 
As evidenced by the response the privatization program was to achieve the 
short-term political objectives of certain political parties/politicians to satisfy the 
political parties that may be opposed to the policy of the Government or to attract voters 
and supporters in addition to rewarding friends and relatives. A total of 44.6% of the 
respondents agreed that the objective of the privatization program is to achieve the 
short-term political goals of particular political parties/politicians. 
 
The response concerning the goals of the process of privatization confirm the 
validity of this opinion. Whereas 49.2% of the respondents agreed that the process of 
privatization is to lay off staff, 56.5% of the respondents agreed that the process of 
privatization is to disintegrate enterprises, and 48.0% of the respondents agreed that the 
process of privatization is to increase bureaucratic power. Moreover, 87.6% of the 
respondents disagreed that all investors have equal opportunities to invest in the 
privatization program, which means that there has been selection in the choice of the 
investors  
 
According to Feigenbaum et al. (1998), pragmatic privatization occurs as a 
consequence of a crisis, intended at solving the internal budgetary crisis or catering for 
the deficit of external balance of payments along with the devising of an austerity plan. 
Third World countries depict this sort of pragmatic privatization. 
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Decisions are not based on any sort of emptiness; however, the motives here are not 
necessarily honest. Financial conditions might pressurize the external financial 
authorities to make a decision in favor of privatization (Babai, 1988).  
 
Most of the restricted areas and depoliticized undergo pragmatic privatization, 
while political scenarios experience tactical privatization. This privatization caters to the 
political benefits on a short-term basis and may also have a long-term impact 
(Feigenbaum 1989). 
 
The privatization that is pragmatic shows most of the properties regarding the 
organizational viewpoint with one vital difference; while the organizational viewpoint 
shows this collection of properties to be applicable everywhere,  the political viewpoint 
does not deem this privatization to be continuous context episodes. This type of 
privatization is fulfilled by bureaucratic units, which is derived from the push and pull 
of stresses by politicians. 
 
From the above it is clear to us that there were no strategic goals for the 
privatization process in Yemen, only short-term political goals, which follow a 
pragmatic and tactical privatization and far from the structural privatization represented 
in the following goals;  
1-  rewarding political friends  
2- create the base of public support for the government and certain policy 
3- providing benefits to voter  
4- interests of the political parties 
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5- cover for loans from international organizations and donor countries as well as 
debt rescheduling.  
 
6.1.3. Evaluation of privatization program in Yemen (performance of    
enterprises and viability of privatization program)  
 
The condition of Yemen‟s economy deteriorated and was not taken seriously by the 
government until 1995. Subsequently, the government realized and made efforts to 
eliminate the problem. With the coordination of Government of Yemen and the IMF, 
the inequities in the aggregate account were observed and they believed that only free 
economic policies could bring stability in the economy and further improve it. 
 
Negotiations took place between the Government of Yemen, the IMF and the 
World Bank for aid and support in order to enhance the economic growth. The 
negotiations were settled with the signing of a contract concerning the economic reform. 
The particular elements included reducing the expenditure, raising the public revenue as 
well as restructuring the budget (Al-Asaly, 2001).  
Many believe that the privatization process did not work for the Yemeni economy so it 
was necessary for us to study the result of the process of privatization so that we could 
evaluate the process of the privatization program through questions relating to the 
assessment of the privatization process in order to obtain a comprehensive view.  
 
For the question, “Policymakers, agency officials, and other stakeholders agreed 
that goals of the privatization have been achieved” the majority of the respondents 
believed that the process of privatization in Yemen is useless, as the set goals have not 
been achieved. Where 74.6% of the respondents disagreed, and 22% of the respondents 
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agreed that the policymakers, agency officials, and other stakeholders agreed that the 
goals of the privatization have been achieved.  
 
On the other hand, security comes at the forefront of the reasons that hamper the 
privatization process in Yemen, where a record rate of 58.2% of the respondents agreed 
that the security constraint is the reason that restrains investment in enterprise to be 
privatized. In addition, we can see the lack of the seriousness and attention from the 
Government for the success of the privatization process by the response to the questions 
concerning the attention of the Government to monitor enterprises that have been 
privatized. The Government did not seek to monitor the enterprise after privatization, 
where 84.2% of the respondents agree or strongly agree (Figure 4.3) and 15.8% 
disagree. 
 
Accordingly, the answer to the question on people's fear of the privatization 
process was positive in that 59.9% of the respondents agreed that many people were 
scared of the privatization program. This fear comes through clear practices on the 
ground since the start of the privatization process in 1995 until the present time. That 
led respondents to evaluate the privatization program in a negative manner. Through the 
question about the enhancement of the enterprises performance after privatization, the 
results show that 54.2% of the respondents disagreed that the performance of the 
enterprises is enhanced after privatization followed by 29.4% of the respondent strongly 
disagreed. However, 13% of the respondents agreed that the performance of the 
enterprises is enhanced after privatization. In addition, the answer to the question about 
whether the whole program of privatization in Yemen is acceptable or not, comes to 
support the fear of the people for the privatization program. From that answer, we can 
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observe that 49.7% of the respondents disagreed that the whole program of privatization 
in Yemen is acceptable followed by 37.9% of the respondent strongly disagreed. In 
contrast, only 11.9% of the respondents agreed that the whole program of privatization 
in Yemen is acceptable. 
 
Moreover, from the question concerning the effect of the privatization program 
in Yemen it can be concluded from the evaluation provided from the outcome effects of 
the program as a whole. The observation showed that the respondents only agreed with 
four categories. First of all, 52.0% of the respondents agreed that the increase in the 
power of the bureaucrats is the effect of privatization, second, 45.8% of the respondents 
agreed that the increase in the power of the personal goals of the public servants rather 
than the nation benefiting from privatization is the effect of privatization, third, 42.9% 
of the respondents agreed that politicians maximized utility is the effect of privatization, 
and, finally, 40.7% of the respondents agreed that politicians gaining popularity is the 
effect of privatization.   
 Therefore, we can summarize the effect of the privatization in Yemen as follows:  
1- increase power of bureaucrats 
2- increase power of personal goals of public servants rather than nation benefiting 
from privatization through exploitation of their position.   
3- politicians maximize utility 
4- politicians gaining popularity  
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6.1.4. Major problems that affect privatization performance in Yemen 
 
Through the above, we can say that the process of privatization in Yemen is not 
sustainable, as the motives behind the privatization program, as shown by the study, 
were not economically motivated but politically motivated in order to achieve short-
term tactical objectives. So that privatization in Yemen could not be viable because it 
has tactical objectives, which are advocated to achieve the short-term political goals of 
particular parties, politicians, or interest groups (e.g. Attract voters and reward 
supporters, generous award of contracts to gain more supporters, change the political 
interests, and create new interest groups), and pragmatic objects, which are generally 
carried out by bureaucratic units somewhat insulated from the push and pull of normal 
political pressure in order to solve urgent problems (e.g. budget deficit, the deficit in the 
balance of external payments, and pressure from foreign financial authorities, such as 
the IMF and World Bank), more than economic/systemic objects (e.g. improve the 
government‟s financial flow by raising revenue from the sale of assets and shares; 
reducing the need for operating subsidies and investment capital; and increasing tax 
revenues as a result of improved enterprise performance).  
 
We can summarize the major problems that affect privatization the performance 
as follows:   
1-   Continuation of the political interference in the privatization process.  
2- The legality of actions and steps taken at the time of the privatization is 
questionable as well as failure to follow decisions in most cases.  
3- A lack of transparency and clarity in the methods of privatization adopted in 
Yemen.  
4- Change the activity of enterprises that were privatized and often liquidation 
of a lot of enterprises in spite of the possibility of continuing to work. 
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5- The lack of effective marketing of enterprises offered for privatization. 
6- Discourage a style of IPO share, which, in turn, achieves expansion of 
corporate ownership. 
7- Negligence of the Government to monitor the work of enterprises that have 
been privatized. 
8- The motive behind the privatization process was not to improve the status of 
enterprises as it was for purely political purposes.  
 
6.2. Conclusion  
6.2.1. Summary of results  
 
The process of research and analysis of the main and sub questions reached important 
results and recommendations, listed as follows.  
1-   For the results of the evaluation of the performance of the three enterprises 
(National Grain Silos Ltd, National Cigarette and Match industries Ltd, and Al-
Esayi Beverages Company Ltd Canada Dry/Aden), the study concluded that 
although these institutions still continue to work, the performance change of the 
enterprises under study after privatization with respect to the change in the mean 
and median values in terms of profitability, operating efficiency, capital 
expenditure, output, and employment were not good as most indicators were not 
clear evidence that progress has been achieved as a result of the privatization 
process.  
2- The researcher found that there were hidden motives behind the privatization 
process, which are completely different to the stated motives, which had a clear 
effect not on the deterioration of the privatization process, but on the deterioration of 
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the economic situation in Yemen in general. The motives varied between politically 
motivated and foreign motives, albeit politically motivated was the basis behind the 
privatization process in Yemen, where the political players used it as a tool to 
improve their political and financial support. The procedures followed when 
conducting the privatization of an enterprise was different to what it should be in 
order to give preference to someone close or pro politicians to be able to get the 
enterprise. Therefore, we have seen that most of the enterprises have been privatized 
before the formal issuance of the privatization law from parliament. Moreover, the 
privatization law passed in 1999 was not observed in most cases. In addition, the 
political and administrative corruption was among the essential supporters for the 
process of privatization to obtain huge revenues from the sale or rental of such 
enterprises in addition to loans granted to the project from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.  
3- The study proved that there were hidden goals behind the privatization program in 
Yemen. These were political goals represented by the political pressure to solve 
urgent problems, to achieve short-term political goals of particular political 
parties/politicians, to increase bureaucratic power, and used as a cover in order to get 
more loans from international organizations.  
4-  The outlook of the privatization program in Yemen showed that a lack of feasibility 
followed such a policy in a country like Yemen where most goals set for the 
program have not been achieved, and it has increased the fear of people from 
continuing to follow the program in light of the deterioration evident in the political 
situation, administration, spread of bribery, and political corruption. 
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5- The main problem of the deterioration of the privatization program in Yemen is that 
the motives behind the privatization program were political rather than economically 
motivated in order to realize short-term tactical goals. 
6- The success of the economic reform programs and privatization is not measured 
simply by the implementation of policies and procedures and not simply the number 
of companies that were sold; broadening the base of private property is not a goal in 
itself.  
7- Following the policy of a free economy and the dictates of the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund may not be successful in third-world countries, 
especially Yemen, where the focus is on certain economic reforms, as it overlooked 
the political reforms and administrative, which is the basis for the success of 
economic reform policy, in general, and privatization, in particular.   
 
 
6.3. Contribution of the study  
 
The idea of government sowing the seeds from its own expansion is not a new one. The 
battle between a government‟s thirst for control and power, and public liberty was a 
major concern of Western democratic theorists, namely, Alexis de Tocqueville and John 
Stuart Mill. However, these concerns were reduced when a legal framework for the 
protection of citizen‟s rights and government bureaucratization was drawn up during the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century. The government was seen as a system that worked 
for the benefit of the citizen instead of constraining them while the institutionalized and 
professionalized civil services painted the government‟s image as that of a tool used for 
implementing the public goals (Putnam, Aberbach, & Rockman, 1981).  As a result of 
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this, the growth of the government was seen as an expansion of people‟s will instead of 
personal liberty.  
 
Over a period of twenty-five years, many theories have surfaced that consider 
government to be an independent element in the economy that can sustain force toward 
its expansion. Many sociologists have provided a base for this perspective in regards to 
organizational theory. Nonetheless, controversial theories have also been formed based 
on public choice and autonomous state. Over the years, the concept of privatization 
rapidly spread globally and was adopted by many countries.  
 
There are many reasons for opting for the policy of privatization, such as the 
potential benefits that may come as part of the policy as well as the macroeconomic 
reform package that it offers along with other stimulating components for a country‟s 
economy in the form of improved products and services, investment, increase in capital 
or access to foreign markets.  
 
It has already been stated that the key motives for the progress of the state-owned 
companies in the developed, and, particularly, in the developing nations, were political 
in nature and that the state-owned institutions were the main tool for the accumulation 
of the power among the elites who were governing these countries. A particular political 
duty was given to the public sector in Western Europe to act as a patron of social well-
being and economic progress together with proper facilities for the populace and full 
employment. It made a very significant contribution in the Third World where it acted 
as a tool for legitimization of the anti-elitist governments by offering services and goods 
at very low price, creating employment opportunities, welfare facilities together with 
fundamental health facilities, education and shelter given by the SOEs or by the 
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government, support and relocation of income together with the white-collar jobs in the 
state-owned enterprises to the agents of certain social groups.  
 
Consequently, a balanced increase in the expectations of the society for the 
government to resolve the current issues appeared along with the increase in the 
demands by the government to control the dealings between the government and the 
society. This occurrence was termed as “a ruling bargain” by Daniel Brumberg, which 
seemed fairly appropriate for the majority of the developing nations even though he was 
concentrating solely on the Middle Eastern and North African countries. The ruling elite 
transacted their privileges to the autonomous political action in response to the promise 
made by them to deliver social wellbeing (Brumberg, 1991). This was made 
conceivable through the earnings from the sale of oil, payments of people working in 
the foreign countries, external debts, etc. This financed the development of the 
incompetent state-owned enterprises and the social well-being projects. If economic 
progress was viable and enough resources were available to distribute among most of 
the people, all appeared okay. 
 
In the late 1970s, it became evident that this conciliation could not be carried out 
any further. The augmented rates of national responsibilities for the government in the 
society and the economy frustrated the leaders about their ability to cope with 
macroeconomic and social consequences. Similarly, the cynicism about the 
government‟s ability to resolve the increasing problems also grew. It was high time that 
the duties of the government be curtailed through the expectations of the people, which 
in itself were political in nature. At this time, the problem of privatization was made a 
part of the agenda to assist the government to forego duties, which led to the 
circumstances leading to the political fiasco (Ikenberry, 1990).  The developing 
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countries provided an excellent example of this where the unnecessary intervention of 
the government in the economy positioned to bring about success had curtailed growth 
by ignoring the business class, the poor decision making in terms of investment and 
various expensive errors. Since the political leaders had the complete control over the 
domestic economy, the responsibility for the fiasco could not be shared with others 
(Harik and Sullivan, 1992). 
 
The majority of the research carried out on the political aspects of privatization 
reveal that even those governments who had total control over the economy agreed to 
the fact that privatization was a means to restructure the proper boundaries of 
responsibility of the government instead of leaving the space for the public community. 
Concurrently, privatization does not suggest that by detaching parts of the state-owned 
enterprises, the leaders are forfeiting their means of manipulating political and social 
consequences. In the majority of developing nations, the people who benefited from this 
procedure were those who had connections with the government. Fred Lawson indicates 
that in the case of Iraq, for example, privatization even strengthened the Government by 
directing the capital to the armies in the main social alliances and that the prospective 
enemies of the government never benefit from this process (Chaudhry 1992). The 
tyrannical power of the dictatorial governments is hardly affected by privatization. 
Additional economic steps could always be helpful in the instances of unanticipated 
political outcomes where economic restrictions are relaxed. Furthermore, the departure 
of the government from large sections of the economy is not consistent with the 
required regulation of the interaction between capital and the labor, and between buyers 
and the sellers. This burdens the entrepreneurs as they become targets of the prospective 
displeasure of the people thereby stabilizing and even strengthening the place of the 
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government as the sole conciliator irrespective of the economic and social consequences 
in the state. 
 
According to Kikeri et al. (July, 1992), privatization is considered as a strong 
policy that can bring more improvements compared to the SOEs, such as removing 
excess labor and thus increasing economic competition. Authors also cite the reason for 
governments pursuing privatization as being because of international lending and/or 
international agency persuasion or pressure, which if the governments follow, may 
allow them to increase the international funding or get new loans (Leeds, 1991).  
 
In addition, in an article written by Robert Poole (1988), namely, „Privatization: 
Providing Better Services with Lower Taxes‟ provides another reason for opting for 
privatization that governments have become too big to handle the activities, which turn 
into bureaucracy and reduces the efficiency.  
 
This is for the developed countries, but in the developing countries, especially 
the Arab countries, the privatization program has not achieved success. It has proven its 
failure in many Arab countries that have adopted it, where the government chooses the 
option of privatization based on other practical reasons. For example, in the Middle 
Eastern and North African countries, the economic liberalization came into being 
without the enforcement of new and irregular regimes. This revolution was led by the 
very politicians who were against liberal policies in the past but were forced to make 
changes according to new circumstances. The Arab States were among the first 
countries to respond to calls for privatization in which several Arab governments started 
selling many government installations, and without controls.  
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Similar experiences of developing countries in terms of the strategy and methods 
of privatization, as well as in terms of the goals and motives behind the privatization 
process, led to a striking similarity in the output of the privatization process in many of 
those countries where most of those experiments failed and did not meet their goals.   
 Through this study, we conclude that privatization, as an economic policy, is 
inadequate for Yemen and Arab countries, in general, in such a political and social 
environment. The result from the implementation of the privatization policy is 
catastrophic to those countries where it has been used by influential politicians, 
stakeholders and the ruling political parties, as it has led to more corruption and looting 
of public money and loading the people with more debt.  
 
Therefore, the interests of the Arab governments (e.g. more money and fund) 
met with the interests of the donor countries and international organizations (e.g. more 
liberal) in the process of privatization.  
 
Privatization appeared as a mechanism to swallow small economies around the 
world where the importance of privatization towards economic recovery for the peoples 
of the third world was considered as the way for third-world countries to follow for the 
Eradication of Poverty. These rumors were promoted by the World Bank, the IMF, and 
Western companies, and the United States and Western allies used their influence to 
enforce the Third World governments to sell the public property to the private 
companies, which has become one of the conditions for the support of Western donor 
institutions accordingly. All these pressures came to force these countries for more 
liberal orientation and globalization system that lead then to walk into the orbit of those 
countries without regard to the interests of the peoples. This is what people have 
realized in a number of Arab countries, recently, which led people to rising up against 
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the corrupt governments in the so-called the Arab Spring revolution in the hope of 
changing these corrupt regimes, new systems carry the concerns of people and guided 
the nation towards progress and the desired goal. 
 
6.4. Political problem in Yemen  
 
According to Enders (2002), an international report compared Yemen with 188 
countries on six aspects of governance. The results showed that in five categories, 
Yemen ranked in the lower 25% of all the countries. Regarding corruption control, 
Yemen fell into the 15th percentile. The rankings for political stability and rule of law 
are even lower. By considering the 19 nations of the North Africa and Middle East, 
even then Yemen‟s governance ranking is fairly poor. Regarding the violence and 
political instability, only Afghanistan and Iraq have lower ratings than Yemen.  From 
the 19 nations, Yemen‟s ratings are as follows:  
• Corruption and rule of law: 16th 
• Government effectiveness: 15th 
• Regulatory framework: 14th 
It is only in voice and accountability that Yemen‟s performance earned a higher 
rank (6th in the 19 MENA nations) (Enders, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, on the failed state Yemen‟s condition worse in the aspects shown in table 
6.1, The Failed States Index is based on the twelve primary social, economic and 
political indicators. 
 
Social Indicators 
1.  Mounting Demographic Pressures 
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2.  Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons 
3.  Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group 
Paranoia 
4.  Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 
 
Economic Indicators 
5.  Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 
6.  Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
 
Political and Military Indicators 
7.  Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 
8.  Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 
9.  Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and 
Widespread Human Rights Abuse 
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites 
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors 
 
From figure 6.1 we recognize that Yemen worsening on the failed of state 
started from 2007 until 2012. In 2007, Yemen scored 93.2 and ranked as number 24 of 
the failed state, in 2008 scored 95.4 and ranked 21, 2009 scored 98.1 and ranked 18, in 
2010 scored 100 and ranked 15, and in 2011 scored 100.3 and ranked as number 13 of 
the worst failed state.  
 254 
 
Figure 6.1 Multi-Year Pressures Trend of Yemen 1 
 
Source: Messner (2012). 
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Table 6.1 Failed State Index Data 2012 1 
 
Source: Messner (2012). 
 
 
6.5. Security problems  
 
Republic of Yemen appears inclined to civil warfares, although in a lot of events these 
were sort of proxy warfares or bounded to particular areas.  The  war  of  1994  that  
defeated  the  effort  of  the  past  PDRY leaders to revert the clock comprised inward 
about esteem a good continuation of the borderline clashes between YAR and PDRY 
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prior to uniting and doesn't represent a civilian war in the exact common sense. Even so, 
the Yemeni government addresses a lot of primitively socio-economic or political 
struggles since menaces to inner security and overreacts from deploying the armed 
forces and/or surety engaging, so often aggravating the situation. 
 
A lot of Yemeni population have firearms located in their hands, with estimates 
indicates the existence of between 5-10 million firearms. Usually these weapons are 
used in those conflicts between the tribes, as well as conflicts between tribes and the 
government, despite these efforts recently to disarm these weapons out of the hands of 
citizens, violence is still rampant in Yemen. 
 
Although Yemen's neighbors do not constitute a real threat to the security of 
Yemen, military spending is high for a country as Yemen that scored in 2006 about 
6.6% of GDP. Somalia is the most problematic neighbor to Yemen despite the lack of a 
common land border where the impact of failure of the Somali State to Yemen from 
several aspects, including the increasing number of Somali refugees in Yemen, the 
increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Yemen.  
 
On the other hand there are several threats to the internal security of Yemen 
represented in multiplication of numbers of Islamist militants belonging to the so-called 
al-Qaeda, which carried out a series of attacks on Western tourists in addition to the 
bombing of the USS Cole, as well as the attack on the French tanker Limburg. Besides 
the breadth of land and maritime borders of Yemen increased the percentage of entering 
large numbers of non-Yemeni militants returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
Africans illegally. Add to that the ongoing geopolitical conflict in the northern regions 
of Yemen, especially in the region of Saada, which has seen six wars starting in 2004. 
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6.6.  Recommendations  
 
The crises suffered by Yemen during the period of unity were represented by the first 
Gulf War and the resultant return of large numbers of Yemeni workers from the Gulf 
States. Furthermore, the integration of two different systems of political approach, and 
the civil war in 1994, had a deep impact on the deterioration of the Yemeni economy. 
This prompted the Government of Yemen to cooperate with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund in order to carry out political and economic reforms and 
provide the necessary support for the process of reforms by the donor countries and 
relevant international organizations.  
 
Privatization came in the forefront of those reforms but failed as a result of 
the above-mentioned reasons, and here we must make recommendations that we 
believe are necessary for the success of such a program.  
 
1- There must be transparency and clarity in privatization methods and procedures, 
also, it should has the full power, individual and independency in its decisions away 
of political pressure. Goals must be clear and specific and not just for financial 
return. It must look beyond the financial return of the privatization program where 
the development and operation of the enterprises with high efficiency after the 
privatization process should be among the main goals, thereby leading to 
achievement of the overall objectives of the privatization as an economic recovery, 
good performance and high efficiency of privatized enterprises.   
2-  In as much as the study proved that the privatization policy cannot be applied in the 
presence of political and administrative corruption, it must provide the political and 
administrative environment before applying economic reforms. This can be done 
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through the application of political and administrative reforms first and the 
elimination of administrative and political corruption, nepotism and then proceed 
with the privatization program.  
3- In as much as the study proved that there were political goals represented by the 
political pressure to solve urgent problems, to achieve short-term political goals of 
particular political parties/politicians, to increase bureaucratic power, and used as a cover in 
order to get more loans from international organizations, it must work to mitigate 
the influence of bureaucratic, advocacy groups, private entrepreneurs, and private 
lobbies from interference during the privatization process. 
4- In as much as the study proved that there were politically motivated was the basis 
behind the privatization process in Yemen, where the political players used it as a 
tool to improve their political and financial support. The procedures followed when 
conducting the privatization of an enterprise was different to what it should be in 
order to give preference to someone close or pro politicians to be able to get the 
enterprise. It must work to abolish the use of public enterprises as a political tool to 
achieve political goals and to reward friends and political supporters and the 
reduction of government interventions that do not aim to raise the efficiency of the 
facility in the first place.   
 
5- Under The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) Act No 39 of 
1992, this governing authority has been declared as the ultimate auditing authority 
within Yemen. The COCA‟s responsibilities include conducting audits, developing 
accountancy and the auditing profession within Yemen, and controlling public 
funds. Nevertheless, the privatization law (45)/1999 did not mention that the COCA 
is the responsible in control of privatization and this is confirmed by actions in 
reality. So that it should Enable the Central Organization for Control and Auditing 
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to fulfill its role in reviewing and checking accounts for those enterprises that are 
implementing procedures for privatization.   
6-  The privatization Law specifies the development of the High Committee and 
Technical Privatization Office to make sure the completion of regulated, impartial 
and transparent privatization methods because of the disagreement of coordinating 
between several ministries and enterprises. The Technical Privatization Office TPO 
is likely to act as an administrative unit for Higher Committee HC, which is 
responsible for maintaining records and other secretarial duties, such as formulation 
of privatization plans, mainly by reconsidering proposals and observing their 
implementation. There were setbacks in the programs of the department‟s 
committees signifying the enterprises to be privatized because of overlapping 
accountabilities of different departments. Ministries severally developed their 
internal committees to privatize some of the enterprises under their authority. These 
committees of the ministries contributed in each action of the process (such as in 
approving the short list of consultants and the report that the eventual consultant 
submits) when the TPO was accountable for privatization. This contribution caused 
disagreements between the TPO. Therefore, it has to be an independency of the 
Technical Privatization Office and reduction of the intervention in the powers and 
decisions of the Technical Privatization Office and its committees.   
7- Feigenbaum et al (1998) Mentioned that IMF and World Bank have a role in the 
transfer of political ideas from one place to another and with little taking into 
account the countries boundaries as well as internal issues. This pressure played by 
international organizations designed to undermine and determine the role played by 
such political forces that support the expansion of the state. As a condition of 
lending to Third World countries, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund claim those countries following the privatization plans first. While 
 260 
 
international lending institutions may be satisfied if a country merely introduces 
market principles into the public sector, rather than full-scale sale of assets, 
liberalization is the price of the loan. Feigenbaum et al (1998) give example of the 
pressure that played by IMF and World Bank  
“In thirty-eight structural adjustment loans to developing countries from 1980 
to 1986, the World Bank recommended liquidation or divestiture of state-assets 
in twenty-five of them. In addition, they recommended increased market 
orientation of state firms in thirty-six of the thirty-eight loans. When the 
international financial community is in a position to provide Third World 
leaders with immediate injections of funds, in-kind services, and a degree of 
legitimacy, local governments may be induced to liberalize for tactical reasons, 
even if their leaders are not convinced of the long-term advantages of free 
markets for the majority of their citizens”.  
Therefore adopting measures commensurate with the circumstances of the country, 
and not scrambling behind that the dictates of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which is not feasible in country such as Yemen, where there 
is a lack of objective views about the situation in general. It must take into account 
the development of developing countries. Every country has its specifics, which 
differ from another, and requires different reforms.      
8- Simply the implementation of policies and procedures or simply the number of 
companies that were sold does not measure the success of the economic reform 
programs and privatization; broadening the base of private property is not a goal in 
itself. Thus, the real objectives behind the privatization are to improve the economic 
efficiency as well as the quality of the services that contain budget deficits and 
liabilities, private sector growth and acceleration of investments. 
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َظشا نًتطهببث إكًبل دساستي انجبيؼيت أتقذو بهزا الاستبيبٌ 
نهحصىل ػهى بؼض انًؼهىيبث راث انصهت بًىضىع انذساست وأقذس 
كًب أؤكذ نًٍ . كبيم انتقذيش نًٍ شبسك في إكًبل هزا الإستبيبٌ
يشبسك ببنسشيت انكبيهت نهًؼهىيبث انىاسدة في هزا الاستبيبٌ 
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  :-تعود أسباب التدىور في القطاع العام الى  -1
      عدم وجود الميارات  - أ
 عدم كفاءة الاداره - ب
   نقص الميارات الرقابية - ت
     
      الفساد السياسي والاداري   - ث
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 لبرنامج الخصخصة؟  
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برنامج الخصخصة يسري عمى /قانون, عمى حد عممك -7
 جميع المنشآت المراد خصخصتيا 
  
 
 تدخل الدولة في قانون الخصخصة يجب أن يقَمص   -8
 
  
 
 قانون الخصخصة يجب أن يستمر الأخذ بو   -9
  
 
 
 برنامج الخصخصة في اليمن مسألة حزبية  -01
 
 
 الطرق الاتية ترى أنيا الامثل لإنجاز عممية الخصخصة -11
      البيع الكامل - أ
      البيع الجزئي  - ب
 التصفية  - ت
 التأجير - ث
     
 
كانت الإجراءات عند القيام بعممية  -21
 الخصخصة واضحة ومناسبة 
 
 
اوافق 
 بشدة
اعارض  اعارض محايد اوافق
 بشدة 
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تم إتباع الإجراءات المحددة عند قيام الحكومة بتقييم إمكانية  -31
 القيام بعممية الخصخصة 
 
 
  :-أىداف برنامج الخصخصة ىو لتحسين الوضع المالي لمحكومة بواسطة -41
      واردات الحكومة من خلال البيع أو المشاركةرفع  - أ
      تخفيض الدعم الحكومي المقدم لتمك المؤسسات  - ب
تحسين الواردات الضريبية كنتيجة لتحسين الأداء لتمك  - ت
 المؤسسات 
     
 
 
  :-كانت أىداف برنامج الخصخصة نتيجة لضعوط سياسية لحل أزمات ممَحة ىي -51
 
      عجز الموازنة  - أ
      العجز في ميزان المدفوعات الخارجي   - ب
      ضعوط خارجية من قبل مؤسسات التمويل الأجنبية   - ت
 
 
برنامج الخصخصة كان لتحقيق أىداف سياسية قصيرة   -61
 . سياسيين /المدى لإحزاب سياسية معينة
 
   
 أي من الأىداف التالية ترى أنيا تحققت كنتيجة لعممية الخصخصة ؟    -71
      زيادة الكفاءة الأنتاجية  - أ
      تخفيض العجز في الموازنة العامة لمدولة - ب
      إجتذاب رؤوس الاموال الخاصة المياجرة والأجنبية - ت
      لاشئ مما سبق - ث
 
  :-الدوافع التي كانت وراء القيام بعممية الخصخصة ىي  -81
 
      دوافع سياسية  - أ
      دوافع إجتماعية  - ب
      دوافع خارجية  - ت
      دوافع اخرى  - ث
 
اعارض  اعارض محايد اوافق اوافق بشدة
 بشدة 
     
     
  872
 
, عمى حد عممك ىل تعتقد أن صناع السياسة  -91
المساىمين موافقين أن أىداف عممية , المكاتب التخصصة 
 الخصخصة قد تحققت؟ 
 
 
    تت عممية الخصخصةأ -02
   تسريح موظفي المؤسسات  )a
 إنياء كيان المؤسسات  )b
  زيادة اليروقراطية  )c
 
 
المتغيرات الاتية دورا اساسيا في سير عممية الخصخصة / المؤسسات /كيف لعبت المجموعات  -12
 ؟
      متعيدي القطاع الخاص وجماعات الضغط - أ
      والنقابات المينية المنظمات  - ب
      الجماعات السياسية  - ت
      الموظفين المدنيين     / البيروقراطيين  - ث
      وسائل الاعلام  - ج
      الرأي العام  - ح
      تشريعية / عوامل قانونية  - خ
      عوامل إقتصادية وخاصة بالموازنة العامة  - د
 
حظي كل مستثمر بفرص متساوية للإستثمار في  -22
 المؤسسات المراد خصخصتيا 
 
 المعايير الاتية تم الأخذ بيا عند إختيار المستثمرين  -32
 
      معايير مالية  - أ
      معاييرسياسية - ب
      معايير اجتماعية  - ت
 
 
 المجموعات التالية تفضل أن تؤول اليو المنشأة بعد خصصتيا   -42
      مستثمر مفرد - أ
      الإدارة والعاممين في المنشأة     - ب
      مستثمر اجنبي  - ت
      الاكتتاب العام        - ث
اوافق 
 بشدة
اعارض  اعارض محايد اوافق
 بشدة 
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 كثير من الناس متخوفين من برنامج الخصخصة -52
 
 
 الاسباب التي تعيق المستثمرين من الإستثمار في إحدى المنشات المراد خصخصتيا ىي  -62
 
      نقص المعمومات  - أ
      معوقات أمنية - ب
      إستثماريةوجود بدائل  - ت
 
 
الحكومة ليس لدييا الاىتمام بمراقبة المنشات بعد  -72
 خصخصتيا 
 
 
 تحسن اداء المنشأة بعد عممية الخصخصة  -82
 
 برنامج الخصخصة بشكل عام في اليمن مقبول  -92
 
 
 :-تأثير برنامج الخصخصة في الجميورية اليمنية  -03
 
      الحد من مسئولية الموظفين العموميين - أ
      الحد من مسئولية القياديين والسياسيين - ب
      زيادة نفوذ البيروقراطيين    - ت
 إزدياد المطالب الشخصية لمموظفين العموميين أكثر - ث
 من المنفعة العامة لمخصخصة   
     
      تحسين اداء المؤسسات وربحيتيا - ج
      زيادة فرص العمل - ح
      تحسن كفاءة المؤسسات  - خ
      إنتاجية المؤسساتزيادة  - د
      زيادة المنفعة الخاصة بالطبقة السياسية - ذ
      زيادة شعبية المتنفذين السياسيين - ر
      تحسن أسموب وطريقة عمل برنامج الخصخصة - ز
      زيادة التنافس بين المؤسسات  - س
      تحسن جودة السمع  - ش
      تزايد الاستثمار الاجنبي - ض
اعارض  اعارض محايد اوافق اوافق بشدة
 بشدة 
     
     
     
     
  082
 
      المحميتزايد الاستثمار  - ط
      تزايد الاستيلاك المحمي - ظ
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 APPENDIX B   Questionnaires in English  
 
Dear brothers/sisters  
Due to the requirements of my PhD in public administration under a 
research title (the viability of privatization in Yemen), I would be 
conducting a survey to obtain some data that are relevant to this research. 
Therefore, I would appreciate very much if you would kindly participate by 
being one of my respondents to help me in my research. You can be rest 
assured that ALL THE INFORMATION IN THIS SURVEY WILL BE 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Lastly but not least, I would like to take 
this opportunity to thank you for your valuable and kind support. 
Abdullah Alameer 
Faculty of economic and public administration  
University of Malaya  
  
Please tick whichever is appropriate from questions from 1 to 30 
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 STRONGLY 
AGRRE 
AGREE INDIFFERNT  DESAGREE STRONGLY 
DESAGREE 
1- Reasons  for deterioration in 
the public sector 
management :- 
 
     
     
     
     
a) Lack of skills  
b) inefficient in 
administration  
c) lack of supervision skills 
d) Political and 
administrative corruption  
 
2- The following characteristics 
should be available in the 
administrative body responsible 
for privatization. 
 
 
a) Free of administrative constrain 
 
     
     
     
     
b)  Free from the constraint of 
routine 
c) No third party intervention 
d) Fair distribution of privatization 
opportunity   
  
3- The privatization law provides a 
suitable legal environment to 
handle the privatization 
program. 
 
 
     
4- The government of Yemen 
developed a more 
comprehensive privatization 
policy and a more aggressive 
strategy for implementing the 
privatization program. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
 
     
     
5- The privatization policy has 
been effectively implemented. 
6- The overall existing of 
privatization policy is 
acceptable.  
7- The privatization 
policy/program is open to any 
enterprise wants to be 
privatized. 
8- The privatization policy should 
continue. 
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 STRONGLY 
AGRRE 
AGREE INDIFFERNT DESAGREE STRONGLY  
DESAGREE 
9- The state‟s intervention in the 
privatization policy should reduce. 
 
     
 
10- The privatization is a partisan issue.  
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
     
     
 
     
11- The following methods are best to carry 
out the privatization process. 
a) Total sale 
b) Partial sale  
c) Liquidation  
d) management contracts 
12- The procedures were clear and 
appropriate. 
13- The Procedures were followed when the 
governments assess the possibility of 
privatization. 
 
14- The objectives of privatization program 
is to improve the government‟s 
financial flows by 
a) raising revenue from the sale of 
assets and shares 
b) reducing the need for operating 
subsidies and investment capital 
c) increasing tax revenues as a 
result of improved enterprise 
performance 
 
 
     
     
     
 
15- The objectives of privatization program 
are one of the  political pressures to 
solve urgent problems  
 
     
     
     
a) Budget deficit  
b) The deficit in the balance of external 
payments 
c) The pressure from foreign financial 
authorities e.g IMF&WO 
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STRONGLY 
AGRRE 
AGREE INDIFFERNT DESAGREE STRONGLY 
DESAGREE 
 
16- The objectives of privatization program 
are to achieve short-term political goals 
of particular political parties/politicians. 
     
 
17- The following objectives have been 
achieved from the privatization process. 
 
a) Increase production efficiency                              
     
     
     
 
b) Reduce the budget deficit 
c) Attract foreign and immigrant capital  
d)  none of the above 
 
18-  the motives behind the privatization 
process from your point of view are:-  
 
a) Political motives       
     
     
     
 
b) Social motives  
c) Foreign motives  
d) other motives 
19-  Policymakers, agency officials, and 
other stakeholders agreed that goals of 
the privatization have been achieved.  
 
20-  The process of privatization is to  
a) lay of staff 
b) disintegrate enterprises  
c) Increase bureaucratic power  
 
 
     
     
     
  
21-  The following groups/organization/ 
factors play a major role in the 
privatization process.  
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
a) private entrepreneurs, private lobbies 
b) Union and professional organizations  
c) Advocacy groups  
d) Bureaucrats/ civil servants   
e) The media  
f) General public opinion  
g) Legal factors  
h)  Economic/budgetary factors  
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 STRONGLY 
AGRRE 
AGREE INDIFFERENT DESAGREE STRONGLY 
DESAGREE 
 
  
22- All investors have equal opportunities 
to invest in the privatization program. 
     
 
23- The following criteria had taken at the 
investor's choice.  
 
a) Financial criteria       
     
     
 
b) Politic criteria 
c) Social criteria 
24- The following groups are the preferred 
to own the enterprise after the 
privatization.  
 
a) Single investor  
     
     
     
     
 
b) management and employees at the 
facility  
c) foreign investor 
d) People - put the company's shares for 
public subscription 
25-  Many people scared from the 
privatization program.  
 
     
  
26- the reasons that restrain investment in 
enterprises to be privatized are:-  
 
a) Lack of information       
     
     
 
b) Security constraints  
c) the existence of alternative 
investment 
27- The government did not seek to monitor 
the enterprises after privatization. 
 
     
 
28-  The performance of the enterprises 
enhance after privatization.  
     
 
29-  The whole program of privatization in 
Yemen is acceptable.  
 
     
 
30- The affect of privatization :-   
a) reduce accountability of public 
servants 
b) Reduce accountability of leader and 
politicians  
     
     
     
 
c) Increase power of bureaucrats  
d) Increase power of personal goal of 
public  servants rather than nation 
benefit of   privatization  
     
 
e) Increase performance and profit of 
enterprises  
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f) Increase employment opportunity       
 
     
 
 
g) Increase efficiency of enterprises  
h) Increase productivity of enterprises       
     
     
 
i) Politicians maximize utility  
j) Politicians gains popularity  
k) Better control of privatization 
mechanism and       procedure  
     
     
 
l) More competition among 
enterprises  
m) Better quality of goods for public       
     
 
n) Increase foreign investment  
o) Increase domestic investment        
     
 
p) Increase domestic consumption  
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APPENDIX C1 All Yemeni Privatized Companies  
 
 
 Enterprises  Enterprises  Enterprises 
 
1 
Yemen Corporation For Textile 
Industries 
18 Usan Biscuit Factory 35 General Organization For Trade 
Of Building Materials \Aden 
2  
Oil Installations Jehev 
19 Automated Bakeries 36 Yemen Company For Free 
Trading 
3  
The Revolution Factory Of 
Steel Products 
20 Tomato Paste Factory 37 General Organization For Building 
And Housing/ Aden 
4  
Factory Of Farming Tools And 
Metal 
21 Public Institution For 
Drinks 
38 General Organization For 
Manufacturing Complexes/Sana’a 
5  
Factory Of Leather Shoes 
22 Badjil Factory For 
Spinning And Weaving 
39 General Corporation For Foreign 
Trade And Grains 
6  
The Martyrs Factory Of 
Clothes 
23 National Cigarette And 
Match Industries Ltd 
40 State's Share In Marib Insurance 
Company \ Sanaa 
7  
Industries Skin Cooperative 
24 Alganady Factory For 
Plastic 
41 General Corporation For Services 
And Marketing Of Fish/ 
Hadramout 
8  
Vegetable Oil Factory 
25 General Consumer To 
The Staff Of The State 
42 National Tanning Factory \ Aden 
9 Women's Sewing Cooperative 26 Plant Hire Agricultural 
Machinery/ Seiyun 
43 National Corporation For Soft 
Drinks (Canada Dry) \ Aden. 
Al-Esayi Beverages Company Ltd 
Canada Dry/Aden 
10  
Popular Bakery 
27 Old Poultry Farm 
Fouh/Hadramout 
44 Soap Factory \ Aden 
11  
Public Institutions For Drilling 
28 New Poultry Farm 
Fouh/Hadramout 
45 General Corporation For Poultry \ 
Aden 
 
12 
Public Institutions Of 
Vegetables And Fruits 
29 Hammam Ali Farm 46 Crescent Hotel \ Aden 
 
13 
 
National Navigation Company 
And Unloading Cargo 
30 Company Of Production 
And Marketing Of Salt 
And Gypsum/ Salif 
47 Rock Hotel \ Aden 
 
14 
National Company For 
Medicines 
Aden 
31 National Company For 
Sponge And Metal 
Furniture Co., Ltd. 
48 Aden Hotel 
15 Industrial Bank 32 (I)         National Grain 
Silos Ltd./ Ports Of 
Hodeida 
49 Arwa Suite\ Aden 
16 Soap Factory 33 General Company For 
The Production Of 
Vegetable Seed \ 
Hadramout 
50 Stone House Hotel \ Sana 
17 Public Dairy Institutions 34 Emulsion And Paint 
Company/Aden 
51 Gail Bawazir Suite\ Hadramout 
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 Enterprises  Enterprises   
52 Praise House Hotel \ Sana 89 Aden Movenpick Hotel   
53 Hotel Thula \ Sana 90 Elephant Bay 
Restaurant/Aden 
  
54 Land Of Gardens Hotel \ Marib 91 Gold Mohur Hotel/Aden   
55 Alqettn Suite \ Hadramout 92 Coast Resort/Hadramout   
56 Ambassador Hotel \ Eden 93 Automated Bakery   
57 Peninsula Palace Hotel \ Aden 94 Spinning And Weaving 
Factory/Aden 
  
58 Liberty Hotel \ Aden 95 Perfume Factory/Aden   
59 Mukalla Hotel\ Hadramout 96 Tanning 
Corporation/Aden 
  
60 People Hotel\ Hadramout 97 Textile Production 
Factory 
  
61 Dome Palace Hotel \ 
Hadramout 
98 Fish Canning Factory/ Al 
Mukalla 
  
62 Al Sharq Hotel \ Hadramout     
63 White Gold Hotel \ Abyan     
64 Negev Suite\ Shabwah     
65 Khormaksar Casino\ Aden     
66 Thousand Nights Restaurant\ 
Aden 
    
67 Sea View Hotel \ Aden     
68 Yemenia Agency For 
Tourism/Aden 
    
69 Top Top Storehouse \ Aden     
70 Tawahi Bar \ Aden     
71 Rex Restaurant \ Aden     
72 Aalghemndan Park \ Lahj     
73 Modeah Hotel \ Abyan     
74 Liberty Cinema \ Aden     
75 Port Cinema \ Aden     
76 Eastern Cinema \ Aden     
77 Balqees Cinema \ Aden     
78 Civil Cinema \ Aden     
79 Azal Cinema \ Aden     
80 Dar Saad Cinema \ Aden     
81 People Cinema \ Aden     
82 14th October Cinema \ Abyan     
83 14th October Cinema/ 
Hadramout 
    
84 Mukalla Cinema\ Hadramout     
85 Maala Cinema \ Aden     
86 Seed Production Company/ 
Seiyun 
    
87 26 September Hotel/Aden     
88 Abyan Suite/Abyan     
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APPENDIX C2 Companies were Liquidated and no Longer Exist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Enterprises  Enterprises  Enterprises 
 
1 
The Revolution Factory Of 
Steel Products 
10 Industrial Bank  
19 
Yemen Company For Free 
Trading 
2  
Factory Of Leather Shoes 
11 Public Dairy Institutions 20 General Organization For 
Building 
And Housing/ Aden 
3 The Martyrs Factory Of 
Clothes 
 
12 
Usan Biscuit Factory 21 General Organization For 
Manufacturing 
Complexes/Sana’a 
4 leather Cooperative 
Industries 
13 Tomato Paste Factory  
22 
General Corporation For 
Foreign 
Trade And Grains 
5  
Vegetable Oil Factory 
14 Public Institution For 
Drinks 
23 General Corporation For 
Services 
And Marketing Of Fish/ 
Hadramout 
6 Women Sewing 
Cooperative 
15 Consumer Association of 
State officials and the 
public&mixed sector 
 
24 
National Tanning Factory \ 
Aden 
7  
Popular Bakery 
16 Company Of Production 
And Marketing Of Salt 
And Gypsum/ Salif 
25 General Corporation For 
Poultry \ Aden 
8 Public company For Drilling 17 National Company For 
Sponge And Metal 
Furniture Co., Ltd. 
26 Yemen Corporation For 
Textile 
Industries 
9 Public Institutions Of 
Vegetables And Fruits 
18 General Organization For 
Building Materials Trading 
\Aden 
27 Vegetable Oil 
Factory/Abyan 
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APPENDIX C3 Companies That Privatized Before Privatization Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Enterprises  Enterprises 
 
1 
Alganady Factory For 
Plastic 
15 Al Sharq Hotel \ Hadramout 
2 Alganady Factory For 
Plastic 
 
16 
Negev Suite\ Shabwah 
3 Aden Hotel 17 Khormaksar Casino\ Aden 
4 Gail Bawazir Suite\ 
Hadramout 
18 Thousand Nights Restaurant\ Aden 
5 Praise House Hotel \ 19 Sea View Hotel \ Aden 
6 Hotel  
Sana 
\ Sana Thula 20 Yemenia Agency For 
Tourism/Aden 
7 Land Of Gardens Hotel 21 Top Top Storehouse \ Aden 
8 Alqe\ttMn Siubite \ 22 Tawahi Bar \ Aden 
9 Ambassador Hotel \ 23 Rex Restaurant \ Aden 
 
10 
Peninsula Palace Hotel 
\ Aden 
24 Aalghomndan Park \ Lahj 
11 Liberty Hotel \ Aden 25 Modeah Hotel \ Abyan 
12 Mukalla Hotel\ 26 People Cinema \ Aden 
13 People Hotel\ 27 Perfume Factory/Aden 
14 Dome Palace Hotel \ 
Hadramout 
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APPENDIX C4 Companies are No Longer Working 
 
 
 Enterprises  Enterprises 
1 Soap Factory \ Aden 18 Balqees Cinema \ Aden 
2 Badjil Factory For 
Spinning And Weaving 
19 Civil Cinema \ Aden 
3 Spinning And Weaving 
Factory/Aden 
20 Azal Cinema \ Aden 
4 National Company For 
Medicines 
Aden 
21 Dar Saad Cinema \ Aden 
5 Oil Installations Jehev 22 14th October Cinema \ Abyan 
6 Automated Bakeries 23 14th October Cinema/ 
Hadramout 
7 Factory Of Farming Tools And 
Metal 
24 Mukalla Cinema\ Hadramout 
8 Old Poultry Farm 
Fouh/Hadramout 
25 26 September Hotel/Aden 
 
9 
New Poultry Farm 
Fouh/Hadramout 
26 Abyan Suite/Abyan 
10 Crescent Hotel \ Aden 27 Aden Movenpick Hotel 
 
11 
Rock Hotel \ Aden 28 Elephant Bay 
Restaurant/Aden 
12 Arwa Suite\ Aden 29 Gold Mohur Hotel/Aden 
13 Automated Bakeries 30 Coast Resort/Hadramout 
14 Stone House Hotel \ Sana 31 Automated Bakery 
15 Liberty Cinema \ Aden 32 Tanning 
Corporation/Aden 
16 Port Cinema \ Aden 33 Textile Production 
Factory 
17 Eastern Cinema \ Aden 34 Fish Canning Factory/ Al 
Mukalla 
 35 White Gold Hotel \ Abyan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 292 
 
APPENDIX C5 Available Privatized Enterprises To - Date 
 
 
 Enterprises  Enterprises 
1 National Navigation Company 
And Unloading Cargo 
7 National Corporation For Soft 
Drinks (Canada Dry) \ Aden. 
Al-Esayi Beverages Company 
Ltd 
2 National Cigarette And 
Match Industries Ltd 
8 General corporation for Land 
Transport 
3 Plant Hire Agricultural 
Machinery/ Seiyun 
9 Seed Production Company/ 
Seiyun 
4 National Grain 
Silos Ltd./ Ports Of 
Hodeida 
  
5 General Company For 
The Production Of Vegetable Seed 
\ Hadramout 
  
6 Emulsion And Paint 
Company/Aden 
  
 
 
APPENDIX C6 Availability of Data for Privatized Enterprises Who Granted 
Approval  
 
 
1 
National Cigarette And 
Match Industries Ltd 
 
2 
National Grain 
Silos Ltd./ Ports Of 
Hodeida 
 
3 
National Corporation For Soft 
Drinks (Canada Dry) \ Aden. 
Al-Esayi Beverages Company Ltd 
Canada Dry/Aden 
 
